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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with theoretical aspects which
underlie the establishment of a methodological framework which
i) takes into account the problem characteristics of the field of
built environment; ii) investigates the implications of these problem
characteristics on the type of architectural knowledge which can be
produced and also on the limits of the methods employed for
obtaining it; iii) evaluates the operational value of this know¬
ledge at the level of design practice.
There are three major proposals made for the methodological
framework. The first emphasizes its structural character. The
second identifies problems of organization and production of
artificial space as furnishing the specific domain of its empirical
orientation. The third argues the necessity for this framework to
maintain an operational link with architectural practice at the
level of the architectural prototype. /
The particular epistemological paradigm invoked in order to
evolve the framework is the structuralist approach, which consists
of many strategies. The structuralist strategy which has been
systematically operationalized within the context of the thesis is
(borrowing the term from linguistics) the syntagmatic one, where
special emphasis is placed on the priority of the synthetic level of
consideration in the investigation of architectural realities.
The potential and limitations of the structural syntagmatic
framework to deal comprehensively with the complexity and dynamics
of architectural structures has been explored, as has the contrib¬
ution it makes to.the elucidation of the concept of the architectural
prototype. The study of prototypes is proposed as a productive
research paradigm which furnishes the key-link between (and provides
for the conceptual unity of) architectural theory and architectural
practice.
Two interconnected areas of research on prototypes are suggested.
0
The first relates to the investigation of the prototypic potential of
A
the built environment, while the second relates to the development of
design-specific prototypes. The thesis offers an illustrative example
of the second area of research, which is evolved within the constraints
of a new group of polyhedra independently identified and characterized
by the author. The architectural extensions of this example and its
potential for further development are explored.
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The search for new methodological frameworks is, of course,
not new. It is customary to advocate such a search whenever a
discipline reaches a certain level of maturity or alternatively
(to paraphrase Kuhn, 1970) whenever it is in a state of crisis.
In the case of the present crisis which architecture is commonly
acknowledged to be in, it is the difficiency of its theories which
is accepted as the cause for concern, rather than their over-
maturation. One particular manifestation of this difficiency has
long been identified in the shape of the so-called 'applicabi1ity
gap'. This has prompted and continues to prompt calls for a new
methodological framework under which research would be differently
organized in order that its results could be more effectively
linked to design practice.
Unfortunately, the majority of these calls have been limited
to criticism of past methodological efforts. There are, however,
a number of positive contributions of design-theoretic interest
available in the literature, though their comprehensiveness varies.
Some of these have been made use of in elucidating aspects of the
kind of methodological framework proposed in this thesis.
The particular contribution from which this thesis has gained
most is the collaborative work carried out by the author and his
colleagues, Drs T. Kotsiopoulos and T. Maravelias. The two papers
describing this work are included as Appendices I and II. The
specific points within the main text which relate directly to these
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two appendices have been duly acknowledged. Of considerable help
also have been the active interest, and numerous critical comments
of my supervisor Professor C.B. Wilson. However, the specific view
presented in the thesis and the arguments associated with it remain
those of the author.
There are usually two major reciprocal aspects to any methodo¬
logical framework. One is conceptual, the other is empirical.
The first provides the abstract tools and establishes the theo¬
retical basis on which any such framework is articulated and
apprehended. The second identifies the domain of its operation which
gives it its particular character and constitutes the basic reference
by which it realizes both its potential and its limitations.
In terms of architecture, the first aspect relates to architec¬
ture as a particular conceptual mode for the study of the built
environment and its object-systems and structures. By necessity,
such a level is predominantly descriptive where description is taken
to include explanation. The second (that is the empirical) relates
to architecture as a practice for producing the built environment.
This is fundamentally design-specific in character. Now, since
architecture operates both as a conceptual mode and as a practice,
the ultimate effectiveness for any of its theories is governed by
issues of practice. This is an operational requirement and it
emphasizes that architectural theories are predominantly theories
about practice or should at least evolve in close relationship to
the practice they hope to influence. It is by keeping a.strong
link with issues of practice that the usefulness of these theories
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can be properly evaluated. It is, therefore, strategically
important to clarify the nature of this link in order to safeguard
the practical importance of theoretical investigation.
The discussions contained in this thesis are concerned for
the most part with the conditions under which this link can be
maintained and further strengthened. The thesis does not, however,
belong to the debate on design methods or techniques proper, but
more importantly to the field in which the basic assumptions of
developing or using any such method or technique can be justified.
There is no intention to present a completely formalized
methodological framework. This is undoubtedly a task beyond any
individual effort within the time-scale of a PhD thesis. The aim
is to propose a working perspective which can be made increasingly
rigorous, and whose underlying premises, potentials and limitations
are fully exposed. Within the confines of the thesis, several
important aspects of this perspective have been identified and
related to similar efforts.
There are three major proposals made for this perspective.
The first is that it should be 'structural'. Secondly, that it
should take 'space' as its first objective basis, since this gives
its specific architectural character and limited empirical orienta¬
tion. Thirdly, that it should seek an operational link with
practice at the level of 'the architectural prototype'.
C
The high level of logical complexity and multidsciplinary
integration involved in all types of built environment object-
systems means that they should be viewed as architectural totalities
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before deciding which of their many particular aspects deserve
further attention and before choosing the conceptual tools appro¬
priate for their investigation. In the view presented in this
thesis, this is a structural requirement. The framework envisaged
is, therefore, structural, and the particular paradigm invoked
in order to evolve this framework is the 'structuralist approach'.
However, the extension of structuralist thinking to architecture
has been contextually defined, first, by insisting that it should
be (borrowing the term from linguistics) 1syntagmatic1, and,
second, by operational izing the syntagmatic framework within the
context of architecture.
The syntagmatic framework accepts the necessity of syntax as
an organizing principle in any coherent system, but also insists
on the simultaneous involvement of the 'semantic dimension' in
its adequate investigation. The proper strategy, therefore, is
not to argue the primacy of one dimension over the other, but to
investigate (within the context of the system under consideration)
the dialectical involvement of each in generating the necessary
conditions for the other without being reduced to it. The level
at which this operates is the syntagmatic level. Though still
abstract (that is it does not belong to the surface level), the
most important characteristic of the syntagmatic level is that it
is a highly synthetic one. And while it allows for a variety of
syntaxes, it is usually dominated by systems of social evaluation
which are historically originated. This is typical of the nature
of architectural structures. Methodologically, therefore, the
system of social evaluation which is historically dominant at the
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time plays an internal structural role not only in terms of the
production of particular architectural realities, but also in
terms of the methodological tools employed in their study.
While architectural theories are of necessity multidisciplinary,
there are aspects of them which make them specifically architectural.
These, in the main, revolve around the idea of the coherent
artificial organization of space for the purpose of human habitation
and activity, and the meaning of that space and its enclosing forms
for its users and for society as a whole (Oakley, 1970, p.162).
Hence the view taken in this thesis is that architectural space
should provide the empirical domain against which the validity of
methodological frameworks is to be evaluated: whatever helps the
understanding and production of this space helps the understanding
and production of architecture. As a reality, architectural space
embodies a natural component (environmental fields) a tectonic
component (the architectural body or building) and a human component
(the producing/consuming subject). In its totality, it exists
only through the interaction of these components between and within
themselves.
At the design specific level, however, concern with architec¬
tural space must be closely related to its production; mainly, but
not exclusively, through the preconceptions of those who design
it. In general, these preconceptions are based on complex
processes which reflect the internalization of equally complex
spatial prototypes or schemata in the structure of which
environmental, socio-economic, cultural, and other aspects of the
built-environment have been well integrated. The influence of
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these already structured prototypes on any new act of design is
initially decisive and it may continue to be so throughout the
design process and beyond (at the level of consumption). The
methodology proposed in this thesis suggests a structural"
syntagmatic approach based on the notion of prototype. It is the
study of prototypes which is seen to present the most appropriate
operational link between (and provide for the conceptual unity
of) architectural theory and design practice.
The main text of the thesis is divided into four parts. Part I
includes Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, gives the general orientation of
the thesis and establishes the need for the development of an inte¬
grated methodological framework.
Chapter 1 is a critical examination of the theoretical formula¬
tions whose premises originated outside architecture. It argues
the case for domain-specific theories of architecture and the
necessity of involving issues of design practice at the very bases
of their formulation. A feasible strategy is for theory to operate
at the level of the architectural prototype.
Chapter 2 traces the historical emergence of space-consciousness
in architecture. It provides evidence for the epistemic and
methodological importance of developing an appropriate conception of
space in both architectural theory and practice.
Chapter 3 carries out a critical review of some major approaches
to space which are active now in the field of environmental studies.
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It identifies a variety of positive concepts and terminological
tools which these approaches have produced.
Chapter 4 attempts a general elucidation of the concept of
architectural space. This eventually focuses the attention on the
logical complexity involved in dealing with built environmental
realities as totalities. As a methodological consequence, the
need for a structural approach becomes more urgent.
Part II consists of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and contributes to the
formulation of the structural framework.
Chapter 5 discusses the contribution which the structuralist
paradigm makes to the development of this framework. The extent
to which this contribution is accepted is guided by its architectural
relevance and limited to its ability to involve the specific character¬
istics of architectural object-systems.
Chapter 6 is concerned with equipping the structural framework
with syntagmatic interpretation paying special attention to problems
of meaning and evaluation. The degree to which the concepts of the
linguistic syntagm and the architectural prototype are comparable is
systematically analysed, and an operational definition of the latter
in terms of the former is conducted.
Chapter 7 develops the syntagmatic structural framework further
by involving issues of description and descriptive theories in
architecture. The close connection between theory and practice in
architecture is once again re-emphasized.
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Part III is subdivided into Chapters 8 and 9. It elaborates
the discussion on the notion of the architectural prototype and
explores its potential at two levels; i) as a design tool; and
ii) as a research tool.
Chapter 8 investigates the idea of prototype in conjunction
with a series of similar notions advanced in the literature. The
conceptual influence these notions have on reorientating design
theory is discussed and the way this reorientation supports the
approach developed in the thesis is evaluated.
Chapter 9 suggests two areas of research on architectural
prototypes. The first is concerned with investigating the proto-
typic potential of the built environment and is termed'prototypic
analysis'. The second is the development of'design-specific proto¬
types', where new prototypes are to be proposed and analysed, and
their problem-solving capacity in response to certain problem-fields
is to be assessed.
Part IV consists of Chapter 10. It offers a preliminary
example which illustrates the possibility of developing design-
specific prototypes within the constraints of particular spatial
forms. The example presented is based on a new group of polyhedra
independently identified and characterized by the author.
Part IV is followed by a set of general conclusions which
summarize the major arguments in the thesis and re-emphasize the
importance of research on architectural prototypes.
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There are three Appendices. Appendices I and II (which are
a reproduction of two papers written collectively by the author and
his colleagues Drs. T. Kotsiopoulos and T. Maravelias) supplement
the whole thesis, particularly Part II. Appendix III is exclusively
graphical and is especially designed to supplement Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 1
ARCHITECTURAL THEORY, DESIGN METHODS AND SPATIAL DESIGN:
A GENERAL CRITIQUE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Current critical accounts of theoretical developments in
architecture reflect a continued dissatisfaction with these
developments and their manifest inability either to maintain a
demonstrable influence over the course of particular approaches to
design or to make a sustained contribution to the resolution of
outstanding methodological issues facing everyday architectural
practice. This inadequacy can be attributed to many sources, but
traceable to two basic ones. The first is the increasingly weaken¬
ing architectural basis of theoretical formulations,and the second
is the pervasive reluctance on the part of theorists to take
sufficient account of specific problem characteristics of architec¬
tural practice in the first place. Relevant to this is the fact
that the scientific frameworks which inform these theoretical formu¬
lations, the vocabularies they employ, the main issues they discuss
and the evaluative measures and criteria of usefulness they apply
remain aprioristic and faithful to the parent disciplines from which
they originate rather than reflecting a genuine concern for their
architectural specificity or design practicabi1ity.
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Now, it is suggested here that the resulting state of
o<_
dissociation and disinterest (generally ascribed to so-called
'applicability gap') on behalf of practitioners towards both the
theories advanced and the research results produced justifies the
proposition that new theoretical efforts should reflect a dual
concern. On the one hand, they should maintain a high level of a
domain-specific architectural identity which may, therefore, have
a direct bearing on the limits of what they can achieve. On the
other, they should attempt to address questions of architectural
practice at the very bases of their formulation. Imperative to
such a 'theoretical-practice1 is a conscious reorientation in
emphasis from theories whose bases are external to architecture
and stubbornly remain so, to theories whose nature is indigenously
architectural or principally organized in close connection to
architectural empirical reality and problems.
To advocate such a reorientation, however, is neither to deny
the importance of the contribution of other disciplines nor to imply
an isolation of architecture (the multidisciplinariness of the pheno¬
mena its theory attempts to describe and the products its practice
envisages and produces is undisputable). Rather it is a realization
that, first, there can be no theory for investigating an aspect of
the built environment which is totally divorced from a theory of the
built environment itself. Secondly, architecture besides being a
conceptual mode for studying the built environment, is also a
practice for producing it. Therefore, it has to accept the duty of
accounting for its design actions. This means that as products of
architectural activity, built environment phenomena should be
explained within a recognizably coherent architectural perspective,
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rather than simply dealt with in an ad hoc fashion by immediate
reference to other disciplines.
The contribution of other sciences is, of course, of the
utmost importance, but the analytic results obtained on their
bases have limited explanatory power if they are not considered
under broad architectural contexts. To this effect, architect¬
ure must unquestionably raise the problem of what is specific to
it and what is not, and together with this develop coherent
methodological frameworks within which disciplinary criteria of
relevance can be imposed on what it borrows and claims to be
pertinent to its problems. Otherwise, and although the continued
ad hoc search for analogies and metaphors may leave a residue of
useful notions and ideas (as occasionally it does), sucha search
is most unlikely to succeed under the severe demands of such
a highly product-orientated and practice-laden discipline like
architecture.
This chapter seeks a clarification of this argument and
extends the discussion to explore the limitations of uncritical
use of external models and imported theories through a short
critique of two types of modern formulation whose theoretical
bases have been largely exogenous to architecture. This refers
to the so-called systematic design methods and their closely
linked counterparts, the analytic space/activity models.
14
1.2 THE CASE FOR INDIGENOUS THEORY AND THE DEMAND FOR SPECIFICITY
The general case for indigenous theories is not without
precedent and can be supported at two levels of consideration. The
first is essentially historical. It relates to the visible successes
attributed to past indigenous theories of architecture - whether
formalized or not - and can be referred back as far as architecture
existed. The second is comparative and calls into evidence the
recent successes made by indigenous or contextually redefined
theories in some socially cognate disciplines which until very
recently seemed sterile.
1.2.1 Indigenous Theory to Architecture: a historical perspective
In historical terms, architecture and architectural design are
as old as civilization. Many ancient man-made objects in the
environment (the pyramids, Stonehenge and so on), argues Bazjanac
(1974, p.3), provide ample testimony of an extraordinary ability
to design. Is it possible then, he asks, that no theories of
architecture or architectural design have ever existed in all that
time?^
"An examination of the writings about architecture from
the past shows that Vitruvius (probably a contemporary
of Caesar and Augustus), Alberti (1404-1472), Filarete
(1400-1469), Serlio (1475-1554), Palladio (1508-1580),
Colonna (1433-1527), Guarini (1624-1683), Ladoli (1690-
1751), Laugier (1711-1769) and others were
1. Even -in traditional and vernacular architecture there must
have been some theories at work. The fact that these were
unconscious or informal cannot be argued as a proof of their
non-existence or lack of viability.
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theoreticians in the deepest sense of the word. They all
had their theories of architecture and a significant part
of the contemporary body of knowledge called architecture
is based on their work ...
These and other theories of architecture were accepted as
general and quite satisfactory theories in their time, and
therefore it is not true that there are no theories of
architecture. The problem is that the theories of the
past were concerned with issues quite different from
issues of architecture and architectural design which are
important today."
(Bazjanac, 1974, pp.4-5, his emphasis).
In fact, compared to past theories, contemporary theories, though
argued in more complicated languages and enriched with sophisticated
techniques, appear far poorer in their practical consequences and
seem conspicuously to be founded on fragmentation. Instead of
presenting a unified all-embracing view of architecture, they
usually tend to present themselves as 'independent models' or more
frequently as 'techniques', strongly influenced by their external
disciplinary origins, and can only be related to isolated aspects
of architecture, a logical consequence of an attitude which makes
little effort to predicate theory on practice. The gaps both
between them and between the results they produce and real-life
design practice are very large.
However, an acute awareness of the dangers this state of
affairs presents to the objectives of research prevails. Wilson
(1973b, p.7) has warned against these dangers:
"Instead of the release which research is often supposed
to provide from the trials and errors of a craft-based
process, we may see only the institutionalisation of it.
Because this collectivises the trials and errors, the
process is coarsened, knowledge is valued above under¬
standing, the product becomes secondary to the activity
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which produces it and the inertia of the process favours
the emergence of new directions less as deliberate
ventures than as desperate remedies."
Such dangers are perpetuated, as pointed out by Gregory (1978)
who discusses the problem in the context of human geography, by
the fact that the objectives of using, say, an imported technique
usually tend to be established outside the phenomena to which it
is applied and as such the epistemological formulations on which
the technique itself is founded tend to be excluded from critical
analysis; and what the researchers appear to be doing is to modify
the phenomena to meet the requirements of the technique. In
comparison, the high level of comprehensiveness and rich empirical
content some past theories, such as the Vitruvian one, have
achieved reflect a superior quality which seems to be unattainable
in many of their modern counterparts.
1.2.1.1 Vitruvius and the problem of theory and practice
Vitruvius1 theoretical framework is rich and wide ranging
both in its multidisci piinary references and in the number of
architectural aspects to which it attends. It prescribes that the
architect's knowledge should be so wide ranging that no aspect of
culture should be foreign to him and gives ample reasons why this
multidisciplinary knowledge is so important. Vitruvius himself
makes this reasoning credible by revealing his own vast knowledge
(by the standards of the time) in these areas throughout his
treatise. Yet he never propagates the view that this knowledge
should be imported into architecture uncritically. His
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architectural affirmations and the practically suggestive language
in which he expresses this knowledge justify all the subsequent
and unparalleled success his theory has achieved. He continuously
problematizes the concepts he borrows within a perspective which
is recognizably architectural and a methodology which is predicated
on practice. In his conception of theory and practice he never
displays an irreconcilable split between the two. Significantly,
he is quite adamant that the knowledge the architect needs to
acquire
"is the child of practice and theory .... It follows,
therefore, ... that architects who aimed at acquiring
manual skill without scholarship have never been able to
reach a position of authority to correspond to their
pains, while those who relied upon theories and scholar¬
ship were obviously hunting the shadow, not the
substance. But those who have a thorough knowledge of
both ... have the sooner attained their object and
carried authority with them .... It appears then that
who professes himself an architect should be well
versed in both directions."
(Vitruvius, 1960, Book I, Chapter 1, p.5, my emphasis)
This seems to embody an advanced outlook indeed, consonant with
2
the modern Marxian concept of 'theory as practice' . With hind¬
sight, it implies that a good architectural theory can never be
developed in the absence of the issues of the very practice it
intends to influence and prescribe. Hence, its usefulness is
3
essentially subject to empirical illustration . It is in a
2. Extensive discussions on this can be followed in the works of
L. Althusser and E. Habermas. See also Vazquez (1977) for a
unified ccnd critical text.
3. Such a view does not subscribe to 'empiricism as a philosophy
but to the central value of empirical evidence in any
scientific enterprise.
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dynamic coexistence between the empirical basis of proving its
correctness and the highly abstract basis into which this proof
may be apprehended.
From the point of view of the present study, Vitruvius
holds two conceptions which are indispensably valuable. One is
the emphasis he places on knowledge in history. The other is his
obvious concern with 'health' and 'comfort'. He justifies the
first by remarking that one should be able to explain what one
does through explaining its origin, the source of the knowledge
and experience that made it possible. Thus, unlike many of the
modern rationalized'methodologies, he avoids locating the
designer in a void. Past knowledge, tradition and experience are
as important to the designer as the design task in hand. And in
the most obvious way, the major source of all these is the built-
environment itself.
On the other hand, his concern with health and comfort and
other similar issues reflects a remarkable understanding that the
objects designed (individual buildings, whole quarters or urban
settings) should promote the welfare of those they are designed
to serve, not only in terms of satisfying their immediate needs
or sensations, but also in terms of the general and long-term
4
conduct of their well-being .
This is roughly equivalent to the view that through such a
value-laden criterion the products of design acquire their social
4. It is interesting to observe that recent reorientations in
climatic design research are evolving a similar view, where
the concept of 'comfort' acquires its significance, not only
19
import and the ultimate evaluation of their significance and
success cannot but be social. This makes his theory fundamentally
anthropocentric. He clearly holds the view that the reason for
the existence of architecture is man, and it comes as no big
surprise when - even in its most formally stated instances,
particularly those that relate to space (though he does not use the
word as such or show a conscious awareness of it) - his theory
remains firmly man-related through the imposition of the proportions
of the human body as a tool of spatial design and formalism.
1.2.2 The Case for Specificity in Other Disciplines
Concern with developing indigenous theories in relation to
particular domains of investigation has served the methodological
purposes of a number of social disciplines remarkably well recently.
Obvious examples relate to areas like those of modern linguistics
and social anthropology. The present methodological success
achieved in both areas can be attributed to two vital considerations.
On the one hand, there have been original efforts on part of both
modern linguists and social anthropologists to originate theories
which are internally specific to the disciplinary phenomena they
4 (cont). in terms of satisfying physiological requirements of the
body but also includes psychological, economic, socio-cultural
and so on evaluation, thus a basic function of building is to
act as a 'climatic-modifier'. See Maravelias (1978), for an
elaborate review and treatment of the new developments in
building climatic design and the evolving conception of comfort.
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are dealing with. In terms of 1inguistics,for example, the
originality and strength of the linguistic model has long been
5
widely acknowledged . On the other hand, there have been
consistent attempts on part of both types of social scientist to
ensure the relevance of imported theories by redefining them within
the context of their respective disciplines. The development of the
semiological model and its successful redefinition within the field
of social anthropology provide a good example of such attempts.
In view of this, it may suffice to present a summarized version of
the epistemological reasons C. Ldvi-Strauss has frequently
emphasized in favour of the above type of methodological
considerations.
In his succinct expository discussion of the Ldvi-Straussian
argument, Mepham (1973, pp.110-6) says that this argument relates to
two requirements. The first is the demand for 'specificity'. The
second is the demand for a 'theoretical critique of facts'. The
demand for specificity constitutes a principle of methodological
antireductionism. It says that in the first instance a science of
a specific domain is based on the discovery of the specific
coherence of its object. Before any question of any relationships
between domains can be discussed meaningfully, one must have a
theory of the specific difference which marks off one domain from
5. N. Chomsky has repeatedly argued the ease for having a theory
which defines the characteristics specific to linguistic be¬
haviour by virtue of this theory bedng authentically linguistic
in the first place. " [His ] attack on behaviourist theories of
verbal behaviour was centred around his claim that the attempt
to assimilate the acquisition of a language to other forms of
learning or of acquiring skills made it impossible for these
theories to account for precisely those central and specific
features of language which constitute its specific difference
(for example the fact that a speaker of a language has the ability
to produce and to recognize a 'virtually ' infinite set of novel
well-formed sentences in that language)." (Mephams 1973} p.110).
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another and which, within a domain, explains the production of the
diverse and apparent arbitrary variations. Thus an appeal to
analogy cannot function as a principle of explanation in the
absence of a theory satisfying the analogy by reference to simi¬
larity of forms of internal coherence. However, this demand for
specificity should not be taken to rule out the possibility that any
two or more sciences may be integrated or influence each other at a
later stage of development. In fact, it is a precondition for that.
The demand for a theoretical critique of empirical facts (contin¬
ues Mepham, p.114) is a vital one. It can be viewed as a consequence
of the principle that coherence is of the order of theory and not of
fact. In otherwords, "a theory may require us to use new criteria for
deciding, in relation to observed phenomena, which are to be taken as
the same, or similar to, each other, and which different".
The specificity of a discipline is not, however - to paraphrase
Agrest and Gandelsonas (1977, p.105) who use the word 'code' instead
of theory - defined solely by the specificity of its theories, but
also by the form in which these theories are articulated. That is
to say, the articulation of theories may be specific, although the
theories themselves may or may not be specific to the discipline in
question.
"Examples of specific code articulation in architecture
are found in classical theories of harmony that utilize
the articulation of musical codes and arithmetical pro¬
portional series for the invention of specific
architectural codes, which are then used to determine
the proportions of and relationships between the
different elements of a building."
(Agrest and Gandelsonas, 1977, p.105, their emphasis).
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Thus, still paraphrasing Agrest and Gandelsonas (p.106),
specificity manages to maintain the limits of architecture despite
the apparent changes that occur under the pressures of history,
technology, social action, or symbolic change. On the one hand,
the more specific theories remain within the context of architec¬
ture; on the other, the less specific theories link architecture
with other systems (for example, engineering) through the opening
and closing of its limits. This mechanism allows for the articula¬
tion of architecture with some systems and not with others.
Thus it is not sufficient to claim that architecture is
analogous with another discipline, but to show in a specific manner
how architecture absorbs but transforms the theories, the models
and so on of that discipline so that what architecture has in
common with it enters into architecture in a form which is
specifically architectural and vice versa, otherwise the transposi¬
tion of these theories and models and their use become both suspect
and hazardous.
1.3 THE SYSTEMATIC DESIGN METHODS MOVEMENT (SDMM)
Contemporary attempts to extend the limits of architecture
and open its boundaries to outside influences have presented them¬
selves in different guises, but found their clearest expression
in the 'Systematic Design Methods Movement' (SDMM) of the 1960s^.
6. The SDDM, of course, claims a huge literature including proceed¬
ings of several specialized symposia (for instance, Broadbent and
Ward, 1969), special expository and review books (for example,
Jones, 1970; Broadbent, 1974) and the lengthy bibliographies
these refer to.
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From its inception, the SDMM relied heavily on imported models and
analytic techniques (basically of operations research descent)'' as
a means for an objectivist rationalization^ of conventional design
9
and its transformation into a thoroughly scientific activity .
'Design' was apprehended as a universal process underlying every
man-made artefact, thus architectural design, industrial design and
so on belonged to one and the same process. In effect, the 'design
process' became more important than its particular products. It
was viewed as being guided by objective criteria, the end product
of which was a logical consequence (in an inductive/positivist sense)
of an entirely problem-solving activity. The choice between the
alternatives generated by it was in the province of a parallel
'decision-making process'. In consequence, any design problem could
be formally presented and solved in terms of a programmatic step-by-
step logical progression of well-defined activities. Initially,
this took the form of a linear pattern (cf Alexander's first theory),
but later modified to embody a cybernetic-1ike feedback mechanism
7. With the computer to perform the extensive calculations
involved, the major problem seen remaining was efficient
computer-programming and problem representation. This
particular aspect of consideration, of course, has since
attracted much attention in relation to the development of
computer-aided architectural design (CAAD). Coupled with it is
the continued preoccupation with the question of the division
of design tasks between the human designer and the machine.
(See Mitchell, 1975, for a discussion).
8. See Skolimowski (1972) for a comparative discussion on
concepts of 'objectivist rationality' and 'anthropomorphic
rationality' and the importance of the latter within the context
of architecture.
9. The insecure. epistemological foundations of the SDMM have been
analysed by numerous authors. (See, for instance, Sillier et at,
1972, for a comprehensive treatment). What is presented here is
a brief recapitulation of the basic underlying assumptions.
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(leading to the well-known analysis -»■ synthesis -> evaluation
decision loops), with the synthetic steps nested inside 'black-
boxes' or performed by unaccounted for 'creative leaps', thus
rendered mysterious. The systemic-theoretic logic (with its
elements, attributes and relationships trilogy) provided the
generalized perspective within which the problem could be decomposed
into elements or decision areas and the generated subsolutions (the
specifics) recomposed into an optimal or nearly optimal determinate
solution (the generic). As a result, problem formulation and problem
solution were posited as distinct from each other, the solution or
part of it could never exist before or coincide with problem
formulation. The start was always a fresh one purged from all past
influences. Finally, of all the paradigms that could give meaning to
architectural form, the functionalist one in its deterministic and
behaviouristically predicated epistemology was unquestionably accepted.
Design criteria were to be defined a priori as functional require¬
ments or more abstractly as 'tendencies' or 'needs' and form was to
be developed to fit these needs in a non-contradictory fashion.
Criticisms, within and without the movement, have since been
wide-ranging10. First,of all the modern shifts in architectural
theorizing, the SDMM proved by far the most poor in its practical
consequences and effects. Ironically, it provided its own internal
paradox when its highly prescriptive data-based programme faced
10. Examples -include Daley's (1969) ph-ilosoph-ical critique of the
strong behaviouris tic component and the myth of quantifiability
associated with it; Simon's (1969; 1975) objection to the
stringent optimality requirement and his replacement of it by
the 'satisficing' criterion; Rittel's (Rittel and Webber3 1973)
criticism of the sharp dichotomy drawn between problem formulation
25
unsurmountable technical and procedural problems. For instance, the
invoked mathematics which would solve the combinatorial aspects
involved in yielding optimum solutions (even at the objectivist level
so specified) still awaits full development^. Equally unhelpful
was the supposedly complete synonymity of the act of designing
buildings and that of designing other man-made objects. This, to a
great degree, obscured the fact that, through their accumulation on
land and their permanent relationship to fixed sites and so on,
buildings represent some peculiar design problems (technical, socio¬
economic and so forth) which firmly differentiate them from other
products of design and hence complicate the design process by which
12
they are produced, beyond and above many other man-made objects
A most hotly contested feature is, of course, the uncritical
prestige to which the so-called 'scientific approach1 was held and
the canvassing of its methodological procedures in order to
guarantee the objectivity and rationality of the solutions which
were sought. This proved deficient on more than one count. First,
the assumed isomorphic analogy between the physical sciences and
architecture proved somewhat difficult to elucidate. In fact, it
10 (cont). and solution generation and his characterization of design
problems as being 'wicked' and, therefore, inaccessible to
exhaustive formalism; and finally, C. Alexander's (Preface to the
1974 edition of Notes on the Synthesis of Formj refection of his
own first theory and its replacement by a theory of 'environmental
patterns' (Alexander et at) 1967; 1977) in which patterns can be
discovered without going through strictly stated formal procedures
of the kind he developed earlier.
11. A recent assessment of developments in this type of mathematics and
the algorithms it provides is given by Lewis and Papdimitriou (1978).
12. The mayor characteristics of building as a product and its differ¬
ences from other design products have been well analysed by
Turin (1966). See also Appendix I.
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seems more reasonable now to contend that architecture exceeds
any such science, in the sense that, while it shares with science
a fundamental interest - through theories, models and so on - to
describe, explain and comprehend the reality falling under its
domain, it reverses this process in order to initiate - through the
deliberation of those (lay and professional) who practice its
design - an undeniably value-laden action aimed at modifying and
transforming the environment, thus effecting wholly new realities
as yet non-existent. Curiously, even when it behaves like a
descriptive science, architecture still spends much time describing
the results of its own practice. Its empirical facts are not
entirely given, they are also constructed and reconstructed through
human deliberations. This is an inherent structural quality (though
shared by other design disciplines). It may perhaps explain the
paradox of the continued discrepancy between what might be considered
at first sight theoretically valid descriptions and the incorporation
of those descriptions within design procedures which are appropriate
to produce everyday architecture.
Second, even if the scientific approach per se is a methodology
which is applicable to architecture, it still remains difficult to
access, since an agreed account of its workings and its logical
13
and epistemological characteristics has so far proved insoluble
13. Equally inconclusive is the ongoing controversy within the esta¬
blished disciplinary perspective of the philosophy of science.
The debate is many stranded and has ranged from K. Popper's ccnti-
verificationist and initially very stringent (but later modified)
'falsificationist and critical rationalism'; to the late I.
Lakatos' 'methodology of scientific research programmes' (a
sophisticated and subtle modification of the Popperian perspective-);;
to T. Kuhn's 'paradigmatic' perspective; to P. Feyerabend's
'anarchist ' one; and what there is in between (for instance, M.
Polanyi's 'tacit knowing'). The details of the opposing arguments
need not be laboured here, but a useful forum is Lakatos and
Musgrave (1970).
27
The elucidation and modelling of these•characteristics have been
complicated by considerations of the purposes of conducting enquiry
and of the uses made of scientific theories which are just as
important as the logical characteristics of the theories themselves.
Further, whatever account is given, it remains basically a post hoc
rationalization of what logicians and philosophers think scientists
are doing rather than an ascertained fitting perspective of what
scientists really do (Meehan, 1968, p.6).
Perhaps the only sound conclusion which may offer a reconcilia¬
tion of the different opposing views,
"is to state frankly that the object of science is cognition
and that it is the strategems of science that are directed
towards the real or empirical world. More precisely, we could
say that science is about 'remaking cognition', it being
clear that if we were satisfied with our cognitive codes for
deciphering the world, we would not have science."
(Hiller et al, 1972, p.7).
What this implies is that the construction of a viable
scientific theory cannot be a passive exercise, but that it almost
amounts to a reconstruction of reality in terms of a dialectic be¬
tween the scientists' prestructuring of the world and the world as
it shows itself when examined in these terms. Therefore:
"Why not accept that only by prestructuring any problem,
either explicitly or implicity, can we make it tractable
to rational or empirical investigation?"
(Hiller et al, 1972, p.10).
And that:
"The application of a theory to the explanation of many of
the phenomena falling within its domain is bound to be
speculative, to be an imaginative exercise and not an exer¬
cise in deduction and calculation, and thus to be such as
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to constitute a demonstration of the potential richness
and power of the theory and not a parade of acquired and
unassailable results." (Mepham, 1973, p.105).
These are the kind of arguments which severely disrupted the
SDMM claim to scientificness and led to its gradual dissolution.
But although it is almost superseded now by more realistic views
or the design process, it is only fair to credit it at least with
one lasting influence. It has raised the degree of interest in
the design process to an unprecedented level and in doing so
brought to architecture a new concern about theory and methodology
(Bazjanac, 1974, p.17) - a concern which is likely to prove more
productive in the long run than any practical consequences the
movement itself may have produced.
Emergent views on the design process reflect a conviction
that the problem-solving activity relating to specific design
problems represents only part of a more complex phenomenon, that
there exists in any design process an underlying structure whose
total nature encompasses aspects outside that particular problem.
This implies that any description of the design process should
somehow introduce the designer as a cognitive subject right from
the beginning and grant him the full facility of his past
experience, his privately-held beliefs, the highly synthetic
cognitive schemata he abstracts from the architectural environment
and the kind of prestructured knowledge he has already acquired.
The solution he produces should be viewed not as an equilibration
to some atomistic inputs, but as a reflexive result between the
cognitive knowledge he holds and what he thinks it is possible to
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achieve within the problem situations to which he attends. Thus
the main object of new architectural research should be to concen¬
trate on influencing and enriching that type of prestructured
14
cognitive knowledge and the form in which it is held.
Such views have been outlined extensively in the recent
literature. Of considerable value to this thesis are the studies
(of which the above paragraph is a synoptic view) of B. Hillier and
his co-authors on the concept of 1prestructures', that of L. March
on the 'abductive/inductive/deductive' trilogical nature of the
design process and that of P.G. Raman on the 'unspecifiable and
tacit1 aspects of it. There will be occasion later, particularly in
Chapter 8, to consult these as well as other similar accounts
when expounding this thesis's argument in relation to the concept
of the 'architectural prototype' as a key-link between theory and
practice.
1.4 THE ANALYTIC SPATIAL DESIGN THEORY (ASDT)
In terms of space, the basic philosophy that has underlain
the SDMM can be found intact in the 'Analytic Spatial Design Theory1
14. As yet the new conceptualizations do not reflect an entirely
homogenous design theory. Indeed3 they do not all originate
from within architecture. Their origins equally belong to
other disciplines3 but mainly those which give significance
to cognitive and socio-cultunal processes.
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(ASDT) ' which ran concurrent to it. It was equally dependent
on a wide range of derivative techniques and imported constructs
(mainly from the field of operations research) and promoted a
comparable justificationist argument for objectivity, systematic-
ness and analytic rigor, thus drawing to itself the same kind of
general criticism as the SDMM. However, the ASDT subsumed other
features peculiar to itself. For instance, it was mainly concerned
with fitting patterns of activity to patterns of space or vice
versa. Within its perspective, the fundamentality of space to
architecture was taken for granted. Nevertheless, the epistemologi-
cal implications of this assumption were never explored explicitly
nor a clear definition of the concept of 1architectural space' given.
Layout planning and activity structuring represented an inter¬
mediate level. On the basis of this, the theory could operate and
mediate the relationship between the institutional identity of,
say, buildings and their environmental characteristics, or between
their software and their hardware structures. But in doing so, it
obscured the inevitable contradictions and anomalies the
simultaneous consideration of these aspects (i.e. activity,
environmental, institutional and so on) usually generates^.
15. Other pseudonyms include, of course, words like 'layout planning',
'space/activity allocation' and so on. For relevant lists of
bibliographies and general surveys, see, for eoxzmple, Eastman
(1975); Mitchell (1977 ) ; Cross (1977).
16. The whole theory, of course, now falls under the province of
CAAD. However, the issues of CAAD as such are outside the scope
of this thesis, but for a discussion on basic theoretical
foundations, design potentials and problems involved, see, for
instance, Big I (1977); Mitchell (1977).
17. Being of different substances these aspects are not amenable to
the same descriptive language.
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There have been many methodological and technical difficu¬
lties with ASDT. One particular manifestation of these has been
the huge number of alternative techniques introduced and the
continuous increase in their complications. And with the
recent subscription (for instance, in the work of the Liverpool
School^) to numerical taxonomic theory^ and the proven mappings
of its method and techniques onto graph-theoretic terms (Hubert,
1974; Hartigan, 1975; Jardine and Sibson, 1971), the list of
possible applicable techniques may extend endlessly.
However, taxonomic theory or cluster analysis as such could
not offer a relief to ASDT from the profound conceptual problems
basic to it and defined by its concrete formulation. Indeed, the
heavy methodological burden placed on taxonomic theory seems
highly unwarranted. It is clear that since each graph-theoretic
criterion defines a rather natural concept of what constitutes
a cluster and since the definition of a connected graph varies
from it being maximally connected to it being minimally so, any
final selection by an applied researcher or theoretician of a
clustering criterion must be somewhat arbitrary (Hubert, 1974, p.290).
In other words, taxonomic theory (cluster analysis, pattern recog¬
nition and so on) has no settled epistemological perspective which
would relieve those who borrow its techniques from the responsibility
18, See, for example. Whitehead and Carter (1975; 1976).
19, This has been variously referred to as theory of classification,
cluster analysis, pattern recognition, Q-analysis, clumping,
typology and so on. The variety in nomenclature may be due to
the diversity of the fields of application. Some active fields
include biology, psychology, artificial intelligence and
information retrieval. The classic text on the subject is, of
course, Sokal and Sneath (1963).
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of ascribing meaning, interpretation, individualization and so on
to the particular phenomena they apply them to.
"The chief problem for these theories [of taxonomy, pattern
recognition, cluster analysis and so on] has been the mech¬
anism of classification itself: does one identity a chair
as a chair by detecting the presence of certain critical
features, by matching the input of a prototypical template
for chairs, or perhaps by synthesizing an internal model of
a chair and matching it to the stimulus? The issue may not
be decidable."20
(Neisser, 1976, p.74, my emphasis)
Hence the decision, for instance, on space/activity delimita¬
tion and isolation can only be pragmatic and operationally pre¬
defined. It is not subject to any single-valued logic because
such a logic consciously or unconsciously denies the collective
environmental, institutional, and so on, context in which any
building exists and acquires its identity. This identity by no
means reflects a complete solidarity of building as a system, but
also it embodies the contradictions and anomalies within and
between its different images.
Furthermore, there is no need to take a rigid view on space:
"Space is neither absolute, relative nor relational in
itself, but it can become one or all of these simulta¬
neously depending on the circumstances The problem
of the proper conceptualization of space is resolved
through human practice with respect to it. In other
words, there are no philosophical answers to
philosophical questions that arise over the nature of
space - the answers lie in human practice."
(Harvey, 1973, p. 13)




In spite of the contributions which the SDMM and the ASDT
made in raising the level of interest in theory and methodology
in architecture and in spite of making problems of space central
to architectural theory today (a valuable contribution in itself),
they have both failed equally to make sufficient links to real-
life practice and recognize the potential and limitations of design
action. They simplified an extremely complex situation when they
claimed they were attempting to rationalize it through imported
methods and techniques. They also tended to reinforce the tendency
to concentrate on entirely surface and contingent phenomena, while
in dealing with them they went to a high level of abstraction which
lost all comprehensiveness and compromized their problem-solving
capacity.
To point out the difficulties that faced them through un¬
critical importation is neither to blame the parent disciplines nor
to assert that attempts at consulting other disciplines should in
any way be abandoned. On the contrary, in the interdisciplinary
climate prevailing today, such attempts are unavoidable and are
worthwhile, so long as they make their wider theoretical frameworks
explicit and do not lose sight of the problem characteristics of
architecture and the complex issues peculiar to its practice.
Significantly, this thesis takes its share from other disciplines
in order to elucidate its argument. But as it does so, it remains
committed to what might be called the 'prototypic level of
consideration'. This is an intermediate level of consideration at
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which a successful mediation between the theory of architecture
and the practice of it is to be sought. It suggests that a
21
'structural approach' which recognizes the 'syntagmatic'
character of architectural structures and their prototypic manifest¬
ations can be effective in two ways. On the one hand, it provides
a comprehensive descriptive framework on the basis of which archi¬
tectural phenomena can be adequately characterized and explained.
On the other, it identifies the practical role played by architec¬
tural prototypes in solving everyday design problems as they emerge
in time. Therefore, the bulk of the knowledge, theory or technique
sought from other disciplines should be directed mainly towards
elucidating this level of consideration and towards identifying,
developing and enriching the empirical content of these prototypes.
This question will be explored repeatedly throughout this
thesis and closely argued in relation to questions of space. The
remaining three chapters in this part attempt to lay the foundations
to this, through discussing and reviewing some specific issues that
are relevant to space.
21'. What is proposed here is that as far as meaning and evaluation
are concerned3 architectural structures do not constitute
anything but 'syntagmsin which the 'syntactic' component
cannot be isolated from the 'semantic' one. However, the use
of the term syntagm in relation to architectural structures
though recognizes its linguistic origin, exceeds its technical
(in terms of linearity and so on) definition in linguistics.
See Chapter 6, especially.
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CHAPTER 2
ARCHITECTURE AND THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF SPACE-
CONSCIOUSNESS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
However elusive the idea of 'space' in architecture might
prove to be, it is generally agreed now that space is an intrinsic
medium through which architecture - both as a discipline and as a
practice asserts itself. It is strongly argued also that the
difficult situation in which architecture finds itself today is
essentially a result of a problem with space (Glanville, 1976,
p.18). To the extent that this is true, the ongoing architectural
debate has produced a wide variety of space conceptualizations.
Yet, the epistemological status and nature of the combined struc¬
ture 'space/architecture' is far from being well defined. A
possible reason might be that the notion of space itself,
consciously formulated, is comparatively new to architectural
theorizing and that it may take some time before a coherent archi¬
tectural theory about it can be evolved.
In this chapter, it is suggested that central to an enquiry
into this notion is the enquiry into the history of its coming into
being. The emphasis laid on tracing this history is not without
significance. Many theoreticians (significantly across all
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disciplines) recognize the fact that the historical origin and
past developments are indispensable to the understanding of an
idea or a concept in the process of acquiring epistemic import.
This history, by its very nature, constitutes a positive contri¬
bution and convenient source of appropriate information out of
which it may be possible to anticipate any subsequent epistemo-
logical or methodological developments that concept may undergo.
Obviously, a comprehensive investigation into the 'total
history of space' as an architecturally conceptualized and
materialized phenomenon belongs to the general history of archi¬
tecture. This still has to be written and there is no room here
to follow its basic constitution in any great detail. Instead,
interest will be focused on outlining a much more recent aspect
of this history. This is what might be referred to as the emer¬
gence of 'architectural space-consciousness'. Although this
space-consciousness has emerged only recently, its short history
has been rather dramatic and has certainly ensured that space is
the one problematic that dominates every serious architectural
debate. An immediate reminder of this recent history may perhaps
improve the understanding of the impact it has had and continues
to have on modern architectural theories.
2.2 THE PRE-HISTORY OF SPACE-CONSCIOUSNESS
According to Collins (1965, p.285), until the eighteenth
century, no architectural treatise ever used the word 'space' and
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the idea of space as a primary quality of architectural composition
was not fully developed until recently.
"What mattered to Classical theorists, in an age which
defined architecture as the art of building, was structure,
and this did not necessarily imply the enclosure of space,
but might equally well be a solid object such as an
obelisk or a triumphal arch (where space-enclosure was
non-existent or negligible). Complex sequences of inter¬
related courtyards and rooms, incorporating extremely
subtle spatial relationships, were often built by
Classical architects; but these were only discussed by
theorists in terms of structure and proportion, and if the
word 'space' was used at all, it was only with respect to
their decoration, to indicate amorphous unproportionale
surfaces, such as the blank areas of a painted ceiling,
and had no three-dimensional significance whatsoever."
(Collins, p.285).
However, the fact that there were no well articulated conscious
architectural conceptions of space in the past, should not be taken
to imply that past architectures were completely lacking in
concepts that pertain to space. On the contrary (Glanville, 1976,
p.18), there have always been indirect concepts of space that have
usually been formulated in ritual descriptions (formalized or
otherwise) of ordering and organizing systems. For instance, in
Muslim architecture a building whose orientation is not set
towards Mecca is anything but a mosque. The role played by the
shape of the cross in guiding church planning can also be cited,
as well as numerous other examples^. The argument here, however
1. A repeatedly used model has been that of the human body
because of its familiarity and immediacy. Within the
documented literature of architecture, it has featured in
(among many) the work of Vitruvius3 Leonardo da Vinci and
in modern times in Le Corbusier's Modulor. Its influence
still continues prominantly in the form of both perceptual
and anthropometric models.
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(to paraphrase Glanville, p.18), is that all these devices describe
approaches to and ways of handling space, rather than consciously
defining what space is to architecture. In this way, for example,
aesthetic concepts of symmetry, proportion, the orders and so on
are not specific descriptions of architectural space, although
when implemented they define spaces. And while modern aesthetics
seeksa firm grounding in perceptual/cognitive psychology
(Hesselgren, 1969; Arnheim, 1977), its present reduced role is
likely to continue. This is because as space gets increasingly
treated as a commodity which is subject to market forces, its
evaluation becomes dominated by more urgent factors, such as
economic ones.
2.3 THE BIRTH OF SPACE-CONSCIOUSNESS
According to Collins (1965, p.285), the change from Classical
conceptions towards a more marked space awareness, probably first
occurred in the middle eighteenth century as a result of the intro¬
duction of 'romantic gardens'. Here the spaces, though equally
amorphous and difficult to subject to formal proportions, say, as
building surfaces, clearly had a more positive quality than being
mere flat surfaces. Nevertheless, the word 'space' itself was
seldom used even in this context. It did not begin to come into
fashion with any precise three-dimensional sense until the mid-
nineteenth century. Moreover, its introduction into the history
of architecture derives entirely from its use by German theorists
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in the same century.
"The German comprehension of the significance of archi¬
tectural space, or Raumgestaltung (i.e. the spatial
design of rooms as opposed to the solid surfaces
circumscribing them) doubtless resulted to a large
extent from native perspicacity, but it can also be attri¬
buted to the interesting linguistic coincidence whereby
the German word for 'space' is similar to the word 'room'.
Thus it required no great power of the imagination for a
German to think of room as simply a small portion of
limitless space, for it was virtually impossible for him
to do otherwise. We thus find, from the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a number of German writers on
aesthetics using the term 'space' in its modern architec¬
tural sense. The best example is Hegel, whose Philosophy
of Art (based on lectures given in the 1820s) contains
numerous uses of the term, as when he refers to buildings
as 'limiting and enclosing a defined space' or describes
a Gothic church as 'the concentration of essential soul-
life which thus encloses itself in spatial relations'.
This somewhat mystical notion of space was developed to
its greatest extent as a technique of art criticism by
the German art-historian Heinrich Wolfflin, and it is
probably through his English-speaking disciples that the
idea spread through the Western world."
(Collins, p.286, his emphasis).
However, it was Frank Lloyd Wright's contribution which
proved most decisive to the establishment of modern architectural
spatial developments and of the emergence of space-consciousness.
2.3.1 The Contribution of Frank Lloyd Wright
It was Wright who, around the beginning of this century, first
exploited the spatial possibilities which had lain dormant since
the end of the Baroque (Collins, p.286). He swept aside
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the idea of rigid spatial compartmentalization and based his
conception of space on continuity. For him continuity was a
natural objective, the very substance of organic architecture.
Plans ot the upper and lower floors.
Fig. 2.1 Frank Lloyd Wright: Robie House,
Chicago, 1909. (from Norberg-
Schulz, 1975, p.349).
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"Through the idea of continuity came the idea of flowing
space. Flowing space brought different ideas together
to combine and form a new idea. He called this organic
design. A continuity of idea: natural idea: growing
idea: living idea: organic design. For the first time
space was not confined within four walls. Walls were
eliminated. Doors were found unnecessary. Space began
to expand into other space, so that when you stepped into
a space, you were really not aware of its size. Part of it
disappeared around to the left, part of it over a case
on the right, so that you didn't know where the area
ended. This did a great deal to increase the effectiveness
of space without increasing actual space. Space not only
went this way and that way, but it went up and over into
another space, so that no matter where you were or which
way you looked you never did see all of the area around.
Part of it is always reserved for exploration. Even a
building and garden can be tied thus together so that the
inside becomes part of the outside, the garden becomes
part of the building, and the building becomes part of
the garden."
(Dow, 1963, p.24)
This does not imply that his space conception was in any way
inarticulate or undisciplined. Quite the opposite, he repeatedly
and consciously used grids in a sophisticated and subtle manner.
His grid planning was associated with his ideas on construction
and his belief that the nature of materials should be allowed
expression as part of the whole process of the building becoming
what it wanted to become. Thus he allowed structural and construc¬
tional ideas to influence form, but not to cut drastically across
spatial requirements (Jones, 1978, p.18).
2.3.2 The Contribution of Mies van der Rohe
Mies' conception of space showed itself most clearly in the
Barcelona Pavilion (1929). This brought to reality the concept
of space with which he had earlier experimented through a few
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buildings and several projects, especially the Brick Country House
Project of 1923. In the Barcelona Pavilion, he dissolved the
ordinary elements of enclosure-floors, walls and ceilings - and
reconstituted them as abstract planes divorced from structural
functions. Thus he obtained more spatial freedom than if these
elements were structural. This, of course, progressively developed
into the fully-fledged 'open-plan' and so-called 'universal space'
(most clearly expressed in the 'pavilion') with no fixed spaces
apart from stairways, lifts and utility spaces.





The severe criticism of his almost Platonic insistence on
purity of form and his resolute suppression of everday practical
use and functioning of building is well known.
"Mies ... imposes upon reality a metaphysical order of
his own. Even this dilemma might be soluble if only the
ideal world for which Mies designs his buildings corres¬
ponded more closely to the real one. Unhappily, it does
not. He has created an architectural order, imperturbable
and implacable (the adjectives are those of his admirers)
for an ideal landscape. Nothing ever happens here. It
is airless, timeless, filled with light - but not sunlight,
since it has no heat, no direction, no fluctuation of color
and intensity, no gales howl here, no dust blows, no
insects fly. There are no excesses of summer humidity or
drifting winter snows. There are no preferred orientations
or exposures, since there is no weather in his compassless
world. In sum, Mies designs for the golden climate of
Plato's Republic - but he builds in Mayor Daley's Chicago."
(Fitch, 1963, p.161).
Nevertheless, Mies' role in shaping the concept of space was
central to its whole modern development. He achieved a synthesis
of the two main innovations of the nineteenth century: the open
repetitive order of skeleton construction and the fluid, but
articulate space of Wright (Norberg-Schulz, 1975, p.364). This
synthesis was anticipated by Le Corbusier, but brought to its
2
logical conclusion by Mies (for example, in the Barcelona Pavilion) .
2.3.3 The Contribution of Le Corbusier
The contribution of Le Corbusier to the articulation of the
concept of space in architecture was equally important, if not more
decisive, particularly in his original recognition of the
2. Unlike the other Great Masters, Mies wrote very little. His
ideas were mainly worked through graphical prototypic projects
and the buildings he designed. These remain the major source
for investigating his ideas.
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structural relationship between skeleton construction and open
space.
Fig. 2.3 Le Corbusier : Dom-ino, 1914. Standard
Framework. (From Norberg-Schulz, 1975,
p.363).
This eventually developed into his now famous five points of
the 'new architecture'; the pilotis, the roof garden, the
free plan, the strip window and the free facade. In these he
listed the advantages of the new approach to space conceptualiza¬
tion and consequently he defined the general properties of
'functionalist building' (Norberg-Schulz, 1975, p.363). It was
not only the application of these principles in some of his
buildings (for instance, the Villa Savoye at Poissy, 1928-29) which
was important, but also their combination with his relentless
activity to develop particular architectural prototypes . A case
in point is his long research on the standard dwelling ("a house
3. The development of prototypes was an activity in which the
other Great Masters were also actively engaged.
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is a machine to live in"), which culminated in the building of the
Unite d'Habitation at Marseilles (1947-52) with its complete
spatial regulation on the basis of the Modulor.
However, in accordance with his capacity for change in both
thought and practice, Le Corbusier undermined many of his own
4
principles . For example, in Ronchamp (1953-55) he used no
ribbon windows, no pilotis, no roof garden, and no free facades.
What remained was some measure of a free plan as a gesture to the
nature of the project. But in doing so, he showed his ability to
explore new spatial possibilities. The most striking one among
these was his exploitation of window size, shape, depth and
glazing in conjunction with daylighting.
2.3.4 The Consolidation of Space-Consciousness
Thus with efforts like those of Wright, Mies and Le Corbusier
and with the birth of the International Style, space was no longer
unconsciously derived but regarded as central to every architectural
undertaking. A significant aspect of those early efforts was the
fact that they followed a dual process of development. This
process included theoretical and practical/experimental aspects.
The practical related to real-life practice in the form of the
4. Jencks (1973, p.141) observes that there is a fundamental
difficulty, which all critics seem to encounter, when trying
to interpret and judge the work of Le Corbusier. They do not
know exactly what standards to apply - whether rationalist,
poetic or both. They all seem to work to a point and then
fail to be conclusive.




various buildings being built. The experimental took the shape of
graphical prototypical projects (a valued cognitive method in
architecture through much of its history and an essential tool in
its teaching). Both were useful as testing and discovery proced¬
ures in relation to the theoretical assumptions advanced.
2.4 HISTORICO-THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Afterwards, however, the purely theoretical side of the above
5
process became increasingly more dominant . This, of course, is
more obvious in architectural research today. Nevertheless, an
important line in theoretical activity has been the historico-
theoretical one (Giedion, 1941; Zevi, 1959; Panofsky, 1960 and so
on). In this connection, the contribution of Giedion remains the
most influential. First, it has provided an important generaliza¬
tion. Secondly, it has established space as a necessary component
in formulating new architectural theories.
2.4.1 The Contribution of Giedion
The generalization produced by Giedion (1941, 1964, 1971)
refers to his now much acclaimed idea that the concept of space,
5. An early post-contemporaneous theoretical contribution was
Moholy-Nagy 's conception of space as 'experienced space ' which
was linked to the concept of the 'biological'. Its functional¬
ist behaviouristic nature cannot be missed. In retrospect, it
must have been influential (though it rarely gets cited in the
relevant literature) in creating the kind of climate in which
much of the recent behaviouristic space formulations have
flourished. See Moholy-Nagy (1937) and also■ Banhcon (I960,
pp.316-9) for further details.
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although only recently named, had always been present in archi¬
tecture and had taken quite different forms at different times.
He viewed the history of architecture as a succession of three
space conceptions. The first (Ancient Egypt, Sumer and Greece)
was brought into being through the interplay between volumes.
The second (from the Roman Pantheon to the eighteenth century) was
synonymous with hollowed-out interior space. The nineteenth
century formed an intermediary link. The third space conception
(the twentieth century) retained the second's idea of hollowing
out interiors, but freed space from the restrictive bounds of
wall-barriers. Movement has been incorporated into this as a
direct response to the influence of the automobile.
Although Giedion's own concept of a 'space-time' (an
Einsteinian phase) in architecture or its relation to other
6
analogies has proved somewhat problematic and thus much disputed ,
his statement on the role played by space in understanding the
bui1t-environment has served an important purpose. On the one hand,
it provided a concept which has since been effective in the
reinterpretation of the history of archi tecture'7. In this respect,
the influence of his method of historical analysis has been wide
ranging. On the other hand, it has helped to make questions of
space central to all new theoretical and practical enquiries in
architecture.
6. See, for example, Collins (1965, p.288).
7. A recent example is Norberg-Schulz ' (1975) attempt to analyse the
history of Western architecture in spatio-cultural terms.
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS
While this survey is obviously an oversimplification, it is
hoped that it provides sufficient evidence for the epistemic
importance the concept of space has achieved in modern architec¬
tural practice and theorizing. It reveals through the considera¬
tion of a few historical instances, the way in which the under¬
standing of the concept was consciously sought, articulated and
assimilated by the discipline. And although the various views on
the subject do not reflect a unified idea of what exactly space
is to architecture, they have gone far beyond classical aesthetic
specifications. They have discussed space in relation to other
concepts, such as structure, organicness, continuity, flexibility,
function, culture and so forth.
In the general historical literature, these are discernable
polarities in terms of the 'rational1 and the 'organic'. Yet,
this may not be the most important observation in history. There
appears to be a more valid level at which the impact of the
different contributions can be held and evaluated. In the first
place, these contributions have ascertained that no new architec¬
tural theory could seriously avoid making known its views on issues
of space. This is the empistemological achievement.
In the second place, it is very difficult to assess the
contribution of men like Wright, Mies and Le Corbusier who
pioneered the new space conception through a purely theoretical
history. That is, their ideas cannot be evaluated entirely on the
basis of their rhetoric, but most importantly through the series
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of changes the concept underwent as a result of their real-life
actions. Their commitment to architecture (through its practice)
was total. They offered tangible testimony (successful or
unsuccessful) to what they said was important to it. Consequently,
their theories (even when they did not work) remained architectural
and can be judged as always being so.
This is a situation which is increasingly rare today. An
acceptable justification is the prohibitive cost of conducting
real-life experiments during theoretical enquiry. Nevertheless,
the possibility still exists whereby the empirical content and
practical effectiveness of theory can be increased. This is where
the idea of the architectural prototype may be of direct help.
It may provide a key-link between theory and practice as it has
always done throughout the long history of architecture. The
argument for this usefulness will become clearer as this thesis
8
progresses .
In the next chapter, however, the historical survey is carried
further by reviewing a number of space formulations which are
comparatively active now in the field of environmental research.
Their relevance to specific issues of architectural practice forms
part of the investigation.
8. Part III of this thesis elaborates on this point, while Part IV
develops a practical example.
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CHAPTER 3
ENVIRONMENTAL THEORIES OF SPACElA CRITICAL REVIEW OF
SOME RECENT FORMULATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN
BUILT ENVIRONMENT STUDIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a number of different approaches to the
study of 'artificial space' are reviewed. Generally, these
approaches are of a descriptive or explanatory character. Their
intention is to achieve a better understanding of the workings of
spatial structures either as they are said to exist morphologically
in the artificial environment or in our perceptual/cognitive
capacity to conceive of them. Most of the approaches, however,
hope that such an improved understanding will eventually initiate
a more effective design practice. In reviewing them, a main aim
is to identify a variety of concepts and terminological tools
which have been evolved and which (at least in theory) offer
useful insights into the nature of artificial space. These may
then serve as convenient points of departure for further
investigation.
Parallel to this, however, it will be suggested that most
of the approaches, important as they are, still remain pre¬
operational insofar as they continue to function at a purely
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descriptive level and do not involve specific issues of design
practice. This criticism is essentially methodological. It
argues that a general descriptive account of the nature of
artificial space, though valuable, is not enough in itself to
generate appropriate design knowledge if it is not closely linked
to the issues of the very practice which produces that space.
This introduces the requirement for a broad structural
framework which besides being relevant to the description of the
artificial environment as such, is also concerned with the
operational character and problem-solving capacity of the
descriptive tools it employs and consequently the knowledge it
produces. A framework of this kind has been termed here a
'syntagmatic framework'^. It is based on the assumption that
design action, because of the immediacy of the phenomena it
deals with, occurs predominantly at the synthetic level of
consideration. Thus to be operationally effective, an architec¬
tural theory needs to accept a less deep level of abstraction than
the syntactic one for describing environmental structures. This
is the syntagmatic level. Its basic tool is the 'syntagmatic
pattern1 in which prototypes which are highly structured can exist
on a multidisciplinary basis and can be used both as a basis for
describing complex architectural structures and also for designing
them.
1. The syntagmatic framework accepts the necessity of syntax as
an organizing principle in any coherent system,but also
recognizes that there is a level equally as deep as the syntactic
one at which the 'semantic dimension'is also originated and
operates. This even goes as deep as the level at which the
basic syntactic rules are formulated. Its strategy is not to
argue the primacy of one dimension over the other, but to in¬
vestigate (within the context of the system under consideration)
the dialectical involvement of each in generating the necessary
conditions for existence of the other without being reduced to it.
See Part II, Chapter 6, especially.
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The different approaches to the study of artificial space,
however, are too many to cover in detail here and for the purpose
of the present discussion it is more convenient to examine them under
a few categories of general formulations. These have been
classified in terms of: psycho-humanistic, syntactic, semiological,
and combinatorial/configurational formulations. Extended
references have been made to the work of K. Lynch and Norberg-
Schulz in relation to the first; to the work of Hillier and
Leaman and their co-workers for the second; and to the work of
L. March et al, P. Steadman et al and R.T. Atkin for the fourth.
The references made to various authors in relation to semiological
formulations have been limited to general comments only, due to
the rarity of concrete models.
3.2 PSYCHO-HUMANISTIC FORMULATIONS
The different approaches to spatial understanding which
involve the human body (as a percept, a schema or an
organizational system), the human mind (in a perceptual/cognitive
sense) or both are given a variety of names. To some extent,
these names express the stresses placed on one aspect of consider¬
ation or another. For convenience, the generic term of
'psycho-humanistic' formulations has been adopted here.
There are two identifiable sub-categories of these
formulations. The first is mainly based on psychology. Here man
is seen to experience the environment as a psychological being,
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hence the general field of 'environmental psychology'. However,
2
there are two quite separate bodies of literature relating to
environmental psychology; one (which takes precedence)^originated
in the field of psychology proper, the other in the various
environmental disciplines, such as behavioural geography, urban
planning and architecture. Both address the same basic issue: how
do we come to know and experience the form of space and how does
this aid our spatial behaviour and actions. Nevertheless, each has
its own specific area of concern.
The work carried out under the field of psychology is
usually conducted within the confines of micro-scale environments
with the emphasis on identifying the exact nature of the
psychological mechanisms involved in spatial perception and
cognition, while the work under the environmental fields is
mainly concerned with extending the application of these perceptual
and cognitive mechanisms from the study of small objects placed in
confined and limited environments to the study of spatial systems
defined within wider environmental contexts - including neighbour¬
hoods, cities, regions and so forth. The interest of this thesis
ih"
is, of course, limited toAbuilt environment and its spatial
systems and it is from this perspective that the contribution of
the environmental fields is viewed. For convenience, this
contribution may be grouped under the sub-title of 'spatial
1U
cognition and.built environment', where cognition includes
2. This literature involves contributions from numerous disciplines.
There axe attempts to bring this literature closely together
and evolve an acrea of unified concern and application. See
Downs and Stea (1973), for an early representative text.
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perception as one of its modes of operation.
The second sub-category of psycho-humanistic formulations
makes the same appeal to psychology, but supplements this by a
philosophical argument which is essentially existential and
phenomenological in character. However, research under both
sub-categories argues its case within the assumption that to
humanize the environment, the subjective values people attach
to it should be given priority.
3.2.1 Spatial Cognition and Built Environment
Within the environmental fields, Lynch's (1960) The Image
of the City provided the first elaborate experimental study which
gave impetus to much subsequent research into spatial cognition
of large-scale environments. It introduced a number of
experimental techniques and spatial concepts and then systematized
these within a built environment perspective. Its most important
spatial concept has been that of the 'urban image1 and its
deployment as form.
3.2.1.1 Lynch and the urban image
Lynch says he is concerned with the 'look of a city'; in
his conception, its 'imageabi1ity'. He takes imageability as
basic to 'legibility' - that is, "the ease with which the parts
of a city can be recognized and can be organized in a-coherent
form" (Lynch, pp.2-3). Any urban image has a series of precise
56
physical contents that confer on it an identity linked to a
structure or pattern and possessing meaning (Lynch, p.8). There
are five physical elements or features of the urbanscape which
constitute the basic vocabulary for forming intelligible images.
These are paths (movement channels), districts (distinctive
areas), edges (boundaries to areas), nodes (strategic foci) and
landmarks (single prominant elements) (Lynch, pp.47-8).
Fig. 3.1 The collective image of Boston derived
from: (a) verbal interviews; (b)'sketch
maps. (From Lynch, 1960, p.146).
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Lynch's work is based on a purely communicative consider¬
ation of the built environment. It does not consider the
process by which the built environment itself is produced nor
does it consider the social meanings and functions involved in
3
it - despite its strong awareness of their importance .
"This analysis limits itself to the effects of
physical, perceptible objects. There are other
influences on imageabi1ity, such as the social
meaning of an area, its function, its history, or
even its name. These will be glossed over, since the
objective here is to uncover the role of form itself.
It is taken for granted that in actual design form should
be used to reinforce meaning, and not to negate it."
(Lynch, p.46)
Nevertheless, the operative value of the images developed
on the basis recommended by Lynch when actually planning or
designing a city or part of it is not immediately accessible.
Despite their involvement of physical elements, the images
themselves do not by necessity constitute part of the designer's
prestructured knowledge. This is because the construction of
these images is highly subjective and dependent on their
definition by other individuals, and their definition by different
individuals or even groups needs to be constantly discovered and
3. Castells (19773 pp. 216-7) points out that3 although the identity
of an image and its possession of a structure may remain
within a pure deployment of forms (referring to one another
according to a code)3 the introduction of meaning necessarily
brings into play the process of production of these forms3
their insertion in a socially determined content. There is
thus a contradiction between Lynch's approach which is
'designatory' implying an autonomous logic of forms and the
results of his analysis3 which refer constantly to a social
meaning that is always external and consequently' largely
arbitrary. Further specific discussion of Lynch's work can
be followed in Appendix I3 pp. 322-3.
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externalized. The problem of how they can be objectified and
made design-operative remains largely unresolved.
atlon. Ther are many difficulties associated with drawing
conclusions about the ability to move and act spatially from
information regarding the ability to give schematized represent¬
ations of that space and vice versa (Harvey, 1969, p. 193). The
dangers involved in confusing the perceptual level with the
representational level, in fact, have long been recognized in the
field of psychology and its associated fields. For instance, in
their work on the developmental conception of space in children,
Piaget and Inhelder (1956; summarized in Harvey, 1969, p.193)
have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between perception
of space and the representation of space by imaginary concepts.
They suggest that the ability to represent space schematically
is influenced by culture and the existence of signs and symbols
designed to represent that space. In some cases, the jump from
perception to schematic representation may not even be achieved if
the appropriate representational tools are culturally lacking.
Pocock and Hudson (1978, p.47), therefore, argue the need for
a broad theory which, on the one hand, would ideally link the
structure and content of the image to the process that produces
images, while, on the other, it would link the structure and
content of that image to some form of observable behaviour. That




3.2.2 Humanistic (Existential/Phenomenological) Formulations
Besides embodying a psychological dimension, this type of
formulation equally subscribes to existentialism and phenomeno¬
logy. To differentiate itself, particularly in the geographical
4
and planning literature, it calls itself 'humanistic' . Central
to its view of space, is the concept of 'place'.
3.2.2.1 Space as place
Space as place is defined as a centre of meaning or a focus
of human emotional attachment and the affective patterns of
identification with places, irrespective of their scale, are taken
as the object of investigation. In fact, the claim has been made
that,
"when the experience of places is taken as a focus,
then the scale does not have qualitative signifi¬
cance." (Canter, 1977, p.3).
Methodologically, therefore, the environmental scale at which
investigations are conducted may vary from object-tokens, such as
beds in hospital wards, to regions and countries. Underlying the
exploration of such a wide range of spatial units is the assumption
4. Influential work in the geographical/planning literature is
spearheaded by E. Relph (for instance, his 1976) and
Tuan (for example, his 1974; 1975; 1977). For a compre¬
hensive review of this literature and a good explication
of the concepts involved, see Entrikin (1976).
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that the psychological processes involved are similar (Canter,
1 977, p.2). Consequently, there seems to be a growing consensus
to take particular units of the environment as synonymous with
places, while space becomes a 'system of places'.
Important to the conception of space as place is the concept
of 'existential space'. Entrikin (1976, pp.625-6) gives a
general summary of definitions of this concept. Existential space
is taken as the 'concrete' space of man's primitive and original
contact with the world; his bodily presence in the world. It
is a non-geometric space of human concern and involvement. It
represents an 'intentional network' which connects objects of
concern with the intentional consciousness ('egocentric space').
At a larger scale, existential space represents an area of shared
meaning and value for a group, such as a neighbourhood space or
national space.
However, despite its recent popularity in the geographical
and planning fields, the direct impact of the humanistic perspec¬
tive on architectural theory proper - apart from the limited
influence of the work of Norberg-Schulz - seems negligible.
3.2.2.2 Norberg-Schulz and the concept of existential space
For Norberg-Schulz (1971; 1975; 1976), the most important
notion is that of existential space and its possible transforma¬
tion into architectural space. He defines existential space as
space symbolizing man's being in the world. In order to attain
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architectural significance, existential space is linked to the
physical environment symbolically through constituent elements
(places, paths and domains). As symbolic forms, these are
determined by the interaction of man and his environment. These
elements can be manifested at different environmental levels,
ranging from the level of the landscape to the urban level of
human settlements and finally to the level of single buildings
or parts of them.
Although the conceptual investigations of Norberg-Schulz
are of considerable exploratory value and offer useful insights
into the concepts he introduces, the applied qualities of these
concepts (at a methodological level) still remain unspecific in
terms of concrete architectural practice. This is a limitation
which extends to the whole area of psycho-humanistic studies.
3.2.3 The Contribution of the Psycho-Humanistic Perspective
Evaluated
An inspection of the available literature suggests that the
majority of psycho-humanistic spatial studies do not explicitly
involve a sociological dimension. Most of the models (considered
as behavioural models; Buttimer, 1972, p. 285) rest heavily on
generalizations about relationships of humans to their enviroment,
but they do not involve the social processes by which the artif¬
icial environment itself is produced.
In its present form, the psycho-humanistic perspective can
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only progress if it is seen as a form of criticism (Entrikin,
1976) or else if its stronger concepts are assimilated or
accommodated by theories of greater power and high empirical
content. As a form of criticism it has challenged and continues
to challenge the excesses of purely formalistic theories. It
has questioned their basic premises in a manner which has high¬
lighted the gaps and over-simplifications they make in treating
such complex and socially evaluated phenomena as those of the
built environment. Additionally, it has reaffirmed the importance
of the study of meaning and subjective values by drawing
attention to the fact that design is about people and not mere
objects. Hence its humanizing influence and the anthropocentricism
it implies will continue to be worthwhile.
On the conceptual level, a series of major concepts has
been evolved. The meanings assigned to these concepts are not
5
standardized or unambiguous , but as tools for general understand¬
ing they are of considerable value. Within the context of this
thesis, the concept of 'schema' (especially as 'spatial schema')
is an important one. Though it is only a loose interpretive
model, it does have distinctive cognitive properties that are not
found in other models of perception, memory and programming of
5. Studies attempting to atarify the concepts involved include
Lee (1976); Pocock and Hudson (1978); Tuan (1975). What
seems to be agreed upon is that all these are mnemonic devices
which help build the same theoretical framework through which
empirical investigations can be conducted. The idea is that
theoretically people use these devices to classify and organize
sense-data for the purpose of navigating paths through space,
locating themselves and other objects in space and coordinating
their activities (Cullen, 1978, p.399).
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behaviour (Lee, 1976, p.182). And while in its original inception
it had no specific morphological properties, it has since acquired
implications of morphology and dynamism. Its major advantage to
this study lies in its power to clarify the concept of the
architectural prototype. Reciprocally, the concept of schema
itself can be made increasingly operative in design terms. An
equally significant concept which is also helpful to this
discussion is that of 'image'. Its role in relation to the other
two concepts is discussed below.
3.2.4 Schema, image and prototype
As a psychological concept, 'schema' has its development
mainly in the work of Bartlett and later in that of Piaget and,
Inhelder. According to Lee (1976, pp.182-3) - who is widely
credited with introducing the concept into the field of built
g
environment studies and originating the concept of spatial schema -
Bartlett (1932) used the term schema in a wide sense, although
mainly in relation to remembered material and the inner templates
that appeared to form as a result of the development of skilled
activity. His central theme was that there are internal
representations upon which an individual draws as a reference
when attempting to construct, say, a picture. It is this
generally accepted set of expectations which enables people to
produce a drawing and also contributes to its distortion (Canter,
6. See, for example, Lee (1963; 1968). One major characteristic
of spatial schemata is that they include areas and places
never experienced, but known indirectly through information.
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1977, p.13). Piaget and Inhelder (1956; Piaget, 1971) have also
developed the concept of schema in a similar fashion, but made more
explicit the means by which new experiences are incorporated into
it. Two equilibration processes are said to be involved. The
first is 'assimilation1; the second is 'accommodation1. Assimila¬
tion refers to the incorporation of new and different experience
into already structured schemata. Accommodation involves
reflexive modification and readjustments of existing schemata in
the light of new experience. The two processes work simultaneously,
the one complementing the other.
However, to acquire a strong morphological dimension, a
schema may be viewed as incorporating a representational pattern
of the structure of something as well as a pattern for action on
it, either in the abstract by manipulating representational
symbols or in real life by actually doing something physically.
Within this definition, the concept of image may be introduced.
Both terms, schema and image are occasionally used interchangeably
in the literature. A popular definition is to see image as a
mental representation of that part of reality known through
direct or indirect experiences, grouping various attributes and
combining them according to certain rules (Rapoport, 1977, p.115).
Yet, it seems more productive to consider images as components
of schemata. In the sense that if a schema is considered as a
field or multi-dimensional structure, then images refer to specific
descriptive modalities embedded hierarchically within that
structure. More precisely, there seems to be no obvious need to
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lay strict conditions that direct experience must always be
involved in constructing or acquiring schemata or images. It
should be possible to develop these through whatever means are
possible including direct experience or objectified means such
as education, reading, information and so on - together or singly.
Of course, the more of these are involved (especially direct
experience) the richer and more accurate the image or schema may
tend to be, although the danger of it becoming confused or
distorted is also there.
In short, an image can be seen as an internal representation,
construct or understanding of an aspect of an existing or presumed
reality according to some particular objectified or even personal
(subjective) model of investigation or'way of seeing'. This means
that an image is reductionist. It is limited by the specific
descriptive substance it employs to construct itself. For
instance, if an object is studied, experienced or apprehended on
a geometrical basis, then a geometrical image is obtained and (for
the time being at least) this image may tend to dominate all
other potentially obtainable images of that same object. In
terms of architecture, for example, an architectural structure may
have an activity image, an environmental or an institutional
image. It may also have subordinate images which come under these.
What is important, however, is that an architectural schema is
more than any of these images, but may incorporate any one of them
or all of them together. It may also accord predominancy to one
over the others. In this sense, a schema has a higher qualitative
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content than an image; though it is constituted by images. But
while a schema or an image may be related to the physical organiz¬
ation of, say, an environmental object, none of them necessarily
conincide with it. They somehow remain at a distance from it.
And that distance is a source of interpretation and meaning.
In a preliminary form, the relationship between the concept
of the architectural prototype and schema can be viewed as follows.
A prototype may be taken as synonymous with a schema insofar as it
is conceived as an internal or deep level construct in which differ¬
ent images of an architectural reality are well structured and inco¬
rporated. However, unlike schemata, prototypes are not entirely
psychological. The concept of prototype can be extended to incorp¬
orate a highly objectified content including the possible realization
in terms of concrete objects, such as buildings. This is not to "
argue that a prototype is necessarily a building, but, on the other
hand, any building can be investigated as, or modelled on, a
prototype (see Section 6.4 and also Chapters 8 and 9). A prototype
may also manifest itself in the form of a design project (or a design
schema) and so on. In other words, a prototype may be internalized
in the form of a design schema by individuals or groups, but still it
may manifest its existence outside individuals as such altogether.
Thus knowledge about prototypes can be gained by studying the built
environment itself or by studying design action or biographical
accounts of it, or even by innovation in terms of speculative or
concrete research programmes. By definition, a comprehensive archi¬
tectural prototype must include (in some hierarchical fashion)
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an activity, environmental and institutional image .
3.3 SYNTACTIC FORMULATIONS
Structural analogies drawn between language and architecture,
with language as a base, are generally designed to establish closer
morphisms between the two. The aim is to aid the investigation of
complex architectural structures by drawing on models of language
since these have proved productive in many other areas of research.
Formally, the Chomskyan version of the modern linguistic theory of
syntax has provided a propular model for these analogies. With
respect to artificial space, the 'space syntax1 model of Hillier
and Leaman and their co-authors can be discussed as a well developed
example.
Some of the theoretical considerations which underlie the space
syntax model originated in Hillier and Leaman's earlier work.
Much of this earlier work was concerned with characterizing the
design process and the kind of prestructures that make design
O
possible . The significance of the arguments connected with this
to the project of this thesis have already been acknowledged
(Section 1.3) and will be further clarified in due course (Section 8.2
in particular). However, because of the specificity of the space
syntax model and the projected attempt to develop it into a formal
7. This discussion is elaborated at various instances in the
remaining parts of this thesis3 particularly Part III.
8. See especially Eillier et at (1972); Eillier and Leaman
(1974a).
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theory of space applicable to both architecture and society, the
discussion here will be mainly concerned with it in the form in
which it has been concretely formulated, especially in its latest
version (Hillier et al, 1976).
5.3.1 The Space Syntax Model of Hillier and Leaman and their
Co-Authors
The space syntax model represents an attempt to develop
(through a selective merging of linguistic and mathematical
g
considerations) a formal language - said to be a member of what
are termed 'morphic languages' - on the basis of which a series
of generative/descriptive patterns are drawn. These patterns are
then used to investigate the spatial structures of existing human
settlements and complex buildings. In the same manner, it is hoped
that these particular patterns will provide a means for the
comparable investigation of the social deployment of society in
space; the argument being that:
"Morphic languages are the realisation of abstract
structure in the real world. They convey 'meaning', not
in the sense of representing something else, but only in
the sense of constituting a pattern. Thus if, as we
believe, both space organisation and social structures are
morphic languages, the construction of a social theory of
space organisation becomes a question of understanding the
relations between the principles of pattern generation in
both." (Hillier et al, 1976, p.152)
Invariably, Hillier and Leaman (the senior authors) adopt the
9. The qualification is made (Hillier et al, 1976, p.152) that
morphia languages differ from both natural and mathematical
languages, yet fall between them and borrow certain properties
from each.
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view that elementary space organization structures are barrier-
structures whose evolution towards higher structural degrees may be
described by functional variables - such as contiguity, differ¬
entiation, boundaries and permeability - and operational rules
(fundamentally aggregational) aiming at transforming simpler
structures into more complex ones (Hillier and Leaman, 1974b). The
key to their analysis lies in the concept of the 'internal
transformability1 of an object according to a morphic system which
defines two structures called the 'deep' and the 'surface' structures.
Both structures are conceived in a manner which is epistemologically
analogous to their definition by Chomsky (1965). Chomsky says that,
in a linguistic system, deep structure is partly defined by,
"Universal rules [the rules of grammar] which specify an
abstract underlying order of elements that makes
possible the functioning of transformational rules ...
that map deep structures into surface ones."
(Chomsky, 1965, p.141)
This transformational process preserves the deep structure,
however complex or varied the surface one becomes. In effect, the
deep structure is to be taken as to constitute the fundamental
conditions for the existence of the surface one. This distinguishes
the 'structural approach' from the 'systemic' one as far as
intelligibility is concerned (Hillier and Leaman, 1974a, p.6).
The space syntax model postulates a syntactic component in
architecture which would be capable of generating both deep and
surface structures (through transformations). It accepts the
concept of syntax in its general epistemological nature, rather
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than in its narrowly technical linguistic definition of
constituting principles of combining words (in a linear fashion)
to form grammatically correct sentences. It defines syntax in
morphic languages as,
"a set of related rule structures formed out of
elementary combinations of the elementary objects,
relations and operations."
(Hi 11ier et al, 1976, p.150).
Now, the general cognitive value of the concept of syntax is
undeniable. By this is meant the idea that structure cannot be
found at the surface level of overt observable relations, but must
be deductively attained through abstraction and the construction
of models of the system of organizational principles that underlies,
regulates or generates surface phenomena. Such a view is productive
in explaining the successive transformations of structure from the
elementary to the complex ('complexity chain') at a certain level
of investigation. It can be successfully employed to show (as
indeed the space syntax model has done) that a series of
apparently disconnected surface phenomena are internally related
insofar as they are derived from the same basic deep elementary
structure - irrespective of the particular transformational
histories of their coming into being in the real world.
Theoretically, it shows that knowledge of syntactic patterns,
although not necessarily always conscious, at least partly under¬
lies design action.
An important question is whether in the sphere of everyday
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design practice it is necessary to postulate that purely syntactic
patterns underlie design action. By definition a formal model
like the space-syntax model is reductionist. Its immediate link
with real problem-situations remains difficult to identify; it being
too general andf&o abstract to support any specifiable empirical
content. Within its own premises, it may succeed in giving
reasonably accurate descriptions of spatial structures of
artificial space, but its ability to deal with differentiation of
descriptive substances (such as the activity, environmental,
institutional and so on) is likely to be limited. It can only
operate at synchronous levels of consideration, therefore, incapable
of explaining in what precise way a structure is transformed from















Fig. 3.4 Deep and surface structure; complexity
and deepness chains
Now, if it is accepted that design action is organized primarily
to conduct historically specific modes of material appropriation,
then it is obvious that the realization of the abstract deep
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structure in the real world is neither entirely random nor a
purely syntactic formal process. It is also intentional and
governed by socio-cultural processes which are historically
originated and have a logic which is by no means entirely spatial
or limited to the production of artificial space as an isolated
product. Other influences relate to the kind of technologies used,
the ideologies involved and the specific kind of natural environ¬
ment that is supposed to be modified. Therefore, design action is
predominantly articulated within what might be called a 'semantic
universe1, in the sense that the production of meaning is both its
start (its programme) and its most important result.
In general, what a purely syntactic strategy usually results
in is to resolve the relation between deep and surface structure
by giving primacy to the former and its purely syntactic logic.
But it is important to remember that the transformation of the deep
structure into a surface structure ('deepness chain') is a semantic
process and it is the surface structure which is ultimately
effected by design action. A particular surface structure is,
furthermore, a choice among many. Therefore, the act of designing
it involves evaluation. But this act of evaluation (which is
essentially a semantic act) must intervene long before that
particular surface structure is effected. This can only happen
at some deep level of consideration. In effect, it belongs more
to the deep structure than the surface one and must, therefore,
have rather serious repercussions on it and on its syntaxes^.
10. Incidentally3 recent linguistic research also seems to show
that semantic considerations have considerable repercussions
on syntax at the very deep levels of utterances (Chomsky
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Operationally, real-life design action is much constrained
(if only by time) in its ability to posit an autonomous deep
structure against an autonomous surface structure (which anyway
does not exist at the moment of design) and explore all the possible
mappings between them. This might potentially be possible in a
science which is only interested in description and has all the
kind of surface phenomena that interests it available to it, but
not with a design science - especially at the moment of its
practice and when it is initiating a new reality. Therefore, the
deep structures which underlie design action must be highly syn¬
thetic in character (where both the semantic and syntactic dimensions
have been integrated) and much easier to evaluate, if they were to
find immediate application.
Thus the problem of how the semantic dimension is related to
the syntactic dimension and how to identify the appropriate level
of abstraction where the deep structure is defined both
syntactically and semantically is a very important problem in any
attempt to produce design knowledge which is effectively operative.
This appropriate level of abstraction has been called here the
'syntagmatic level1 - the level of highly structured prototypes
and synthetic design schemata, (see Part II, especially Chapters 6
and 7).
10. (contd) himself now recognizes this). This makes the complete
isolation of any level of the linguistic system and/or
structure methodologically inadequate (Wilden, 1972, p.232).
See also Leech (1974) and Appendix I (particularly3 Section 4)
for an elaboration on this point.
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3.4 SEMIOLOGICAL (OR SEMIOTIC) FORMULATIONS11
Studies which investigate the built environment semiologically
are now widespread and although space is a common theme(Rapoport,
1975), the subject matter is mixed and wide ranging. Studies
extend from concern over the nature of architectural elements,
such as staircase, door, window, column and the like (for example,
Eco, 1972); through concern over the nature of whole buildings
(for instance, Jencks and Baird, 1969; Norberg-Schulz, 1963); to
concern over the nature of whole human settlements (for example,
Lagopoulos, 1975). Others are concerned with analyses related
. to media - graphical representations, models, verbal descriptions
and so forth - used in the design process. An emerging area of
11. In the related literature, the terms semiology and semiotics -
despite their common etymological origin (the Greek word
semeion meaning sign) - da not mean the same thing to their
respective adherents. The reason is the independence of their
epistemological origins. The term 'semiology' has been founded
in the Saussurian linguistics. It was envisaged to designate
a future science of sign, the conceptual basis and methodo¬
logical apparatus of which would be guided by linguistics as
a pilot science and modelling perspective. 'Semiotics'
(o.rignally, termed in the singular 'semiotic') has its major
origins in the philosophy of C.S. Peirce (with his well-known
trichotomies - famous among which is the sign triad, of icon,
index and symbol) and that of C.W. Morris (with his well-known
division of the field into syntactics, semantics and prag¬
matics). It has been posited as a science of sign, but to
be developed in a manner independent of linguistics. It has
recently (Eco, 1976) been developing towards becoming an all-
embracing interdisciplinary science concerned with all systems
of communications. In this thesis, however, the term semiology
will be generally preferred. This is mainly because much of
the well developed linguistic/semiological terminology and
concepts have proved (with qualifications) valuable to the
overall subject matter which is under discussion.
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concern also is that of textual analysis of the architectural
12
writings of Vitruvius, Alberti, Palladio and others
3.4.1 Architecture as a System of Signs
Semiological studies invariably express the belief that
semiology, largely on its own, is capable of providing both a
theory and a methodology for investigating architectural meaning
as reflected either in architectural products or in the conceptual
13
means by which they are understood, described, produced or expressed .
The general objective which has been postulated by architec¬
tural semiologists has been that, through the consideration of
architecture as a system of signs and as a systematic and specific
way of organizing forms and meaning, more effective architectural
knowledge can be produced. Similar claims to the production of
effective knowledge have been repeatedly made in other theoretical
and critical approaches to architecture (Agrest and ..Gandelsonas,
1977, p.97). The basic difference between semiology and these
other approaches lies in the former's specific attempt to develop
models that are consciously intended to take problems of meaning
12. For a critical study of the various themes, see Agrest and
Gandelsonas (1977).
13. For example, Broadbent (1978, p.475): "If all buildings
inevitably carry meaning, then we should do well to see how they
do it. At the very least, that will help us to understand all
buildings better. And if over buildings are going to symbolise
anyway - despite our best (or worst) intentions - then an
understanding of how they do so may help us design them to do
it better. The most promising way of looking at these things
seems to be the Theory of Signs which has been developing from
the work of Ferdinand de Saussure ... and Charles Sanders
Peirce ..." (his emphasis)
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into account and, therefore, make it potentially more productive.
Unfortunately, this potential is, as yet, far from being realized.
A major problem has been the unmistakably high degree of
involvement of the functionalist paradigm. By implication, most
studies claim that they are opposed to functional ism, but closer
examination reveals their strong dependence on it in some way or
another. For instance, objects in the environment are seen to have
inherent meaning which is special to them; thus architectural
elements possess meaning that they can communicate and consequently
they are treated as signs. The obvious conclusion being made is
that architecture can be considered as a system of signs equivalent
to other communication systems, such as language.
Conclusions of this kind have been strengthened by the
successes made by semiological theory in the fields of linguistics,
literary analysis and anthropology. But this overlooks an important
fact. In these areas,the semiological model has been contexfcvally
redefined on the basis of the empirical realities associated with
these areas (Maravelias, 1978, p.292). It is precisely this con¬
textual redefinition and use of the model that led to their
successes as encountered, for instance, in the works of Barthes,
Chomsky, L£vi-Strauss and others. Indeed, all three (Barthes,
Chomsky, L^vi-Strauss) are strongly opposed to the mechanical
transcription of models from one area to another without prior
13
consideration of indigenous theories and phenomena . Barthes
13. The relevant views of Levi-Strauss and Chomsky have been
reported in Section 1.2.2.
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(1973, p.112) says,
"Semiology, once its limits are settled, is not a
metaphysical trap: it is a science among others,
necessary but not sufficient. The important thing is to
see that the unity of explanation cannot be based on
the amputation of one or the other of its approaches,
but, as Engels said, on the dialectical coordination
of the particular sciences it makes use of. This is
the case of mythology: it is a part both of semiology
inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of ideology in¬
asmuch as it is an historical science: it studies ideas-
in-form."
In the context of architectural semiology, Agrest and
Gandelsonas (1977) express similar views. They present many
cases which stress the efficacy of indigenous architectural models,
especially those which have their origin in theories of
architectural criticism and in the history of architecture. The
- main argument is that indigenous theories of architecture, through
their close relationship with the practice of architecture, might
provide semiology with a closer and more direct view of the
problems that architects are trying to solve.
3.4.2 The Evaluation of Present Semiological Contributions
Two recent reviews (Broadbent, 1978; Agrest and Gandelsonas,
1977) may be consulted for lists of references and coimients on the
14
state of the art . What emerges is that semiological studies in
architecture seem to be troubled by two things; first, by the
14. Broadbent's paper is rather general and with an obvious aim to
popularize the subject. Less so is Agrest and Gandelsonas '
article. It is more rigorous and particularly critical of the
high level of uncriticality and unspecificity observed in many
studies.
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obvious state of confusion and conflict (both conceptually and
terminologically) in which 'general semiological theory' itself is
engulfed (being still in a state of early development and not yet
a well articulated science); second, as observed above, by the
very uncritical and somewhat superficial way semiological concepts
have been imported and applied to architecture. The result of all
this has been reflected in the high level of generality of most of
the semiological research so far being conducted and its lack of
specific concepts and models appropriate to architecture (Agrest
and Gandelsonas, 1977, p.93).
This situation had been aggravated by the negative attitude
which accepts the necessity of working entirely within the
linguistic framework, while ignoring many basic structural
15
differences between language and architecture . As systems, there
are some parallels between them, but this parallelism cannot be
stretched too far.
Particularly important to architecture is the fact that
environmental artefacts are models having a multivariant nature.
They do not have isolated structures assignable to them by an
infinite productivity controlled by more or less explicit grammatical
rules (Agrest arid Gandelsonas 1977, p.95), nor do they contain
specifiable encoded meanings which a knowledge of specific codes
or their grammar would enable one to decipher once and for all.
15. Major structural differences include the principle of linearity
in combining linguistic signs and the predominance of communica¬
tive value in evaluating them. The first principle as such has
no heading on architecture, while the second is fundamentally
secondary to it.
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This is simply because the operations of their production and
consumption enable them to be structured in a variety of ways.
More appropriately, when a subject assigns structures or forms to
them, he does so on what Morberg-Schulz (1963) or Pettit (1975)
would call a 'Gestalt basis' or through 'reflective abstraction'
in the piagetian sense, rather than by a definite generative
procedure. The generative ability related to language as described,
say, by Chomsky's model is probably related to the biological
characteristics of man. But, while it would be too difficult to
deny the importance of architecture to man, there is no conclusive
proof that the production of architecture is a natural act as, say,
speech utterances are said to be natural acts. It is obvious that
only a limited number of people learn the architectural productive
mechanism in a process which should be seen as mainly sociological,
rather than coming from man's biological characteristics (Gandelsonas,
1973, p.21).
Therefore, the attempt to consider architecture as a system of
signs falling under the sphere of general semiology, and then to
take this as being both a methodological necessity and a theoretical
claim without justifying either through the empirical realities of
architecture or even disentangling one from the other, needs to be
resisted. Architecture has long established its legitimacy in
practical life. It has its history, its theories and its practices.
All of this cannot be systematically distorted for the expedience
of a conveniently available parent discipline. Nontheless, in
terms of methodology, a structural analysis which embodies a
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semiological dimension is both acceptable and feasible. Further¬
more, the difficulties attributed to the majority of semiological
applications should not obscure the fact that semiology, with its
conscious undertaking to deal with problems of meaning, is very
valuable. But to avoid the anomalies which have just been
referred to, a methodological shift is required from the commonly
adopted analytical attitude, and its preoccupation with devising
taxonomic typologies and investigating isolated environmental
objects.
3.4.5 The Syntagmatic Strategy
Apparently, the shift in methodology has already begun. A
number of studies in the recent literature discuss and develop a
new body of architecturally redefined notions that explicitly or
implicitly suggest the emergence of new approaches. These approaches
(at least in outline) adopt what might be called a 'syntagmatic
strategy1^, where elements acquire their meaning according to their
place in a system (a context) and through their permutation from
16. Such a syntagmatic strategy is pragmatic in outlook. It is
initially based on the Saussurian gesture that meaning requires
structure and that it is generated at the level of syntagmatic
formations (that is, in the structural solidarities formed by
signs through a set of systemic relationships). However,
this strategy completely refects any idea of the necessity of
strict linearity (which is essential to the formation of
linguistic syntagms) in the formation of architectural
syntagms. What remains essential is that the structural
solidarities are to be realized permutatively and are to be
investigated at a multiplicity of levels. Furthermore, what¬
ever level is taken or however deep it is, the structure of the
syntagm is dual in nature incorporating both a syntactic and a
semantic dimension. See Chapter 6,for detailed discussion.
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from one level of consideration to the other ^.
More generally, it seems to be agreed that semiology furnishes
structural analysis with a concept which is decisive in that it
makes explicit what is essential to every system of meaning, namely
its organization. This concept has been termed by Barthes (1977,
p.85) the level of description. According to Barthes (pp.85-9)
the idea of levels gives two types of relations: distributional
(if the relations are studied on the same level) and integrational
(if they are grasped hierarchically from one level to the next).
Consequently, distributional relations alone are not sufficient to
account for meaning. In order to conduct a structural analysis,
it is thus first of all necessary to distinguish several levels or
instances of description and to place these instances within a
hierarchical (that is integrational) perspective. Given such a
perspective, analysis cannot rest satisfied with a purely
distributional treatment of the units it defines. To understand a
structure is not merely to follow its horizontal unfolding, but also
to recognize its multi-level construction; to move from one level
of consideration to the next. It is integration in various forms
then, says Barthes, which compensates for the seemingly
17. See Awadallaet al (1976; 1977), where an outline of a syntagmatic
descriptive framework has been suggested (refer also to
Maravelias, 1978, for an elaboration of this within a climatic
design context); the self-criticism of Eco (1976) counterarguing
his own earlier conception of architectural sign; the general
discussion presented by Pettit (1975) in support of an approach
to the study of architecture and the non-literary arts through
what he terms 'syntagmatic structuralism'; and the many examples
cited by Agrest and Gandelsonas (1977) including the recent work
of G.C. Argan and their own, part of which is developed as a
critique of what they describe as historically emergent archi¬
tectural ideologies.
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heterogeneous and unmasterable complexity of units on a particular
level.
A structural analysis semiologically characterized and
developed within an architectural context may, then, be carried out
at two levels. First a conceptual level which relates to architec¬
ture as a science of the study of the built environment and its
structures. By necessity such a level is predominantly descriptive.
The second level relates to architecture as a practice. It is
fundamentally design-specific in character. In terms of space, the
conceptual level of structural analysis takes into account the
physical (that is environmental) existence of artificial space,
but also adds to it the kind of activities it is supposed to
accommodate as well as the institutional dimension (depending
largely on the system of social evaluation involved), both of which
contribute to its understanding. At the design-specific level,
structural analysis will be concerned with the artificial space
itself, but in relation to its design and production, mainly, but
not exclusively, through the preconceptions of those who design it.
In general, these preconceptions are based on complex processes
which reflect the internalization of equally complex spatial proto¬
types or schemata in the structure of which environmental, socio¬
economic, cultural and other aspects of the buiIt-environment have
been well integrated. The influence of these ready structured
prototypes on any new act of design is initially decisive and it may
continue to be so throughout the design process and beyond (at the
level of consumption).
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However, it will be wrong to see these two levels of considera¬
tion as separate: both are central to the subject matter of this
thesis and will be repeatedly addressed as the discussion progresses.
3.5 COMBINATORIAL AND CONFIGURATIONAL FORMULATIONS
Recent studies of the combinatorial and configurational type
reflect a significant shift in attitude. Compared to their opti¬
mization-orientated predecessors, these studies are guided by
18modest objectives . No programmatic claims are made to presenting
optimum or prescriptive solutions to satisfy prescribed functional
requirements. Instead, the whole idea of drawing specific lists
of functions as strict generative bases for architectural layout
designs is abandoned. Functions are viewed only as constraints and
concern is directed towards defining the limits to possible
solutions under such constraints or alternatively investigating
what constraints certain solution sets are likely to satisfy. Some
solutions may do this (probabilistically) in an optimum manner, but
not as a necessity.
3.5.1 The Contribution of March et al
Active research directed by the above shift in attitude is
18. Interestingly, even within the applied, mathematical sciences on
which these studies depend3 this shift has already occurred. Lewis
and Papadimitriou (19783 p.109) discussing the 'efficiency of
algorithms' have identified this: "A more profound compromise gives
up not only the requirement that a solution he optimal3 but also
the insistence that a less than optimum solution he guaranteed to
fall within a specific range. Instead the assurance is given that
the solution will not deviate far from the optimum."
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represented by much of the literature published in the journal
Environment and Planning - B, but especially the work of L. March,
W.J. Mitchell, P. Steadman and their co-workers. One of the many
areas of investigation under this type of research is the study of
combinatorial and enumeration problems - the number of ways that
spatial elements may be combined and partitioned to give distinct
'designs' and the adaptability of forms to accommodate activities
(March and Matela, 1974, p.231). The immediate aim is to show,
through employing combinatorial and other associated mathematical
procedures, that there are definable functional limits to the type
19
of floor plans (based initially on the criterion of adjacency)
that are possible and that these are, in fact, countable and
enumerable depending on the number of space cells (or rooms)
considered . What the work generally hopes to achieve is to provide
(statistically) useful profiles, bounds and distributions of
adjacency censuses for different populations of cellular forms that
are analogous to architectural plans.
This is based on the assumption that:
"...prior to any attempt to solve a particular architec¬
tural layout problem it is of value to have studied the
properties of certain solution sets even though these
are abstract and extremely simplified."
(March and Matela, 1974, p.196)
19. This is taken as a reflection of the intuitive recognition of




"... a designer with a well-understood and structured
vocabulary of form is more likely to find suitable
matchings with functional requirements than one who
attempts to let form follow function in some
supposedly self-generative way."
(March and Matela, 1974, p.212)
For instance, March and Earl (1977), through investigating
recent enumeration results in the field of combinatorics and
relating them to the problem of counting various classes of
architectural floor plans and their adjacency structures, demon¬
strate the existence of an isomorphism between the set of trivalent
3-polytopes (three-dimensional forms in which three polygonal
faces are incident at each vertex) with n+1 polygonal faces and a
class of architectural plans with n rooms - including internal court¬
yards and the like. They argue (p.59) that such a class of plans is
fundamental in the sense that all architectural plans with n rooms
may be derived from it through ornamentation. They conceive of
ornamentation in a manner which is consistent with Frank Lloyd
Wright's view that ornamentation presents an integral process in
architectural design: the material expression and enhancement of
underlying structure.
"... ornament is to architecture what efflorescent of a
tree or plant is to its structure. Of the thing, not
on it." (Wright, 1953, p.348, his emphasis)
Thus for March and Earl (p.59):
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"... room formation is not itself a design problem,
whereas ornamentation is. Immanent structures for
each and every room formation are finite in number and
known aprioristically: architectural design is
preeminently a matter of selection and the appropriate
physical and material transformation of one of these
fundamental plans." (Their emphasis)
This, in effect, implies that evaluation is an inescapable
aspect of design action. Furthermore, implied in the research
programme itself is the notion that functional relations between
cells are of a qualitative nature and it is through introducing
constraints that the quantitative aspects to these relations can
be progressively revealed. For example, the work of P. Steadman and
his co-workers (see, for instance, Steadman, 1970; 1976; Mitchell
et al, 1976) shows how a dimensioning constraint (within rectangularly
dissected plans) can be introduced. The resulting dimensioned
adjacency structures (and their elaboration into cells whose areas
Le //ri
and parametric lengths are derivable) are amenable to A made
increasingly specific (and thus of more practical interest) by
introducing into them further constraints that enrich their
empirical content. Perhaps climatic factors may present the next
type of constraints that could be incorporated. Hence the specificity
of these adjacency structures, one hopes, can only improve with time
and, therefore, become more practical.
Significantly, this type of research illustrates the workings
20
of some important emergent views on the design process . These
views recognize the synthetic nature (what have been called in this
20. The specific contribution of March to the debate on the design
process wilt be introduced in some detail in Section 8.2.
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thesis the prototypic nature) of design action, the importance of
prestructures (whose properties may sometimes be specifiable within
certain constraints) and that usually some preliminary solution has
to be allowed to emerge before much detailed analysis on problem
requirements can be carried out. This is because,
"part of the problem in design happens to be the solution!
The'solution' when arrived at inevitably poses further
problems ... Some of these problems arise from the fact
that internal conditions cannot traditionally be taken into
account until the solution is made explicit. However,
this study suggests that at least some internal
properties of form can be introduced initially in terms
of population bounds .... Thus the extreme bounds for
certain properties may be used as internally determined
constraints: it is known that no solutions can possess
values outside these ranges, and it would be futile to
attempt to match some functional need to a population
which could not possibly satisfy it."
(March and Matela, 1974, p.214)
However, it has to be noted that concern within this area of
research is still largely limited to the investigation of spatial
structures at the environmental level. The more general problem
of discussing simultaneously 'spatial' and 'aspatial' structures
and how they interrelate at the environmental, activity and
institutional levels has not yet been seriously approached. It
is only within such a broad framework that the operational
character of the adjacency structures enumerated in relation to
specific design situations can be fully apprehended. Nontheless,
the related attempt by R.T. Atkin to discuss the interrelation
between spatial and aspatial structure, though its degree of
success is still difficult to estimate, is worth reporting.
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3.5.2 Atkin and the Structural Relationship between Spatial and
Aspatial Structure
The work of Atkin (1974a; 1974b, 1974c; 1975) represents an
elaborate formal attempt to discuss the interaction between spatial
(referring to the distribution of phenomena in space) and aspatial
(referring to the interrelation of phenomena within non-spatial -
that is political, cultural and so on - frames of reference)
structure. This problem was identified by Foley (1964) in relation
to his attempt to develop a general conceptual framework for
21
investigating 'metropolitan structure1 . Atkin's (1974a, pp.52-3)
basic assumption is to view aspatial structure, such as an organiza¬
tion of activities or of social relationships, to exist in a space
of its own - not the ordinary three-dimensional space of objects,
but the multidimensional space needed to describe the structure.
In consequence, he views the mutual interaction of a spatial
structure with an aspatial one as itself being a structure
describable in a higher dimensional mathematical space. This he
considers as providing a fundamental structural basis for the study
of urban and architectural structures, and the social processes
associated with them.
More generally, Atkin emphasizes the point that, once we
decide on the system that interests us, the search for an appro¬
priate topology or algebra is the most crucial step in our effort
to investigate that system. In effect, he develops a rigorous
mathematical language (the language of so-called simplicial
21. Foley's conceptual framework is made use of in the following
chapter, Section 4.6.
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complexes or q-analysis) to which the idea of identifying sets and
understanding the structural properties of relations between them is
central. The attempt itself reflects a special concern to develop a
mathematical structure rich enough to support the mapping of
empirical (numerical) observations onto it. The most important
aspect to it is that it does not treat 'structure' as merely distri¬
butional, but also in a hierarchical manner, where a structure is
investigated at some level N, while at the same time it is recognized
that there are immediate levels N-l and N+l (and also beyond these)
below and above level N that are important to its appropriate
understand!- ng.
Technically, the mathematical language developed is complex
and demanding. Nevertheless, despite the richness of Atkin's
programme, there remain a number of difficulties which may inhibit
its full implementation in a complex system such as the built
environment. For example, it is not obvious how a chosen geo¬
metrical backcloth is arrived at in the first place or how sets
are to be defined or their elements identified (much of the
phenomena involved is non-digital) or how to put numerical values
on whatever traffic that is between them. Obviously, what elements
appear to signify in relation to a given space is very difficult
to identify, since there is no guaranteed isomorphism between an
abstractly constructed element and an empirical spatial reality
which is likely to contain phenomena in an overlapping manner.
Another difficulty is how to make the different estimates on the
different types of traffic comparable (some may relate to colour,
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some to cost, some to distance, some to material and so forth) .
Atkin himself recognizes these kinds of problems, and, in fact,
despite the stringent demand his programme places on defining sets
and their elements, he never suggests or claims that the
significance of these problems could in any way be ignored. In a
way (even within physical science), he ascribes a subjective, but
highly objectified (through theories, models and so on) aspect to
our dealing with reality, in the sense that the observer cannot
totally exclude himself from the reality he investigates. "This
naturally involves an interaction between himself [the observer]
and not-himself, between observer and observed, and ultimately
this means that he must use his physical senses" (Atkin, 1974c,
p.82). Moreover, Atkin's conception of 'space' is quite opposed to
taking space as something absolute or a priori.
"It is essentially a Newtonian idea (rather than an
observation) that space is something a priori, a
sort of thing wherein objects are found. We move
around and have our being in space-, we are not a
structural part of that thing space. On the other
hand it is essentially a Leibnitzian view that our
idea of space is a concomitant of the relations
between objects. In other words, Leibnitz sought
for the meaning of the word 'space' in relations
between observed sets (of objects) and not as an
unobservable prerequisite for observed sets."
(Atkin, 1974c, pp.82-3, his emphasis)
The difference between the two conceptions of space, says
Atkin (p.83), is profound and turns out to be important in the form
and content of physical theories about all phenomena set against a
23. This is similar to the questions encountered by theories of
taxonomy and pattern recognition. See Jardine and Sibson
(1971) and Hubert (1974 ), for a discussion.
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backcloth of the thing called 'space'. However, while these two
conceptions may appear as opposed to each other, in fact, within
an architectural context, each holds true at some conceptual
level of consideration (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4).
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the preceding survey, it can be argued that no
specific comprehensive framework can be found within which research
on the different aspects of space and its relation to architecture
is coordinated and comparative studies might be implemented. Many
investigators seem inclined to deal with space, and consequently
the built environment, according to the disciplinary origin of
the descriptors they employ, though attention is paid to evolving
these within an architectural context. The result is an obvious
disparity between the different formulations which cannot as yet
claim a unifying theory or a conceptual structure through which
they enrich the positive qualities of each other. Thus their
collective import tends to be limited. In their own separate
ways, they, of course, do have potential implications (ranging
from the strong to the weak) for architectural design, but many of
them are rather difficult to interpret easily at that level
and most of the knowledge produced remains at a preoperational
stage.
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Nevertheless, though the discussion in this chapter has tended
to be critical, it would be quite wrong to suggest that any of the
present formulations is unimportant or not useful. As serious
forms of analysis, they offer insight at various levels of consider¬
ation and each adds something valuable to our understanding. They
capture an aspect of reality which would otherwise remain hidden.
Some constructive concepts and well articulated descriptive tools
have been evolved and related to architectural phenomena. These
may usefully be adopted in the development of new theory. A
constructive task for theory is to investigate how the different
images, created by the descriptors it embodies, relate to the real
'identity' of environmental structures, and to the limitations and
potential of design action. Important to this is not whether
'artificial space' or the built environment is technically
describable in terms of a particular set of descriptors, but how
comprehensive this set of descriptors is, what are the contra¬
dictions and anomalies within and between the different images it
creates, and what is the operational status and problem-solving
capacity of the knowledge produced.
What makes such a theory viable is that there seems to
emerge from the different formulations a general awareness and
interest in the concept of 'structure' as a tool for understanding.
This awareness establishes a preliminary unifying link between the
different approaches. This makes the role played by structure
quite central to any new conceptualization. An important task,
then, is to uncover the nature of the concept of structure and
94
broaden its scope.
The chapter that follows, Part II and Appendices I and II make
a contribution in that direction, but closely related to questions
of built environment. That is also where the syntagmatic framework
will be discussed in some detail and extended in its application.
The following chapter, however, continues to deal with aspects of
space in order to elucidate the concept of 'architectural space'.
Some new terminology which will be of benefit in later parts of
this thesis is also introduced, while the general features that
constitute what might be termed an 'architectural structure' are
established in preliminary form.
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CHAPTER 4
SPACE, ARCHITECTURE AND STRUCTURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, it was shown that the multitude of
approaches specially designed to deal with space in the built
environment are varied in origin and orientation; none of them
being separately sufficient, but each of them helping towards a
better understanding. What they reveal is that, like other
powerful concepts, 'space' is prolific with meaning and that
at different times and in different architectural contexts one is
dealing with different kinds of spaces whose congruence is an
important issue in design. But how do notions of space generally
arise? This chapter sets out to explore, in brief, some of the
various ways spatial experience and fundamental conceptualizations
of space are said to originate and to become differentiated. It
draws initially on the contribution made by developmental theory
(from a Cassirerian-Piagetian-Wernerian point of view), but
elaborates the discussion progressively in order to involve evidence
presented by many authors (including Harvey, Arnheim, Eisenman and
Langer) who discuss the idea of space in relation to many fields
(such as physical science, geography, anthropology and art), but
most importantly attempt to define it in architectural terms. This
yields a number of fundamental conceptual tools which when
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combined with the ones already obtained in the preceding chapter,
^us-
explain much of the underlying structure of man-made environment.
This leads to a generalized definition of what constitutes
'artificial' or 'architectural space' as opposed to 'natural space'
and what is the relationship between these two and between them and
man - most significantly as a socio-cultural being. At this stage,
the need forAstructural approach becomes clear. The argument
advanced (supported initially by a model of C.B. Wilson, but more
elaborately by a much earlier one suggested by D. Foley) is that the
proper investigation of questions of space involves issues other
than the spatial and the physical (that is environmental). The
extended involvement of aspects other than these two, however,
automatically results in an increased logical complexity. To deal
with the high level of logical complexity involved, a broader con¬
ceptual framework which covers the comprehensive description of
built environment structures is necessary.
In their totality, built environmental structures have to be
examined in relation to many aspects: their spatial and aspatial
properties; their institutional (socio-cultural and normative),
activity (functional) and environmental (physical) characteristics;
and their characterization in terms of both stable forms, and dyn¬
amic and historical processes which transform them from one state
to another at various times. The involvement of the historical
dimension is important in that it is within historical contexts
that the various systems of social evaluation (economic, aesthetic,
political and so on)which are involved in the apprehension,
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description and generation of these structures are originated. In
investigating the kind of logical complexity of which these
structures are constituted, a number of areas of concern emerge,
the most important of which is: how are architectural design actions
governed by the nature of the complexity of architectural struc¬
tures themselves, on the one hand, and by the conceptual tools
used in their understanding and description, on the other?
4.2 SPATIAL EXPERIENCE AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
According to Harvey (1969, p. 192) concepts of space are
essentially founded in experience. In its most elementary form
this experience is entirely visual and tactile. But as this
experience develops, senses other than the visual and conceptualiza¬
tions other than the concrete and physical get involved. Thus
there is a transition from primary sensory experience of space to
the development of intuitive spatial concepts and ultimately to
the full formalization of such spatial concepts in terms of some
geometric language (Cassirer, 1959, p.148). In the process of this
transition, primary sensory experience, myth and image, cultural form
and scientific concepts interact. As a result, it becomes extra¬
ordinarily difficult to determine how precisely concepts of space
arise and how such concepts become sufficiently explicit for full
formal representation to be possible (Harvey, 1969, p.192).
A comprehensive study of spatial experience and experiential
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space would require the examination of sensory, perceived and con-
ceptual spaces, noting how the more abstract ideas of space develop
out of those given directly to the human body, both from the
standpoint of man as an individual and from his perspective as a
societal being. A detailed undertaking of this kind is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but the potential and significance of the
general conclusions reached by developmental theorists in helping
the understanding of the nature of spatial experience in built
environment contexts cannot be overestimated^.
In a structural-developmental sense, spatial experience
reflects a progression from the concrete to the abstract and
symbolic, and from the level of physical (sensorimotor) action in
space, to perception of space, to conception and thought (at the
level of pure ideas) about space. The term 'development' is
obviously applicable to the description of a process changing over
time, but the principle, as it has been evolved by its chief
proponents (J. Piaget, and H. Werner; see Hart and Moore, 1973),
defines development in terms of the degree of organization
(that is the more differentiated and hierarchically integrated a
system is, the more developed it is). Thus it is not limited to
processes changing over time, but also may be used for the
conceptual ordering of contemporaneous systems (Hart and Moore,
1. For a comparative review of developmental theories of spatial
cognition3 see Hart and Moore (1973). Besides reviewing the
literature3 they suggest a line of research consistent with
the major theories of cognitive development (especially those
of Piaget and Werner) which extends the investigation into
the study of large-scale environments. See also Pocock and
Hudson (19783 Chapter 43 in particular)3 for further discussion.
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1973, p.254). It is also accepted that while developmental pro¬
cesses may essentially be conceived as progressive, they are also
subject to reversibility. Therefore, it seems more productive to
try to understand how development takes place than exactly when
it can be expected to occur.
Inherent in the developmental view of spatial experience are
the qualitative changes in the structural organization of exper¬
ience from one level to the other, and it is the description of
the characteristic pattern of each of these levels and the
explanation of relationships and transformations between them which
has been most important to all theories of development. The
philosopher E. Cassirer, during the course of his detailed analysis
of the nature of human culture and the fundamental symbolic forms
it takes, was one of the first to deal with space developmentally.
4.2.1 Cassirer's Theory of Symbolic Forms and Spatial Experience
Following Kant, Cassirer called space and time the chief
modes of experience: that is, "We cannot conceive of any real thing
except under the condition of space and time" (Cassirer, 1944, p.42);
and he treated the problems of both extensively. In terms of
space, he provided a series of useful categorizations of the
kinds of spatial experiences involved in man's conception of space.
In An Essay on Man (Cassirer, 1944, pp.42-9; see also Harvey, 1973,
p.23; Hart and Moore, 1973, pp.252-3), Cassirer differentiates
between three primary categories of spatial experience;
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organic space3 perceptual space and symbolic space. Organic
space (which man shares with all animals) refers to the kind
of spatial experience which appears to be genetically trans¬
mitted and hence biologically determined. It is spatial exper¬
ience of the lowest order - at the level of body presence in the
world. The second order of spatial experience is perceptual
space (which man shares with higher animals). It involves the
integration of different kinds of sense experience - optical,
tactile, acoustical, and so forth. This integration takes the
form of schemata in which the evidence of the various senses is
reconciled and coordinated. These schemata are also subject to
qualitative changes by cognitive and culturally learned modes
of thought. The highest order of spatial experience is
symbolic space. Humans alone develop the ability to comprehend
and represent the idea of abstract space - the space of pure
intuition dispossessed of any necessary concrete referent.
Symbolic space refers to abstract and contemplative experience,
where space is experienced through the interpretation of
symbolic representations which have no spatial dimensions in
themselves - though they refer to such dimensions. For
instance, geometry provides a convenient symbolic language for
discussing and learning about spatial form, but it is not the
spatial form itself - its points and lines are neither physical
nor psychological objects; they are nothing but symbols for
abstract relations.
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"Geometrical space abstracts from all the variety and
heterogeneity imposed upon us by the disparate nature
of our senses. Here we have a homogeneous, a universal
space. And it was only by the medium of this new and
characteristic form of space that man could arrive
at the concept of a unique, systematic cosmic order.
The idea of such an order, of the unity and the law¬
fulness of the universe, never could have been reached
without the idea of a uniform space."
(Cassirer, 1944, p.45, his emphasis).
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between concrete
acquaintance with, and abstract knowledge of, space and spatial
relations.
"Acquaintance means only presentation; knowledge includes
and presupposes representation. The representation of
an object is quite a different act from the mere
handling of the object. The latter demands nothing but
a definite series of actions It is a matter of habit
acquired by a constantly repeated unvarying performance
of certain acts. But the representation of space and
spatial relations means much more. To represent a
thing is not enough to be able to manipulate it in the
right way and for practical uses. We must have a
general conception of the object, and regard it from
different angles in order to find its relations to other
objects. We must locate it and determine its position in a
general system."
(Cassirer, 1944, p.46)
4.2.2 Psychological Theory of Development of Notions of Space and
the Epistemological Contribution of Piaget
In the psychological field, both Piaget and Werner (the two
highly influential theorists of developmental psychology) develop
similar views to Cassirer, but in a more elaborate and empirically-
based fashion. In their general theories, they share the idea
(summarized in Pocock and Hudson, 1978, p.89) that development can
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be seen as a process involving the increasing differentiation of
child and environment, followed by a reintegration between self
and environment. That is, it is a progression from a state of
relative globality and lack of differentiation to states of
increasing differentiation, articulation and hierarchic
integration. Piaget, in particular, offers a powerful theory
which has been extended from a mere psychological programme into
an epistemological one in the shape of his so-called genetic
epistemology (Piaget, 1971; 1972; Hart and Moore, 1973) with its
strong concern over the acquisition and development of human
2
knowledge .
Parallel to his general theory of cognitive development (and
later genetic epistemology), Piaget's 'specific' theory of develop¬
ment of conceptions of space offers several important conclusions.
First, conception of space arises from the coordination and
internalization of actions: that is knowledge of space is a
function of action rather than mere perception. Related to this,
the genesis of images of space arises from the internalization of
deferred imitations: initially, the child copies other people's
action, but later these become remembered and so available when
appropriate at a later time. A third point is that there are
four levels (or structure) of spatial organization corresponding
to four major hierarchic and successive phases of development
(sensorimotor -* preoperational -* concrete operational -* formal
2. Further details of Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology can
be followed in the cited literature and many of his other
numerous publications (for instance3 Piaget} 1973).
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operational). Finally, there are three classes of specific spatial
relations which from the content of spatial cognition: topological,














































Fig. 4.1 Schematic representation of Piaget's theory
of the development of spatial cognition in
relation to overall intellectual development,,
(From Hart and Moore, 1973, p.265)
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However, the most important contribution the developmental model
of spatial cognition makes (most significantly in its generalized
Piagetian epistemological form) is that it avoids the difficulties
of both the rationalist concept of innate ideas and the
empiricist alternative of environmental determinism. Piaget (1971;
1972; see also Gablik, 1976, p.73), for instance, completely
rejects any a priorist position which asserts that space (or time
or causality) is a category of mind with permanent structure and
processes, instead he believes that our way of representing the
world is regulated by cognitive processes of different degrees of
development. On the other hand, our spatial notions do not derive
directly from perception of the environment, but imply a logical
construction and stages of formation. Thus the intuition of space
is not an innocent reading or apprehension of the properties of
environmental objects, but from the very beginning is an action
(mainly in terms of operational thinking) performed on them. The
physical order found in the object is not a directly abstracted
quality, but is reproduced in a process of increasing coordinated
actions, so that a whole series of virtual relationships will be
brought into play which go beyond the data recorded by pure sense-
perception.
This is why the act of representation (which implies the use of
imaginary concepts) is usually richer than pure perception,
precisely because it incorporates knowledge of the object's possible
transformations. The ability to represent an object transcends its
perception, since its image is not a simple copy, but comprises an
element of mental reconstitution. It is only by understanding the
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structural transformation of a phenomenon that we are able to fully
understand and scientifically explain its mature form.
"Were it not for the idea of transformation, structures
would lose all explanatory import, since they would
collapse into static forms."
(Piaget, 1971, p.12).
Representation, then, presumes internal mental activity over
and above perception. At the representational level, the emergence of
spatial concepts is inextricably bound up with the structure of
the culture in which such concepts are being developed.
4.3 S0CI0-CULTURAL AND PHYSICAL SPACE
4.3.1 Socio-cultural Space
The decisive role played by culture in the development of
spatial concepts is supported by a huge body of anthropological
evidence.
"Anthropological studies have indicated considerable
variation in the nature of spatial concepts from one
society to another. This is scarcely surprising
since the representation of space 'involves the
evocation of objects in their absence1 (Piaget, 1956,
17). It involves relating imagined concepts to
other concepts and further it also involves concepts
which have no empirical content - in particular it
involves concepts such as 'empty space', 'infinity'
and so on. The emergence of concepts of this kind is
partly governed by language and partly by culture
(Kluckhohn, 1954) ....
Concepts of space thus vary from one cultural context
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to another, and within broad cultural configurations
smaller sub-groups may develop a particular conceptual
apparatus with respect to space geared to the
particular role which they perform in society."
(Harvey, 1969, p.194).
Moreover
"The conceptual framework which a society develops to
represent space is not, however, static. Spatial
concepts have changed very substantially since
antiquity. Cultural change often involves change in
spatial concepts, but on occasion the sudden need to
reappraise spatial concepts through scientific
discovery has delivered a powerful jolt to an existing
set of cultural values."
(Harvey, 1969, p.194).
In Social Justice and the City, Harvey (1973, pp.28-31)
develops this discussion much further. Accepting the three levels
of spatial experience (the organic, the perceptual and the symbolic)
identified by Cassirer, he emphasizes the problems that arise in
the process of transferring experience gained at one level to a
mode of experience operating at another level. The difficulties
involved in studying the interactions or transformations between
these modes of spatial experience is not so much that any of these
modes is in itself not structured, but more that there are no
obvious isomorphisms among them which would automatically lead to a
successful (or one to one) mapping between one mode of experience
to another. Furthermore, while it might be quite convenient to
argue that the actual physical space which people experience and
perceive is not far from being Euclidean and, therefore, may best
be describable in Euclidean terms, there is no clear evidence that
the social activities which take place in this physical space are
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in any way structurally Euclidean.
"Each form of social activity defines its space; there
is no evidence that such spaces are Euclidean or even
that they are remotely similar to each other.... A
primary need, if we are to understand the spatial form
of the [built-environment], therefore, is the
articulation of an adequate philosophy of social
space."
(Harvey, 1973, p.30).
Spatial experience is, therefore, predominantly social, in
the sense that particular spatial experiences are embedded in
some wider socio-cultural experience and it is through socio-
cultural value systems that hierarchies between the various
spatial experiences are structured.
"In other words, the shaping of space which goes on in
architecture and, therefore, in the city is symbolic
-of our culture, symbolic of the existing social order,
symbolic of our aspirations, our needs, and our fears.
If, therefore, we are to evaluate the spatial form of
the city, we must, somehow or other, understand its




Implicit in the argument developed so far is a strong
rejection of any physical determinism. But to reject physical
determinism as an absolute base for describing or generating built
environment is neither to impose a socio-cultural determinism nor
to argue against the idea of effectively studying built environment
from a physical point of view. Indeed, the most obvious result of
architectural activity is built form. And built forms as buildings
108
or man-made environmental objects are undoubtedly physical and
belong to a physical system.
"The system carries information which is capable of
interpretation by people in different ways, but the
information is physical in origin and physical in
transmission. Moreover, the architect specifies only
physical characteristics. However he may think
about his building, his design is a set of instruc¬
tions for a particular arrangement of pieces of
material."
(Wilson, 1973a, p.413),
Therefore, the consideration of space in physical terms is
very important and has always provided a convenient start for
environmental theories of space. This is understandable, since it
is the physical attributes of space which are the most intuitive
reason why space is artificially differentiated and experienced.
Physical considerations have also been aided by the availability
of highly developed formal languages much of the historical and
conceptual evolution of which has been closely linked with the
development of physical science - with its special interest in
space as a physical phenomenon. This combined history is, of
course, a comparatively long one and involves numerous philosophical
and scientific contributions. Consequently, there have been
variations in the details of the space concepts that have been
originated, but these are essentially founded on two contrasting
views (Jammer, 1954; Harvey, 1969; Arnheim, 197?; Davies, 1977;
Atkin, 1974c).
The first presents space as -infinite, homogeneous and a
priori-, a container of all material entities existing prior to and
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independently of, the physical bodies that find their place in it.
It is an absolute framework unchanged by the behaviour of its
contents. It is the space of Newtonian physics, the geometry of
Euclid and the Cartesian coordinate system. The second view is
the view advanced by Leibniz which culminated, through a series
of mathematical developments and the construction of several non-
Euclidean geometries during the nineteenth century, in the Theory
of Relativity and the development of modern physics. It sees
space as a positional quality of the world of material objects
or events. It is both relative and relational. It presents
space as a relationship between objects which exists only because
objects exist and relate to each other; and as contained within
objects in the sense that an object can be said to exist only in
so far as it contains and represents within itself relationships
to other objects (Harvey, 1973, p.13).
The rationale behind this relationist view is based on the
fact that the acquisition of information about physical or actual
space depends upon measurements and observations carried out using
material objects, light signals and so on (Davies, 1977, p.2).
The objects themselves maintain their relative existence in four-
dimensional space-time.
The difference between these two views of space has, of
course, been of fundamental consequence in the form and content of
physical theories. Obviously, philosophical and scientific
debates about the ultimate nature of physical or actual space are
likely to continue, including disputes perhaps on its dimension-
no
ality or the kind of geometries most useful in its description
and representation. But, although the various theories advanced
may be presented as reinforcing, conflicting with or superior to,
each other, the essential point is that neither of the two major
views above necessarily implies the total elimination of the
other from the conceptual scheme of physical science.
"It is, in fact, rather rare (in physical science at
least) that a fully accepted theory is actually
wrong in the strict sense of the word. Newtonian
mechanics, and the associated model of space and
time, served well for 200 years and more, and continue
to serve well today. Newton was not wrong. The
fact that his theory has been superseded by the
theories of relativity and quantum mechanics means
that the limits of validity of Newton's theory are now
known. Both relativity and quantum mechanics contain
Newtonian mechanics at the level of an approximation,
which is an exceedingly good one in everyday affairs
of the world. Nobody would dream of using general
relativity to compute the path of an aeroplane."
(Davies, 1977, p.200-1, his emphasis).
Therefore,
"It may be realistic to regard the concept of space as
a 'multidimensional1 concept in the sense that the
concept has a different meaning according to cultural
background, perceptual ability and scientific
purpose."
(Harvey, 1969, p.197).
4.4 ARCHITECTURAL SPACE AND NATURAL SPACE
From an architectural point of view, it is interesting to
observe that each of the above views on space holds true at some
important level of consideration (Arnheim, 1977, pp.9-10). On
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the one hand, without taking space as the minimum 'given' that
precedes the objects in it (the setting in which everything
takes place), it is quite difficult to apprehend the nature of
architecture as an act of space differentiation and hetero-
genization (through barrierization); an act of arrangement of
built-environment artefacts placed within a supposedly given,
homogeneous and continuous space. Built environment artefacts
exist in space, however, without destroying completely the idea of
a continuous volume of space enveloping them.
On the other hand, this conception of space cannot describe
adequately the way the cognition of space comes about psycho¬
logically. That is, although space - once established - is
experienced as an always present and self-evident given, everyday
experience of space is generated, through the interrelation of
objects within some sort of definable fields (Arnheim, 1977, p.10).
This implies channelization (the establishment of networks or
channels of connectivity). Even with a single building, this is
what goes on between its inside and outside^.
"It is quite in accordance with the fundamental function
of architecture that neither a complete separation of
inside and outside nor a complete integration of both
can ever be achieved. No work of architecture is
totally closed against the outside, but neither can it
ultimately conceal its function of separation. As much
3. In general terms3 differentiation may be applied to both physical
phenomena and abstract concepts3 and it represents the real
or imaginary existence of a physical or an abstract barrier
(boundary or demarcation)respectively. In either case3 the
existence of a barrier (or boundary) can be seen in terms of
two important and logically different ways: (i) positive3 by
distinguishing between things through similar attributes3 but at
different qualitative or quantitative scales; (ii) negative3
by distinguishing between things through dissimilar attributes
(that is presence or absence of properties).
4. The relationship between inside and outside has been, of course3
a favourite theme in architectural theories of aesthetics. It
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as every inside tries to protect itself against
intrusion, it can never deny the existence of the
outside.... On the other hand, no inside can ever
totally fuse with the outside. If such amalgamation
were possible, it would mean that an artificial
creation of man had sunk back into the undifferentiated
matrix of nature from which it was once cut out."
(Zucker, 1966, p.11).
Put another way, the main aim of architecture is to mediate
between man and the undifferentiated consistency of his immediate
natural environment as it exists. Its basic tool for doing this
is the use of barriers (which ultimately generate boundaries) in
order to create enclosures. But the extremity of complete
enclosures is counterbalanced by introducing channels (or making
the barriers permeable), since the aim is not a total differentia¬
tion or exclusion from other differentiated domains or the rest
of nature. Thus, though the most primitive architectural gesture
may be a barrier or boundary gesture, in its most elementary
operational form an architectural structure is a dual structure
5
of barrier/channel character ; barrier in order to heterogenize a
homogeneous surrounding natural environment and a channel in order
to partially homogenize or access an artificially heterogenized one.
4. (contd) still constitutes some popular approaches to architecture
such as that of Venturi (1966).
5. In Appendix J, it is shown that this operational barrier/channel
structure can be elaborated syntactically in order to describe
the built environment from the level of a room (cell or enclosure)
to the level of a whole settlement (cf. the 'space syntax' model
of Hillier et al, 1976). However3 it has been observed that the
history of architecture does not signify a very strong change in
the way that elementary barrierization is worked out (although
the development of frame-structures and so on has given much
freedom to making variation in this), but it signifies a
remarkable change in the way this operation is socially evaluated.
4s opposed to this3 the historical evolution of channelization does
show not only a differentiation in the social evaluation of net¬
works, but also important changes in the physical properties, the





Fig. 4.2 Dual identity of elementary architectural
operations (see Appendix I, pp. 309-10)
In fact, this dual structure is embedded even in what might at
first sight seem to be a pure barrier phenomenon: for instance, a
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solid wall. A solid wall is a barrier to human circulation, but
this same wall is a channel for transmitting loads. In terms of
heat, any barrier is actually penetrable. Therefore, the act of
introducing a barrier is quite complex. This complexity is
reflected by the number of boundaries a barrier creates. It is
obvious that there will be as many boundaries as there are domains
and there are many domains as there are specifiable fields. And
since the environment is multidimensional (if only climatically),
these boundaries are in different places for different reasons and
purposes^ (McCleary, 1972, p.108).
More importantly, space can also be interpreted in terms of
the two categories of 'natural (or universal) space' and that of
'artificial space' (which within the context of this thesis is
taken at the level of the built environment and, therefore, will
be called 'architectural space', most commonly). Any man-made
environment presupposes a natural environment for which it is a
modification. Thus in its general form, natural space is the space
of the total natural environment - but linked to earth-bound
phenomena. In global terms, it exists irrespective of the history
or location of human settlements in it. It is differentiated on
purely geophysical terms (climate, vegetation, topography and so
on), and outside specific localities, the ecological argument
6. Refer to Appendix I3 Sections 3 ccnd 4, for further
discussion.
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notwithstanding'7, it is treated as universal and different from
artificial space.
Artificial or architectural space refers simply to that
component of natural space which is defined or modified by a variety
of human architectural actions for the purpose of habitation and
settlement. (This definition, obviously, excludes the political
definition of regions, countries and the like). In its most
obvious way, it is recognized through the intuitive recognition of
architectural objects. It holds quite different meanings for man.
"Physical convenience rather than necessity was the
early reason for the creation of 'architectural
space'in general, and was the motivation for moving
life from the 'universal space' that man shared with
animals to 'architectural space'. Due to the ever
increasing psychological sensitivity of man toward
environment and his diminishing physical ability to
resist climatic extremes, 'architectural space' has
long since become a prerequisite for human existence."
(Engel, 1965, p.246).
Architectural space, since it is capable of creating micro-
environments suited to the most various functions of man's social
and physical life, may justly be described as representing the aim
of architecture. It is architecturally organized space. To this
effect, the significance of tectonics as an organizing feature is
evident by definition (Markuzon, 1972, p.42). Without the
7. In the present circumstances of overpopulation3 pollution and so
on3 the case for the ecological argument is3 of course3 over¬
whelming. It is argued that even the natural environment is no
longer what it is3 it is in the process of being man-created
(Lefebvre,19763 pp.32-3). Eowever3 without in any way disputing
the case for this argument3 the interest here is in man-made
environment which has been produced for the purpose of human
habitation and settlement and persists most obviously in the form
of built forms3 comprising so-called built environment.
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architectural hardware, the material fabric and the erection of
building (extending from tent to pyramid and from wall or fence to
complete enclosure), there can be no architectural space. This
applies just as fully to the streets and open spaces which have
been bounded out of their natural environment by volumes of
surrounding buildings as to those inside spaces enclosed within
them. The involvement of the 'architectural body', that is building
in its morphological/physical nature, leads to peculiar properties.
A basic one is what might be called accumulation of products on land.
"The built environment functions quite frequently as a
commodity for consumption, but at the same time it is
also based on land; it remains for a longer period than
the capacity of the construction industry would imply
and transfers the characteristics of its production
process from one historical moment to the other by
transforming its semantic and pragmatic value. The
built environment signifies, furthermore, the
successiveness of the material substances of the
ideologies which have been dominating its production and
it is, also, one of the best preserved signifier of
them."
(Kotsiopoulos, 1978, p.52-3).
Despite the determinate involvement of an undoubtedly physical
body like building in defining architectural space, architectural
O
space has an equally strong 'virtual' nature (borrowing the term
from Langer, 1953). While the dialectic potential of actual and
virtual exists in all physical phenomena, its manifestation in
8. 'Virtual space' is conceptual and non-physical in inception3 but
can be given manifest form or structure through objects. A
similar concept to it is perhaps Eillier and Leaman's (1973b3
p. 510) idea of 'logical space'. "Logical space is an imaginary3
many dimensional space created by and filled with signs3 symbols.
and representations. It exists neither purely in our heads3
nor in real space outside3 but constitutes the medium through
which the relation between the two is made. It works both ways.
Logical space creates spatial or architectural space as one of a
number of perceptual 'realities' it interprets. It represents
the results of our cognitive operations on the world3 including
the world of artificial things."
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architecture is held to be special.
4.5 ARCHITECTURAL SPACE AND VIRTUAL SPACE
P. Eisenman, throughout his work, has been mainly syntactic
orientated, and he draws a useful comparison between the virtual
nature of architectural space, on the one hand, and pictorial and
sculptural space on the other. In both painting and sculpture,
argues Eisenman (1973, p.323), there is an inherent dialectic
between observer and space which is not initially present in
architecture. That is whatever real space there is in painting
and sculpture, the observer is usually outside of it; his
relationship to that space can be considered virtual rather than
actual. Thus any understanding he has of that space, whether
perceptual or mental will always be in a sense conceptual in that
he can never experience the actual space.
But we can have our physical being in architecture and involve
all our senses. Our relationship to it is initially actual and
our experience of space to that extent real. But, continues
Eisenman, if one posits that all physical reality has inherent in
it a capacity for an opposite or virtual state, because of the
capacity of certain physical relationships to present a potential
continuum from actual to virtual, then somehow we must seriously
take this factor into account in any model concerned with the
generation of architectural space.
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"It is precisely because the individual has the capacity
not only to perceive and actually walk through the
space but to conceive of that space he will receive
information which he will translate into conceptions.
Therefore, if an architecture can make one more aware
of the actual space ... potentially available in it,
then this awareness might be made possible by the
presence of an intentional virtual structure. In
other words, since there is always the possibility in
architecture of a virtual experience as well as a real
experience, they both might be predetermined.
However, in architecture as opposed to other plastic
arts this virtual condition must be built into archi¬
tectural space; it does not exist a priori. While
those qualities remain latent in any environment, they
must be modelled in both a surface and deep structural
description."
(Eisenman, 1973, p.323).
The comparison between pictorial, sculptural and architectural
space which Eisenman draws had, of course, been long preceded by
the one made by Langer (1953, especially Chapters 5 and 6).
Langer takes architecture as one of the plastic arts. She argues
that each of the plastic arts (as manifestations of spatial
conception) has its own manifestation of virtual space which comes
in increasing order of complexity starting with pictorial space,
then sculptural space and finally architectural space.
First,
"... organized space in a picture is not experiential
space, ... It is an entirely visual affair; for touch
and hearing and muscular action it does not exist ....
This purely visual space is an illusion, for our sensory
experiences do not agree on it in their report.
Pictorial space is not only organized by means of color ...,
it is created; without the organizing shapes it is
simply not there. Like the space 'behind' the surface
of a mirror, it is what the physicists call 'virtual




"Sculpture creates an equally visual space, but not a
space of direct vision; for volume is really given
originally to touch, both haptic touch and contact
limiting bodily movement, and the business of
sculpture is to translate its data into entirely
visual terms, i.e. to make tactual space visible."
(Laager, pp.89-90, her emphasis).
But architecture, argues Langer, clearly has actual function
and it also defines and arranges spatial units in terms of actual
spatial relationships which have meanings for us in terms of the
space in which we live and move. Nevertheless, the architect
deals with a created space, a virtual entity effected by a basic
abstraction peculiar to architecture. This basic abstraction is
described by Langer (p.95) as that of an 'ethnic domain1. Unlike
painting and sculpture, architecture articulates the ethnic
domain, or virtual space by treatment of an actual place.
The ethnic domain that goes with architecture is an entire
functional realm made visible and tangible. It is the embodiment
of the life of a culture,
"a physically present human environment that expresses
the characterisec rhythmic functional patterns
which constitute a culture."
(Langer, p.96).
And,
"A universe created by man and for man, 'in the image
of nature' - not, indeed, by simulating natural
objects, but by exemplifying 'the laws of gravity,
of statics and dynamics' - is the spatial semblence
of a world, because it is made in actual space, yet
is not systematically continuous with the rest of
nature in a complete democracy of places. It has its
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own center and periphery, not dividing one place from
all others, but limiting from within whatever is to be.
That is the image of an ethnic domain, the primary
illusion of architecture."
(p.97, her emphasis).
Thus as a product of human actions and a provision of a place
in which human life and activities are to be comfortably supported,
architectural space requires a much broader conceptual framework
than the one sufficient to describe pure physical objects. In
this framework, the total structure of architectural space becomes
complicated. It has a natural component, a tectonic component and
a human component. In its totality.it exists only through the
interaction of these components between themselves and within
themselves.
Environment Building
Fig. 4.3 Total structure of architectural space
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From this, it is obvious that neither building nor the architectural
space it defines remain purely physical. In fact, there is no
need any longer to maintain a sharp conceptual or even practical
distinction between architectural space and architecture in its
wider sense. It is precisely that which constitutes architectural
space constitutes architecture. Space has become the 'historically'
constituted subject-matter of architecture (see Chapter 2).
4.6 ARCHITECTURE AND STRUCTURE
C.B. Wilson (1973a)has recognized the totality of architec¬
tural structure and sought to formulate a mathematical model
expressing the basic interrelationships involved in this total
structure - but with emphasis on dealing with those which are
physical. Wilson's model is expressed in terms of three relations:
E-, = B.(Eq) .... (1)
E1-(H): H - H+ .... (2)
Er(B): B - B .... (3)
Where, H is human being; H+ is human being in a state of content
where he does not require the transformation of the environment
(E) from state EQ (environment before the existence of building
(B)) to state E-| (the environment after the existence of building).
The model is to be understood as cybernetic in the sense that, H
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being in the state H_ (state of discontent and wish to change the
environment) for Eq-(H), a building is created. If this still
leaves H in H_ a further attempt is made and so on. The
relation expressed in (3) is a survival requirement in that the
building must be unchanged by its environment (that is to with¬
stand its action on building fabric structurally), though it is
possible to introduce any acceptable deviation from an initial
state of B and a finite life for B (see Fig. 4.4, for further
elaboration).
The most important principle underlying Wilson's model is
that architectural structure constitutes a totality, the
appropriate consideration of which can only be achieved by taking
the above listed relationships simultaneously into account. The
ultimate aim, in Wilson's view (p.416) is, of course, to produce
satisfactory building. Thus, "treated as equations (1), (2) and
(3) are to be solved for B. That is the analogue, in the model, of
the architect's task.". Wilson has developed the model further
in order to deal with the physical relationships (especially
climatic ones, these being more readily describable) in architec¬
ture that are expressed in (1) and (3), but he points out that
the kind of solution reached for B and the means for approaching
it will depend largely on assumptions which are made about H and
E-(H). This calls for more effective descriptors whose nature






Wilson's model when a time dimensioned)
is introduced, say, a building life-span
Fig. 4.4 Wilson's model expressed and
elaborated graphically
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In a design context, one way for physical structure to come
about is by a process of translation from other non-physical
structures pre-existing in society, structures whose nature is the
concern of the social sciences, economics, politics and so on
(Atkin, 1974a, p.52). Foley (1964; see also Atkin, 1974a, for
discussion and mathematical development) has been concerned with
developing a general framework of 'metropolitan structure' and
identifying within this framework the various interrelated steps
involved in proceeding from abstract normative socio-cultural
structures to the physical spatial ones through the functional
organizational structures. He defines two important categories
under which these structures may be further classified; 'spatial'
and 'aspatial'.
Spatial refers to a direct concern for spatial pattern, that
is for the pattern in which culture, institutions, activities,
people and physical objects are distributed in space. Aspatial
interrelationships of selected phenomena viewed within other
frames of reference (such as political, social, economic and so
on), but without special concern for their spatial distribution or
arrangement.
On the basis of his conceptual scheme, Foley identifies
various sets of relationships (see Fig. 4.5, but Fig. 4.6
for a more comprehensive representation) which could be investi¬
gated, but lays the greatest emphasis on the functional (activity)
organizational level as the one that mediates between the
aspatial/normative (institutional) structure and the spatial/
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in space of varying
qualities of physical
objects
Fig. 4.4 Selected aspects of metropolitan structure:
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Fig. 4.6 An alternative representation of Foley's
model
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physical (environmental) one (Fig. 4.5.1).
"The key question is how to examine the implications
of alternative spatial arrangements on the
functioning of given units of social organization."
(Foley, 1964, p.29)
Nevertheless, Foley's conception of structure is general in
character and involves 'processual' (dynamic) considerations,
besides purely 'morphological' (static) ones (see Fig. 4.7).
"We conceive of metropolitan structure as comprising
both formal aspects - a static, snapshot view of
the metropolitan community's pattern at any one point
in time - and processual aspects - the ongoing
functional relations of the metropolitan community.
In such a view, the functioning of the community exhibits
a pattern just as does the strictly morphological aspect
of the community. With this conception, then, form
and process may be readily treated as two complementary
versions of structure."
(Foley, p.35, his emphasis)
This maintains the same primary distinctions between aspatial
and spatial, and carries forward the three levels of consideration
(institutional, functional, environmental) previously identified.
For each cell of the previous framework, there are added counter¬
part aspects of form and process. From this, various chains of
g
reasoning and levels of structural complexity can be identified .
To this framework, a historical dimension is added (Fig. 4.8)
structure not only exists at a given moment in time and is in
process within a given short period of time, but also evolves
over time.
9. See Foley (1964) for further details.














Structure at period 1
Structure at period 3
Structure at period {2
Fig. 4.8 (From Foley, p.40)
Structure at period
Without placing the same emphasis on functional and activity
organization as the primary mediator between the institutional/
aspatial and the environmental/spatial which Foley takes, the basic
structuring implications of his conceptual framework can be
accepted in their entirety, including the attempt to discuss present
and potential contributions of environmental research
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accordingly^. The path to be taken from the institutional/
aspatial level of consideration to the environmental/spatial one
is obviously a long one and involves a series of conceptual
transformations which are quite difficult to comprehend outside
the totality of built environment structures. A framework of the
kind Foley constructs^ is useful, therefore, not only in terms
of the implementation of specific areas of research and suggesting
the need for new ones, but more importantly in terms of evaluating
and integrating these areas within a broader architectural
context. It can be used to provide a categorization of the
different epistemological backgrounds and conceptual bases from
which this research originates, and at the same time account for
its complex variety and multidisci piinary character.
But as it attempts to do so, it inevitably identifies gaps
between the different types of knowledge produced. More
significantly, it paves the way towards bridging these gaps and
generating more effective knowledge. Within this, major considera¬
tions always have to be borne in mind: how, for example, architec¬
tural design actions are shaped, on the one hand,by the nature of
the complexity involved in architectural structures themselves
and, on the other, by the epistemological backgrounds and discipli¬
nary bases from which the descriptors employed in describing these
10. The different conceptual bases and disciplines involved have
been discussed and analysed extensively by Foley.
11. See Maravelias (1978) for some detailed discussion and compara¬
tive analysis on similar frameworks3 especially within a
climatic design context.
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structures and producing knowledge about and designing them
originate.
Thus while Foley's framework was originally conceived in order
to deal with large-scale metropolitan structure, it is, in fact,
well equipped to aid the investigation of all types of built
environment structure extending from the level of a building
to that of a metropolis, since all these may be taken as special
instances of architectural complexity and structure requiring the
12
same conceptual basis . It describes in a general sense the
logical complexity to which architecture refers, while at the same
time it can be used as a basis for identifying the various levels
of this complexity, how are they to be resolved and what are the
conceptual tools appropriate for their investigation within the
totality of the whole structure.
An added advantage is the removal of the conceptual confusion
usually made between the physical and spatial aspects of architec¬
tural structure. Physical arrangement is necessarily a spatial
arrangement, but there are components of architectural structure
other than the physical which also have spatial characteristics.
These include activities, interpersonal relations and even
normative ones where socio-cultural and other institutions manifest
themselves spatially. On the other hand, all these aspects of
structure (including the physical) have aspatial characteristics
12. Complexity is viewed here to be governed by how the system
under consideration is defined and not by how small or big
it is.
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and the first characteristics (the spatial) cannot be comprehensively
understood without considering them within the context of the second
(the aspatial) and vice versa.
Now, what may be viewed in this thesis as an architectural
schema or prototype (even at its most abstract level of conception)
involves in its totality a highly complex structure which is as
comprehensive and logically complex as the one just discussed and
which relates to any level of consideration of the built environment.
Besides its spatial nature (which is usually taken for granted by
architecture as also its environmental one), it equally involves
aspatial characteristics and embodies an institutional, activity
and environmental images. However, since it is the institutional/
aspatial level which most of the time provides the start for design
action (by defining a problem - if only when we say we want a house,
or a school, and so forth) and at the same time establishes the
predominant basis for the use and evaluation of architectural
products, then, it is inevitable that the whole structure is
eventually and predominantly evaluated on such a basis. Not only
this, but whatever is used to describe or generate this structure
must also be amenable to this evaluative mechanism.
This is particularly so if we realize the simple fact that
there is a kind of inescapable duality in our dealings with
architectural phenomena, in that, while our concepts about them
may tend to be very general and deep (decentred), the focal point
of our practical dealing with them remains equally particular
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(centred) at the level of the individual built environment artefact
(whether a building or a whole settlement) and the social use to
which it is put. The more paradoxical aspect to this is that in
the decentved situation, architecture - behaving like a science -
tends to deal with abstract forms, while in the centred situation -
behaving like a practice - it deals with objects as institutions
or building types, such as houses, schools, hospitals and so on.
Therefore, in describing or designing a building of a particular
type and bringingit into reality,its institutional identity can
never be ignored.
4.7 ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURE, MEANING AND SOCIAL EVALUATION
The institutional/aspatial base, of course, embodies many
value systems (including the economic, aesthetic, political and
so forth) which originate historically. These systems, undoubtedly,
interact and have a structure of their own, but at particular
occasions or historical moments (and without in any way eliminating
the others), one takes precedence over the others and becomes the
most influential system of social evaluation. For instance, the
contemporary value system operating in architecture has tended to
be dominated by broad economic values (the emergence of an auto¬
nomous subject like building economics serves to consolidate this).
Accordingly, it is not surprising to find the primacy given to
particular aspects of structure at one time becomes less at another.
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For example, the present energy crisis has brought to concrete
realization the fact that the built environment is part of a wider
terrestrial system which is finite in resources and thus less
resistent to waste and pollution, and that building decisions
seriously affect the stock of organic energy reserves and extents
of raw materials. Hence is the increasing priority accorded to
the economics of the various contents of architectural energy
consumption, especially in terms of achieving satisfactory levels
of environmental performance and quality but with reduced waste.
This, of course, does not mean that questions of economics
associated, say, with planimetric spatial provision/use which have
been dominant over the past two or three decades will in any way
be completely ignored. Indeed, they remain active, but increasingly
assimilated to the general context of environmental performance and
its energy/(high or low) technology economics.
The involvement of social evaluation, in fact, influences
even the choice of the methodological and conceptual tools invoked
to investigate a structure. This is why we find from time to time
various shifts in relation to the kind of descriptors employed
and the kind of scientific disciplines consulted. It is clear,
then, that social evaluation is not external to a structure, but
plays an internal structural role in investigating it. It is
involved both in the process of its production and also the
descriptive tools that are necessary; it is involved both in its
description and generation. And since the production of a product
of high complexity such as the built environment takes place in
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a historically created process, then so do the descriptive tools
and the social systems of evaluation.
The strong involvement of historical processes and conse¬
quently of systems of social evaluation introduces the
requirement that questions of 'meaning' have to be taken seriously
into account in any attempt to investigate architectural structure
(even at its most elementary and abstract level). In general terms,
the articulation of meaning is essentially organized around
predominancy and hierarchic integration. Integration says that
built environment phenomena acquire their meaning and pragmatic
value at synthetic levels^, the complexity of which can be
approached adequately only within a multidisciplinary structural
perspective. Multidisciplinary considerations, however, result
in increasing complexity and, therefore, need to be simplified
in order to be integrated. This is a common strategy in all
spheres of knowledge and action where generalized assumptions
are employed to simplify more complicated situations in order to
keep them manageable.
But as there is a benefit in abstraction (whereby increased
generality results in reduced complexity and hence easier
integration), so there is a danger also. In describing reality
as in experiencing it, we are limited by the nature of the conceptual
tools we have at our disposal. Conceptual tools present
13. This, of course3 takes into account the terse! of maturity of
these descriptors and the disciplines that inform them.
14. Refer to Appendix I and II for elaborate discussions on this
point. See also Chapters 6 and 7.
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themselves as a means for understanding reality, but they are at
the same time a means for manipulating it. Their logic is reduction:
the nature, for instance, of millions of built environments is
reduced to symbols. They gradually become more abstract and far
removed from their reality, and the methodological conditions we
impose in order to discern an order among them is that they should
remain so. We do not see built environment reality, but images
of it.
And yet the meaning of reality does not end at the
convenience of the media in which it is described. Built environments
are facts of history and location. They have their specificity which
somehow needs to be accounted for by any comprehensive architectural
theory. Therefore, while there is a need for abstraction in order to
achieve multidisci piinary integration, this integration, if it J5
not to lose its descriptive comprehensiveness and problem-solving
capacity, should be kept at optimum levels of abstraction. An
optimum level of abstraction is taken here as (borrowing the term
from linguistics) the syntagmatic level (see Chapter 6 in particular).
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has dealt with the concept of space in some
generality, but has progressively evolved the concept within
architectural terms. It has examined the notion of avahitectvj'al
s-paee and concluded that the most adequate way of investigating
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architectural spatial phenomena is to analyse them within the
totality of architectural structures.
As a methodological consequence, the need has emerged for
adopting a structural approach which not only recognizes the
importance of socio-cultural and institutional dimensions of
architectural structures, but also organizes and presents the
different images these structures take: their normative and insti¬
tutional image, their functional and activity image, and their
physical and environmental image. Architectural structures involve
both spatial and aspatial aspects and, at deeper levels (the levels
at which schemata and prototypes are conceived and internalized),
the interdependence between their various images and character¬
istics is profound and presents a structural totality involving
stable forms (morphology-synchrony), dynamic process (transforma¬
tions) and history (diachrony) - within which appropriate systems
of social evaluation originate (internal to the apprehension,
description and generation of these structures and consequently
present in the articulation of the conceptual tools employed in
investigating them). This means that, although at certain levels
of consideration the contribution of specific disciplinary descrip¬
tors becomes inevitable, the need for a more comprehensive and
coherent structural logic seems unavoidable - in order to deal with
the high level of logical complexity which is involved in archi¬
tectural structures themselves.
The following part is mainly concerned with development of
structural approach. It characterizes several aspects to this
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CHAPTER 5
SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE: THE STRUCTURALIST SOURCES OF
STRUCTURAL APPROACH
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The need for a structural approach was stated more than
once in the preceding chapters, but acquired special significance
and character towards the end of the last one. There, it
became apparent that due to the high degree of logical
complexity and integration involved in all types of built environ¬
ment object-systems, a structural approach must initially be
concerned with architectural realities seen in their totalities,
before deciding which of their many particular aspects deserve
further attention and what are the conceptual tools appropriate
for their investigation.
The movement known as structuralism has contributed in
several important ways to the formulation and elucidation of
the principles on which such an approach might be based, and
with this the notions of 'system' and 'structure' have received
explicit attention. In this chapter, certain general aspects of
-k
The discussion in this and the next two chapters is closely
connected with the one contained in Appendices I and II - which
are antecedent. Several highly specific points whose origin or
elaboration is to be found in these two appendices are cited,
but, for purpose of preserving the continuity of the rest of
the argument, other general overlccppings in theme or content
have not been particularly stressed: this footnote being an
acknowledgement.
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the structuralist argument are presented. This presentation is
guided by its architectural relevance and hence duly evaluated.
5.2 THE LOGIC OF WHOLES VERSUS THE LOGIC OF RELATIONSHIPS
The case for a logic of systems seen as wholes as opposed
to an atomistic logic of relationships (or a summative logic of
aggregates) was well formulated by Angyal (1969, p. 17).
"Our scientific thinking consists prevalently in the
logical manipulation of relationships. That the
structure of wholes cannot be described in terms of
relationships has, however, been repeatedly pointed
out by many writers. While accepting the premise
that holistic connexions cannot be resolved into
relationships, some authors have implied that the
pattern or structure of wholes does not lend itself
at all to logical manipulation. We suggest,
however, that the structure of wholes is perhaps
amenable to logical treatment after all, that,
though it may not be described in terms of relations,
it may be described in terms of some more adequate
logical unit, representing an entirely different
logical genus."
Such a 'logical genus1 is characterized by Angyal as being
capable of contracting an indeterminate number of 'elements'
or 'relata' whose relationships cannot merely be ordered in a
linear fashion or by means of their inherent or absolute
qualities (as is usually assumed by the atomistic logic of
aggregates), but most importantly by their place in an
organizing system. An organizing system of this kind is a
holistic system. Unlike an aggregate in which elements are
added, in a holistic system elements contribute to the formation
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of the system predominantly by their positional qualities and
arrangement. Thus components of a system cannot be analysed by
arbitrary reduction into pairs of relata: in a holistic system,
"We abstract constituents ('elements') and refer only to the
organization of the whole" (Angyal p.20, his emphasis).
It has been customary, argues Angyal (p.21), to consider
relationships as existing between objects, which are separate or
individuated and that for these relationships to exist a
dimensional domain (a manifold) is necessary. A dimensional
domain is also necessary for a system, but,
"The role of the dimensional domain for a relationship
is merely disjunction of the relata. [It] does not
enter into the relationship... [Whereas] the dimensional
domain not only separates the parts, but it participates
in the formation of the system A system is a
distribution of the members in a dimensional domain. "
Angyal, p.21, his emphasis)
Furthermore, while in a relationship the connectedness between
relata is a direct one and unmediated (involving identity,
diversity or similarity), in a system (from a holistic point of
view), members do not need to connect directly with each other,
but with reference to the whole. To emphasize this point,
however, is not to argue that direct observable relationships do
not contribute in an important way to the formation of systems;
nevertheless,
"One thing ... seems clear, namely, that systems cannot
be deduced from relations, while the deduction of
relations from systems still remains a possibility.
If that is the case then the more logical genus would
be 'system', while 'relation' would be a reduced,
simplified system which is adequate only for the
logical presentation of very simple specialized
constellations." (Angyal, p.25).
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5.3 SYSTEM THEORY AND STRUCTURALISM
In modern epistemology, two movements have claimed to deal
with systems as wholes: systems theory and structuralism.
Systems theory has been founded on the analogy of the form of
organization in biological (living) systems postulated as open
systems and later generalized (as in Bertalanffy1s general system
theory) to cover all types of system in a manner which is
envisaged to be interdisciplinary. Structural ism,whose greatest
impetus came from the field of structural linguistics, has been
largely concerned with societal and artificial systems, but it
has progressively appealed for support in models of structural
mathematics. Epistemologically, neither of the two perspectives
could be shown to exclude the other in its entirety - though
there have been arguments which are extremely critical of one or
the other (such as Hillier and Leaman's (1972) in favour of
structural ism and Wilden's (1972) in favour of an information-based
open system theory). There are differences in formulation, of
course, owing perhaps to fields of origin, concrete methodologies,
predelictions of individual authors and so forth; nevertheless, a
degree of conceptual agreement can be shown to obtain.
Laszlo (1971)^ maintains that the two perspectives in their
original conceptualization do not argue for the reduction of one
set of phenomena to the other (for instance, biological to
1. The article by Laszlo (1971) draws a comparison between the
basic premises of the two perspectives and holds out that
there are isomorphies and uniformities (invariances)
exhibited between their theoretical schemes. Consequently,
he suggests the establishment of a 'hybrid' framework which
may be able to interconnect them and hence bridge the gap
between natural and social sciences.
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physical) or imply that differences can be reduced to identities.
Every system has its specificity and none is adequate to account
for the organized complexity of another. Thus the diversity of
phenomena must be allowed for. However, though the various
systems that exist cannot be adequately explained by immediate
reference to each other, these systems do not necessarily violate
the laws of one another. For instance, biological organisms
do not violate the laws of physics nor do societies violate the
laws of biology. Therefore, the search for unity should not be
sought at the level of direct analogy and identity of phenomena,
but at a different level altogether, that is at the conceptual
level - the level of theoretical models.
Theoretical models may reflect an isomorphism between them¬
selves, but in no way does this prove the isomorphism of the
phenomena to which they apply.
2
"Models may be abstracted from the frameworks of their
original reference and compared, and if found iso¬
morphic, only the fundamental unity of nature need be
affirmed in the corresponding respects, and not its
undifferentiated identity. The latter would disregard
the possibility that the models may apply to phenomena
on different levels of organization and complexity,
i.e. that the unity in question may be hierarchic,
rather than linear."
(Laszlo, 1971, p.190, his emphasis)
2. The general subject of models and their uses is, of course,
an interesting one. There is no intention here to
reproduce the debate on the merits of the different
formulations. This has been dealt with by many competent
authors whose own views continue to be analysed and
elaborated both by themselves and others in numerous fields
of enquiry. The discussion by Echnique (1972) which
characterizes the nature of models and investigates their
role in environmental design is illustrative.
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From the outset, then, systems theory and structuralism need
not be sharply opposed to each other, since they can undoubtedly
be supportive to, and involve a high perspectival measure of,
each other. In fact, the shades of meanings are not easy to
distinguish by the use of terms as complex and variable as system
and structure. Nevertheless, within the context of this thesis,
it is the contribution of the structuralist perspective which is
often sought, mainly for three reasons.
First, architecture as a system is obviously more of the
nature of societal and artificial systems (indeed, one of the
most concrete) than of the nature of biological (living) systems.
Thus a perspective such as the structuralist one whose chief
origins are rooted in societal and artificial systems offers a
more feasible entry.
Second, though theoretically systems theory makes similar
pronouncements about the search for isomorphy at the level of
theoretical models rather than of perceptual phenomena, methodo¬
logically (perhaps due to its biological origins, historical
circumstances and concrete formulation) systems theory has been
less resistent to the temptation of utilizing the huge stock of
analytic models and techniques which owe much of their efficacy
to mathematical applications within mechanistic and behaviouristic
frames of reference. Consequently, applied systems approaches
have themselves tended most of the time to be both mechanistic
in their strategies and too analytic in their applications, thus
the scope of the involvement of systems theory itself at the
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synthetic level of investigation (with which this thesis is
3
much concerned) seems severely limited . On the other hand,
structuralist theory deliberately avoids the behaviouristic/
mechanistic question of what exact system a particular set of
observables and their relations determine the existence of by
positing the fundamentally different question of what system
structure is there to be for certain observables to be possible.
This automatically renders the actual an instance of the
possible.
4
Recapitulated briefly , the main objective of structuralist
analysis is to establish a way of identifying the logical
complexity of a system and how this logical complexity con¬
strains and makes feasible the functioning of both the system
and its constituent elements. The logical complexity of a system
is the one embodied in its structure. Thus the essential
properties of structure are logical and not substantial.
Structure is always less than system because unlike system,
structure does not exist at the surface level of observables,
but at the deep level of their invariance; it being an abstract
set of logical relations underlying the manifest richness of the
3. This is not to argue that the analytic level of consideration
can be done without. At lower levels of complexity where
the exact elements or parameters of the system are specified,
analytic techniques are undeniably useful and, in fact, at
the level, say, of design specifications they are inevitable.
The argument here, however, is that the conditions under
which these techniques apply must be first established by a
theory operating at the synthetic level before any detailed
analytic analysis can be fruitfully undertaken.
4. The sources for structuralist argument are numerous, but for
some lucid accounts, see Brittan (1972); Culler (1975);
Glucksmann (1974); Lane (1970); Piaget (1971); Robey (1973);
Rossi (1974).
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concrete system. Therefore, structure operates more like a
theory for describing th$ basic principles that make the system
possible than by determining the exact cause of its existence or
the prediction of its behaviour. Structuralists argue that any
real-world system is nothing but a transformation of its
structure which incidentally is the structure underlying any of
its parts (albeit in elementary form). Translated into Chomskyan
terminology, what is observed or experienced at the level of
consciousness or overt behaviour (the level of performance) is a
surface structure which is a transformation on a deep structure
that operates at the level of competence-, the level of the
unconsciousness. Deep structure, it is to be observed, is
equivalent to the general use of structure adopted by all other
structuralists.
Without subscribing to the extreme view advocated by some
leading structuralists (for instance, Levi-Strauss) that it is
possible to reach a level of unquestionable certainty in
identifying real or permanent structures that are valid for all
time, the structuralist idea of structure can be accommodated
5
and assimilated to architecture , especially within a design
context, since in design the object-systems that interest us
(that is the finished products) are still in the realm of non-
observables. We can only reach them by theorizing their underlying
structures and then transforming these into reality through
further specification and physical labour.
5. Some important qualifications are included below in this chapter.
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The third reason in favour of the structuralist perspective
is that any way of thinking which is to do with structure can
hardly be seen as totally foreign to architecture - from a
historical point of view. The term structure, with its associated
words, is a key term in modern thought, but originally its use
was exclusively architectural from the Latin 'structura', from the
verb 'struere', to construct or build, implying primarily a noun
of process: the action of building (Glucksmann, 1974, p.l;
Williams, 1976, p.253). Subsequent developments in terminological
uses assigned to the word a meaning which is still dominant
today - though not exclusive - in that, while the principles of
construction are seen as structural the general sense in which the
term operates is that of constituitive organization. Thus arose the
conventional differentiation between structural and decorative
(or ornamental - accepted largely as to do with tectonics than
structure®) which strengthened the sense of an internal structural
organization that is relatively fixed and permanent, even hard,
and which is to do with load-bearing parts of a building and
that are resistent to the various systems of forces (gravitational,
wind and so forth) acting upon it.
At present, of course, the term structure is part of a
vocabulary available to most fields of enquiry'7, where structure
is seen to underlie all manner of objects (from physical to
6. The comparative sense in which the terms 'structure',
'construction ' and 'tectonics ' are architecturally used can he
followed in Sekler (1965).
7. The history of the various senses in which the term structure
has been used and expanded in the different scientific fields
is traced in a brief but informative manner by Williams (1976).
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ideational) and this perhaps may account for the polysemic meaning
it is increasingly acquiring. In fact, the multiplicity of
connotations attributed to it doubts both the existence of a single
definition or a precise methodological orientation which could be
undisputably called structuralist and hence the conceptual
complication surrounding the use of the term in general epistem-
ology and consequently in specialized fields like architecture.
5.4 STRUCTURE: INTENTIONAL OR OPERATIONAL
According to Boudon (1971, pp.16-7) the general ambiguity
surrounding the concept of structure is to a large extent a
result of its appearance within two types of apparently different
contexts; one intentional, the other operative. In the
intentional context, structure is used either to underlie the
systematic nature of an object or to stress that a certain method
can be applied in order to describe an object as a system. Thus
for Piaget (1971), for instance, the conditions of wholeness,
transformation and self-regulation are applied in a manner which
is logically specific and which defines structure as a system of
transformation under some well-defined transformational rules or
operations which are both internalizable and reversible, but which
are at the same time, subject to a principle of conservation or
invariance that renders them commutative, and, therefore,
jointly applicable to the same situation or problem. Piaget
takes the mathematical group as the finest prototype of his
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definition of structure.
In the operative context, the concept of structure is
incorporated within a theory which attempts to account for the
systematic nature of an object. Here the interest is not
strictly centred on the concept of structure as such, although
the very fact of attempting to analyse the structure of an
object implies that a certain theoretical meaning is given to it as
a concept. Examples of this are the syntactic linguistic
structure as defined by the Chomskyan theory of transformational
grammar or the various societal or literary structures defined
by semiological structural ism* as, for example, in the anthro¬
pology of L^vi-Strauss or the literary criticism of Barthes.
However, the various positions taken by individual authors
are far from being so neatly classifiable. For instance, while
Piaget maintains an intentional definition from the outset and
indeed an exceedingly formal one, his brand of structural ism
(that is genetic structuralism) is operational3 evolutionary and
constructivist. It envisages structures as deep constitutive
formations, but they are never permanent or fixed; they are
continuously being built up and transformed at different stages
in history or development.
"The being of structures consists of their coming to be,
that is, their being under construction."
(Piaget, 1971, p.140).
This runs counter to any suggestion that structures can be
innate (as argued by Chomsky) or can be entirely synchronic and
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isomorphic with a permanent human intellect (as argued by Le'vi-
Strauss).
The differences in outlook between Piaget's project and
that of Le'vi-Strauss and between their two brands of structuralism
and other types obtain at various levels of detail, but it is not
the purpose of the present discussion to investigate these
differences. There are several levels of agreement and positive
qualities in the various projects which are of general relevance
to the argument developed here. However, before adopting any
particular structuralist point of view, it must be stated that
from the general point of view of this thesis, it is largely the
operational value that we obtain from defining a structure which
offers a realistic option, since (as explained in Appendices I
and II) there can be no ojective way of imposing any a priori
conditions of defining a concept of structure (as such) and
afterwards using this general concept to explain a particular
set of architectural realities once and for all. What is firmly
held here (and the possibility of its operation has been partly
demonstrated in the previous chapter and is to be further
investigated in the rest of this thesis) is that there can be a
general construct which can be termed 'architectural structure',
and, therefore, the search for it has meaning. However, this
structure is neither unique in itself nor is it located at a
single level of consideration. To define this structure with
any precision at any particular moment in time, architecture must
be considered as a totality whose object-systems have their
specificity. Parallel to this, there must also be an
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architecturally specific theory whose task is to evolve an
operative definition of this structure, define its various levels
of existence and manifestation, indicate its use, and give it
coherence and contextual meaning.
From this point of view, then, the most obvious interest
afforded by structuralist thinking is not a precise method or
technique by which any object-structure will be automatically
discovered, but the insistence that the theoretical premises
underlying any such method should be made as explicit as possible
so that they can be among the things held out for comparison and
critical analysis. Closely connected with this is the
structuralist argument against the conventional sharp distinction
drawn between description and explanation. Instead, it is seen
that the description of a structure simultaneously explains the
object under consideration. The integration of description and
explanation in this way is a reflection of the structuralist view
of causation. Glucksmann (1974, p.147) lists and analyzes
several tenets underlying this view, the most representative of
which are^:
1. that the structure, though immanent, is manifested only
in its effects - it is never immediately active so causation
is mediated;
8. Excluded from these is the controversial issue of whether
structure causes its effects exclusively synchronically,
and thus less affected by history, or not. Many structuralists
adopt the view that it is sufficient to account for structure
at the synchronic level - a view rightly attacked by their
critics. Piaget, among others, however, has amply demonstrated
that structure needs not be so effectively at variance with
history or for that matter function. Indeed, the historical
dimension gives it vitality and justifies much of its
significance and functioning. See Section 5.5 below.
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2. the elements and levels of the structure and the relation¬
ships between them may be of different natures and
weightings so that any structure consists of several types
of determination;
3. that there is no one to one relation between cause and
effect and that contradictions and elements are likely to
be 1overdetermined' (that is each is due to several causes
and has more than one raison d'etre);
4. that although one of the levels may be 'determinant in the
last instance', the dominant role in the structure may be
taken by another level.
Thus the desire to be rigorous and systematic does not necessarily
entail attempts at causal explanation of the cause-effect chain
type. Other highly suggestive notions include Piaget's idea of
'reflective abstraction'.
5.5 REFLECTIVE ABSTRACTION, PROBLEM-SOLVING AND MEANING
By reflective abstraction, Piaget (1971, p.19) means that
properties are derived "from our ways of acting on things [and]
the operations we perform on them", rather than by the much
simpler and more direct form of abstraction which draws properties
out of things. The deep character of reflective abstraction
implies that the operations performed are necessarily
intemalizable (i.e. cognitive or symbol ic)actions which, in turn,
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means that they can be re-externalized or objectified in the form
of communicative codes, systems of classification and so on,
and, therefore, need an internalizing/externalizing subject.
Piaget refers to this subject, which is the centre of activity,
as the 'epistemic subject', thus emphasizing its collectivity and
guarding against any conventional association between it and a
spontaneous egocentricity or an isolated individual psyche or
consciousness.
The object insofar as it can be acted upon, and, therefore,
known or used or related to by the subject is an indeterminate
entity whose definition at any given moment is relative to the
actions and operations of the subject. This is not to argue
that the object is wholly arbitrary. The object is never
completely lacking in autonomy or substance. It imposes con¬
straints and defines limits on the appropriateness of the
actions that are brought to bear on it, and, therefore, enters
reflexively into the subject's symbolic and cognitive schemata.
In this sense, the historical dimension can be incorporated, in
that the subject's actions (conceptual or sensorimotor) take
place at particular historical moments. Most importantly, these
g
actions are largely aimed at solving problems which the subject
faces in its interaction with its environment, and hence evalua¬
tion is also part of all aspects of its activity.
It is all this which (as has been observed in Appendix I)
9. Some of these problems could be entirely conceptual as is
faced, for instance, in much theoretical scientific research
activity.
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has made Piaget, and many other authors^, conceive of reflective
abstraction in close connection with the Marxian concept of
'praxis' - that is of human practice. Thus reflective abstraction
can be made anthropocentric, but without necessarily losing its
generality. The practical significance of this general remark is
that it shows the way in which it is possible to answer the
important question of: at what abstract level, especially in
sciences of the artificial - such as architecture, should the
investigator attempt to locate the structure of the object under
investigation? This question implies that any abstraction is
of little value if it is not to solve the problems (practical or
theoretical) which have produced it. It is in response to
problems that conceptual tools find their significance and
acquire their operational value.
In artificial systems and certainly in architectural ones,
human action is involved throughout. It is involved in their
production, consumption and in devising the conceptual tools that
are appropriate for their description. And with such a deep
involvement of the human subject, the nature of the meaning
attributed to these systems becomes of paramount importance.
However, though genetic structuralism recognizes the importance
of questions of meaning and indeed can be quite helpful in
identifying them, it is less able to deal with their particularity
10. See, for example, Harvey (1973). Incidentally, Le'vi-Strauss
in much of his writings (see, for instance, his 1966) also
maintains a conception of myth or primitive art as an imaginary
resolution of some real social contradictions which for
all practical purposes can be viewed as nothing but problems.
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because of the extreme generality and high interdisciplinary
character of its project. It is here that the contribution of
semiological structuralism needs be sought. This is to be
discussed and reconciled with the genetic one in the next
chapter.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The discussion in this chapter has reaffirmed two main
points about the structural approach. First, a structural
approach, besides recognizing the specificity of architectural
realities and the contexts in which they occur, must go beyond the
level of their surface manifestation and habitual observation
and establish how they manage to be continuously transformed
while at the same time maintaining an internal order and
structural coherence which gives them meaning and guarantees their
appropriate functioning. Secondly, whatever object one is dealing
with, its structural analysis is a product of a theory, but the
construction of theory depends primarily on the nature of the
object considered and on the derivation of the appropriate con¬
ceptual tools that permit the analysis of this object as a system.
In other words, the concept of structure does not apply
until it is decided to consider a given object as a system.
However, structure is essentially a logical construct which
informs us about the object and not an undisputable or exact
mapping of it. Quite significantly also, it is not the attempt
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to try and pinpoint a definition of the word structure which
constitutes its utility, but the sense of being able to develop
an idea of it operationally and relate it to a given context.
Because of this, the structuralist perspective has been accepted
(with qualifications) mainly at the conceptual level of its
formulation. There is no precise structuralist method or
technique which, when applied to an object, automatically dis¬
covers its structure. Nevertheless, there is a kind of theo¬
retical attention which one might call structuralist and which
gives coherence and intelligibility to the conditions under which




THE SYNTAGMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL APPROACH
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Semiological structuralism whose origins go back to Saussare
has developed out of the general assumption that theories of
structural linguistics are directly or indirectly applicable to
other aspects of human culture insofar as all of these may be
interpreted like language as systems of signs and communication.
It emphasizes the way in which meanings of events or objects in
the socio-cultural world are conventional or socially produced
rather than being entirely natural or directly causal. In
Section 3.4, the present trend of formulating architectural
approaches that rely heavily on semiological structuralism as a
methodological background has been referred to and several
difficulties with these approaches were shown to obtain.
Nevertheless, the architectural value of semiological con¬
sideration still holds. For instance, the notion of meaning which
is implied by semiological structural ism is crucial to architec¬
tural description, particularly in the general form of meaning,
that is of 'social evaluation'. Furthermore, there is a level
(that is the syntagmatic level - which constitutes the major theme
in this chapter) at which the advantages of both genetic (general
and abstract) and semiological (socially meaningful) approaches may
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be resolved. In either circumstance, brief references to some
basic theoretical arguments founded in modern linguistics are
imperative. The references contained in this chapter, however,
are guided by their specific relevance to the discussion developed
below, rather than a reproduction of the technical details of
linguistic method itself in its various versions.
6.2 THE SCOPE OF LINGUISTIC MODEL AND SEMIOLOGY OF SIGNS
In the series of conceptual characterizations which the
'linguistic model' gives to language, two Saussurean distinctions
have been decisive: la langue and la parole, referring to
language system (a socio-cultural institution governed by rules and
norms) and language behaviour(manifested in actual speech
utterances and writing), respectively. In Saussaure's (1917, but
see edition 1974) view, language (or langue) - as distinct from
speech (or parole), language synohronically considered - is
fundamentally differential. It differentiates between linguistic
items or signs (which Saussure took essentially at the level of
words)by setting up syntagmatio (contiguous) and paradigmatic
(classificatory or taxonomic) relationships^ within which any word
2
can be highly individuated and receive an identity of its own .
1. According to a general characterization made by Lyons (1973, p.12),
"syntagmatic relations which an element contracts are those which
derive from its combinations with preceding and following elements
of the same level. . . paradigmatic relations contracted by an
element are those which hold between the actually occurring
element and other elements of the same level which might have
occurred in its place. "
2. This is based on both the sound image or written form (signifier;
significant,) a word takes and the concept or idea (signified;
signifi£7 to which it refers.
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And this may be argued to be what prompted Saussure to postulate
semiology as a science of signs piloted by linguistics .
The difficulties with the search for signs qua signs (or
their Peircean and other semi otic variants; symbols, icons, indices
and so on) in architecture are many, but the following is both
fundamental and sufficient. For while in language, words (or
other linguistic items) are undeniably means of expression and
communication, in architecture the notion of communication,
though involved, is seldom that obvious. After all the bulk of
architectural artefacts are not intended for pure communication;
they are objects of use in themselves. These objects are not
signs as such, but are in the nature of what Barthes (1967; 1973)
describes as second order (indeed one may say third order or even
higher) semiological systems. These are'systems which are
constructed or elaborated on the basis of highly permutated units
that largely exist before them and which have already undergone
extremely complicated processes of culturalization and are treated
most of the time as commodities dominated by their use value.
Furthermore, whatever is taken as an architectural sign, the
meaning it is said to communicate or signify neither comes to it
as totally arbitrary nor remains unique to it. For instance, a
3. Culler (1976, pp.91-2) has pointed out, however, that in
suggesting linguistic as a general model for semiological
investigation and emphasizing the arbitrariness and conven¬
tionality of its signs, Saussure was not arguing that all
signs are wholly arbitrary, but was trying to suggest that
through this one may be able to avoid the familiar mistake of
assuming that signs which appear natural to those who use them
have an intrinsic meaning and involve no conventions.
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column not only signifies vertical support in a linguistic sense,
it functionally acts as a vertical support. On the other hand,
the function of vertical support is not in any way a unique property
of columns, nor are columns entirely restricted to function as
vertical supports. Load-bearing walls also function as means of
vertical support and, in turn, they have functions other than
this, such as acting as climatic filters, barriers to human circula¬
tion and so forth. Moreover, while a column may be of the nature
of a skeleton structure, at other times it may not be clearly so,
as when a structure is a mixture of load-bearing walls, columns
and lintols. Add to this the kind of building materials that are
likely to be used, geometrical shapes, methods of construction,
processes of production and so on, and the complexity that is
involved is no longer one which can be dealt with appropriately
by a procedure which is insistent on identifying individuated
language-like signs in architecture.
It is quite obvious that in architecture, signs do not just
persist concretely so that they may be readily apprehended from
the outset. What seems to be involved is that there are varied
and multiple domains of signifiers (these usually tend to be
called forms by architects) and there are varied and multiple
domains of signifieds (usually called contents or functions), but
the correspondencies that obtain within and between the various
domains on either side or their opposites or their elements are -
apart from very rare instances - never of a one to one nature.
They are in the nature of dynamic structures which are both
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highly synthetic and invariably multi-valued and subject to












Language itself exhibits this property. One of Saussure's
major contributions to the study of meaning in language is his
rejection of the idea that meaning is inherent to words. For him
words only acquire their meaning according to their place within
language as a system which confers it on them as a result of a
'social contract'. Consequently, he accepts that within everyday
discourse, the most viable level of meaning generated by language
and experienced by its users is to be found at the level of
structural solidarities holding between words, and these structural
solidarities are basically (but not exclusively) exhibited in
syntagmatic formations, where a syntagm is formed out of the
combination of contiguous units supported by linearity (Saussure,
1974, p.128).
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6.3 THE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IDEA OF SYNTAGM IN LINGUISTICS
Three significant points need be stressed in connection to
Saussure's definition of syntagm. First, the notion of syntagm
applies not only to a particular type of grouping of words, but,
more generally, to all levels of groupings including the
formation of words themselves and extending hierarchically to
cover complex units of all length such as compounds, derivatives,
phrases, whole sentences, combination of sentences, and as
pointed out by Barthes (1967, p.65), even whole texts.
Secondly, the definition of syntagm involves a spatio-
temporal order, albeit a linear one. Barthes (1967, p.58) has
stated this most clearly.
"... syntagm is a combination of signs, which has space
as support. In the articulated language this space is
linear and irreversible (it is the 'spoken chain1):
two elements cannot be pronounced at the same time ..."
Thirdly, it is not enough to consider the relation that
ties together the different parts of syntagms, but how these parts
relate to the wholes and how the wholes relate to the parts.
And, therefore,
"between the syntagmatic groupings, as defined, there
is a bond of interdependence; they mutually condition
each other. In fact, spatial co-ordination help to
create associative [paradigmatic] coordinations,
which are in turn necessary for analysis of the parts
of the syntagm." (Saussure, 1974, p.128).
In all three cases, we see Saussure establishing links
between language and meaning at the level of fundamental structur¬
ing operations, but predominantly as exhibited in the nature of
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syntagmatic formations. Now, the fact that syntagms are based
on structuring operations, that they are chiefly responsible for
the generation of meaning in concrete situations, that the way
they generate meaning is indeterminate (but also restricted both
structurally and contextually), that they are spatio-temporal,
and that they function at the level of system but also recogniz¬
able at the level of everyday discourse to those who use or
encounter them - all of these offer a concept which is
easily extendable to architecture, without in any way implying
that architectural realities are reducible to linguistic realities
or that architecture needs to be systematically distorted or lose
any of its specificity in order to be investigated syntagmatically.
By contextually redefining the term syntagm and broadening its
scope, it is possible to assimilate to architecture a concept
which is strikingly rich, highly synthetic and can be made
rigorous at the same time. It should now be possible, in the
light of this argument, to offer a preliminary statement of the
scope and limitations of the notion of syntagm and its functioning
within architecture.
6.4 SYNTAGM AND PROTOTYPE
It has just been shown that syntagm in language inheres at
various levels of hierarchic combinations and that it carries
with it both an intuitively intelligible structural organization
as well as a meaning which is socially produced and evaluated.
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When examining everyday experience in the architectural environ¬
ment, we find that it is organized on a basis almost comparable
to that of everyday discourse. Everyday architectural experience
rarely expresses itself in terms of isolated spatial units, but
appears to operate on spatial domains which are roughly analogous
to those of syntagms, where configurations of series of spatial
units are structured in the neighbourhood of each other in a
manner which offers dense functional possibilities that none of
these constituent spatial units could support on its own. The
richness of this experience is reflected both in the complexity
of the observed social use to which these spatial domains are
put as well as in the cognitive schemata held about them. It is
only sufficient to consider terms like bedroom, kitchen, house,
hospital, district, neighbourhood, village, city and so on to
discover that they carry with them spatial descriptions which
reflect certain modes of functional behaviour and social signif¬
icance as well as modes of spatial organization within and between
themselves which have long been intuitively intelligible to us
through everyday use and socialization. To be sure, these
schemata do not just refer to entirely physical entities or things
like buildings, building elements or the actual materials from
which these are constructed, but rather to more general notions
which include both experiential and virtual characteristics that
are of the nature of syntagms or some comparable spatially
structured formations. In effect, it is reasonable to suggest
that the most elementary architectural configuration is already a
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syntagm - invested with meaning as well as being structurally
coherent. And though it may not be (as its linguistic counter¬
part is also) radically open to complete formalization, still it
can be made specific when referring to concrete situations.
An appropriate generic term which gives the true sense and
real importance of a concept like syntagm is that of the
4
architectural prototype . Like linguistic syntagms which can be
reproduced at the level of actual discourse and also as under¬
lying structures, architectural prototypes can be reproduced at
the level of the actual environment and also as underlying
descriptive/generative structures. Indeed, the way the idea of
prototype compares and covers a valuable notion such as that of
syntagm has been put more clearly in Appendix I (pp.320-1).
"The function of prototypes in architectural practice
has characterized its whole history both at a 'language'
level by producing different styles and at a 'speech'
level by influencing the individual way in which
architectural surface structures have always been
produced. What we propose here is that prototypes do
not constitute anything but syntagms, in which the
semantic component cannot be isolated from the syntactic
one. Particularly in architecture prototypes have
played the role of 'already structured' elementary units
which have always carried a special meaning."
Now, it is interesting to remember that syntagms are, for
Saussure, systematic and constitute the raw material out of which
the linguistic structure is identified and acquires its
communicative value. In this sense, syntagm is very near to
(but not quite synonymous with) speech. Saussure was rather
4. Section 3.2.4 relates the concepts of schema and prototype.
See also Chapter 9 for further discussion.
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careful to specify in what way syntagm could not be considered
as speech, yet so near to it. Barthes (1967, pp.62-4) clarified
this argument by emphasizing that:
1. there exist fixed syntagms, which usage forbids us to
alter in any way and which are out of reach of the
combinative freedom of speech (these stereotyped
syntagms, therefore, become sorts of paradigmatic
units)^;
2. because the syntagms of speech are constructed accord¬
ing to regular forms which thereby belong to the language,
there is, therefore, a form of the syntagm dealt with by
r
syntax which, is, so to speak, the 'glottic' version of
the syntagm.
More importantly, Barthes (p.62) insists that this
structural proximity of syntagm to speech is an extremely important
fact,
"because it ceaselessly offers problems to be analysed,
but also - conversely - because it enables a
structural explanation to be given of certain
phenomena of 'naturalization' of connoted discourses."
This intermediate role which is attributed to syntagms is
remarkably similar to the one which has been repeatedly
attributed to prototypes at various instances in the previous
5. Cfj for examples prefabricated units3 building systems and so on.
6. 'Glottic': which belongs to the language as opposed to speech.
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chapters. Prototypes, it has been argued, are to be viewed as
highly synthetic structures obtainable at intermediate
levels of abstraction. Their role is to guarantee a minimum
level of stability and to provide a key-link between theory and
practice and to act as a means for describing the built environment,
at all levels, as well as a means for designing it. They are not
surface phenomena in themselves, yet not entirely isolated from
the rich level of observables, since they realize their potential
and material existence in it. Prototypes are understood only
because they are already virtually contained within the
architectural environment. And as linguistic syntagms can be
subject to analysis in terms of their deeper syntactic structures
and still maintain their freedom of combination to produce new
and wholly novel discourses so are architectural prototypes.
They presuppose a structural organization that is relatively
persistent and amenable to some form of analytic treatment, yet
they retain a property of fundamental incompleteness that makes
them flexible, dynamic and open to transformation and hierarchic
permutation. They continuously negate their actuality only to
reintroduce it enriched with new possibilities that obtain within
various operational contexts. Hence they can be employed
creatively in the process of producing new architectural realities
as yet non-existent, and, therefore, linking existent and past
realities to possible and future ones, but which can only be
grasped within historical limits and constrained by culturally
emergent conditions of usage. If their pragmatic value continues
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to change, then that is because they are always entering
reflexively into new relations within and between themselves and
with their operational contexts: new relations which not only
transform them, but the architectural system itself. More
significantly, it is the concrete problem situations to which
both designers and users (through usage) attend that present the
ultimate test for the usefulness of any one prototype and estab-
lishe its pragmatic value at specific moments in time.
It is obviously tempting given the above illustration, to
suppose that linguistic methods can be directly applied to
investigation of architectural syntagms or prototypes, but this
would unquestionably be an over-simplification. First, in
evaluating its syntagms language gives predominancy to their
communicative value. This is essentially a secondary value to
architecture (see below, Section 6.5.3).
Secondly, in language the chance of combining words with each
other to produce linguistic compositions seems virtually unlimited.
In architecture, however, the material resources involved in the
realization of its compositions are limiting, thus restricting
its productive (or 'speech') freedom to such an extent that it is
rarely, if ever, carried out prior to some elaborate decision¬
making and evaluative processes. In fact, the kind of language
which is involved in this aspect of the architectural system (that
is its design and production) belongs to what Barthes (1967 , p.31)
has called 'fabricated' languages or 'logo-techniques'^. Languages
7. Cf Simon's (1969) term 'sciences of the artificial'.
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of this kind, says Barthes, are not usually elaborated by a
'speaking mass1, but by a 'deciding group'.
Unlike natural language, the fundamental origin of
logo-techniques is essentially utilitarian (involving high
material contents) and not simply a signifying one. The user's
freedom to elaborate on them is limited to the usage of their
products and not the production of the products themselves. The
decision-making group which is involved at the origin of any such
system can be more or less narrow; it can be a highly qualified
technocracy (for instance, professional architects). It can also
be a more diffuse or anonymous group (far example, the builders of
vernacular or traditional architecture). The fact, however, still
remains, this decision-making group does not involve every member
of the community in a democracy of decision-making; the way
natural language does with the mass of its speakers. This, it
may reasonably be argued, is what makes languages that are
elaborated by decision and utilitarianally-based evaluation
practically open to ideological manipulation, if it is not entirely
part of them.
-fkw
The third feature which differentiates linguistic syntagm
from the architectural one is that since language is fundamentally
an auditory system, its syntagms unfold spontaneously during a
passage of time. In architecture, syntagmatic relations do not
in principle presuppose (though by no means exclude, especially
during construction processes) a linear ordering of units, such
that the substantial realization of one element must precede or
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follow the substantial realization of another in time and place.
Architecture usually displays and juxtaposes its elements all at
once and imposes on them a physical existence in volumetric space.
For instance, it is not unusual to experience being in a particular
room in a particular building, but at the same time in a particular
neighbourhood or a whole city. It is this simultaneity which is
basic to syntagmatic formations in architecture,and that is
perhaps what makes them usually experienced as extremely dense
functional totalities.
However, having said that, simultaneity as such is not a
property that can be entirely denied to language for it is import¬
ant to remember that in reality what we tend to apprehend when we
encounter a linguistic syntagm is not exclusively restricted to
its particular sequential ordering where one term leads to the
other, but the total structure that unites these terms3 that is
the larger unity which is the syntagm or, more importantly, the
whole context in which the discourse itself is taking place.
6.5 THE LOGIC OF SYNTAGMATIC STRATEGY
6.5.1 The Priority of Syntagmatic Considerations
Within modern linguistic theory proper, the logical priority
given to syntagmatic consideration over other considerations has
proved the most productive. Pettit (1975) deals with this in some
detail and makes a convincing case for the development of what he
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calls syntagmatic structuralism which is to be applied to the
g
customary and non-literary arts . He argues (p.11) that it is due
to the difficulties faced in finding, from the outset, precise
features or attributes by which to differentiate things paradig-
matically, that the syntagmatic approach seems to provide a more
feasible strategy. In linguistics, what the syntagmatic approach
has attempted to do is to describe linguistic items in such
abstract features as, for instance, 'noun phrase', 'verb phrase'
and so on in order to formulate first the syntagmatic rules that
unite them and circumscribe their operational meanings before
resorting to a detailed analysis of what is special to any
particular item in itself or what specifically differentiates
it from all others.
However, the real importance of the syntagmatic approach
lies in its logical understanding of the concept of syntagm as
involving a simultaneous reference to both syntactic and semantic
levels of consideration of the phenomena to which it applies.
6.5.2 The Syntactic Component
The underlying syntactic implications of the syntagmatic
approach are the ones which, of course, found an explicit and
rigorous formulation in, and explain much of the power of, the
Chomskyan theory of transformational generative grammar.
8. Barthes (1967, p. 61) also argues the logical priority of
syntagmatic consideration in any semiological system.
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Chomsky (1965) argues that it is the study of syntactic structures
which should form the core of linguistic method. According to his
theory, language is still a system as characterized by Saussure
whereby meaning is produced, but this production is fundamentally
based on rule rather than taxonomic typologies. That is, language
is more than a system of interrelated units; the relations which
compose it are also a system of rules, and it is this aspect that
Chomsky emphasizes in replacing Saussure's langue and parole
with his competence and performance, respectively (Culler, 1976,
p.83). Consequently, what he offers is a generative syntax,
the core of a transformational generative grammar (which also
includes a phonology and a semantic component) that forms a body
of recursive rules by means of which any sentence of the language -
and only a sentence of the language - can be given an abstract
'structural description1 (Pettit, 1975, p.15).
Chomsky, however, insists that the grammatical rules so
constructed do not imply that is what the speaker/hearer
consciously knows about language, but merely that they represent
the best analysis of what he does when producing or understanding
speech utterances.
"To avoid what has been a continuing misunderstanding,
it is perhaps worth while to reiterate that a generative
grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer. It
attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible
terms the knowledge of the language that provides the
basis for actual use of language by a speaker-hearer.
When we speak of a grammar as generating a sentence
with a certain structural description3 we mean simply
that the grammar assigns this structural description to
the sentence." (Chomsky, 1965, p.9, my emphasis)
9. See also Lyons (1970)3 for a good summary and critical analysis
of Chomsky's theory.
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It is in the context of this clarification and the primacy
given to 'description' that the question of meaning which the
syntagmatic framework involves is to be approached. A convenient
entry is to see how semantics is related to syntax in
linguistics.
6.5.3 The Semantic Component^
According to Pettit (1975, p.27), in the modern linguistic
theory which is based on the Chomskyan model of grammar, any
sentence will have an abstract deep structure to be described by
one (base) set of syntactical rules and a surface structure
(at the level of observables) derivable from the deep one by
another (transformational) set of rules; the deep structure
will be common to a number of sentences which differ on the surf¬
ace, and those sentences will have roughly the same meaning.
Consequently, semantics is to be conceived of as dealing with
deep structure and as providing a 'semantic representation' of it.
How this semantic representation comes about has been a subject
of controversy, but two important views are described below.
In Chomsky's (1965), semantic representation is derived from
the deep syntactic structure as follows (Fig.6.2):
10. The discussion included in this section is highly dependent on
the elaborate one presented in Appendix J, Section 4 and also
generally on the overall argument presented in Appendix II.
Various modifications, exclusions and appropriate elaborations








Fig. 6.2 (After Leech, 1974, p.328)




(Base) —)■ Deep structure Projectionrules
Transformational rules
Surface structure
Fig. 6.3 (After Leech, 1974, p.329)
Both Chomskyan versions constitute what has been called the
1 interpretive approach' to semantics, and thus have been
distinguished from a recent approach called the 'generative' one
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(Leech, 1974, p.324). According to the generative approach
semantic interpretation is no longer derived from the purely
syntactic deep structure, but the structure is so deep (this is
what is called the 'base' in the Chomskyan versions) as to be
identical with semantic interpretation. In this manner








Fig. 6.4 (After Leech, 1974, p.330)
Many important questions of theory and method arise in
connection with the nature of linguistic semantics that go far
beyond the present discussion. Little further reference will be
made to them here, except to note that the sense in which the
syntagmatic structural approach has been adopted by this thesis
is in the spirit of the generative approach to semantics than that
of the interpretive one, because it accepts the involvement of
meaning at the very bases of the structures it investigates
rather than seeing it as an addendum or epiphenomenon to them.
The syntagmatic approach as an envisaged framework for investigat¬
ing architectural structures has less to do with a purely
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Chomskyan interpretation that subscribes to an entirely mapping
mechanism whereby a formal syntactic structure is established
first and a meaning is assigned to or mapped on it later - in the
absence of both its functional contexts and historical character¬
istics. Indeed, instead of depending on a purely rationalized or
designatory syntax, it is advocated here to adopt what might be
generically called 'syntagmatic syntax'.
6.5.4 Syntagmatic Syntax and Social Evaluation
Syntagmatio syntax is a syntax which operates mainly at
synthetic levels where the generation or description of a struc¬
ture can be socially evaluated. The important difference between
it and a purely designatory or rationalized syntax is that the
latter usually tends to be single-valued, and originates in other
scientific fields, while syntagmatic syntax comes primarily from
the problem area and can embody more than one descriptive tool
for formally describing a structure. The multiple descriptive
tools it embodies are neither fixed (they remain open in number,
type and level of formality: they can be added to, excluded from
or hierarchically arranged) nor are they expected to be totally
isomorphic (being made of different substances). Indeed, it is
the contradictions and anomalies that may exist within and
between the images they create which offer potential for renewed
transformation, restructuring and regeneration of a structure,
and which create the necessity for design action itself. Design
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action is fundamentally founded on the realization of the obvious
lack of correspondence between the various images of a structure.
It is aimed at removing (by introducing new conditions) observed
contradictions and anomalies which get solved only to reappear
in new forms or replaced by equally demanding ones.
This way of interpreting the idea of syntax allows us the
possibility of dealing simultaneously with several images of a
structure. It is a syntax which is pragmatic in nature and not
rigidly prescribed. By definition, it would incorporate character¬
istics of an historical moment (such as the acceptance of a given
set of descriptors or a particular system of social evaluation),
the realization of contradictions and anomalies within and between
the images these descriptors create and an hierarchy according
to which such anomalies offer potential for transformation and
practical manipulation, especially when it comes to design action
and solving new problems or improving on old solutions.
An advantage of this understanding of syntagmatic syntax is
that systems of social evaluation are included in the methodo¬
logical tools of the syntax and are not entirely external to it as
is usually presumed in rationalized syntaxes. Social evaluation
thus becomes a dialect for understanding the whole multi-
disciplinary nature of a structure and not a language limited to
a particular image of it.
The issues connected with this particular argument are in
the nature of 'descriptive theories' in general and those of
architecture in particular. The latter are dealt with extensively
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in Appendices I and II and a summarized discussion is presented in
the next chapter. But before bringing this chapter to a close,
it is worth including (as a quotation) part of the general
argument which has been developed in Appendix I on the nature of
social evaluation and the kind of systems of social evaluation
involved in architecture, especially.
The historical evolution of the social evaluation of products -
which at first sight might be only evaluated semiologically -
means that we accept that each particular historical period is
characterized by a particular balance of systems of evaluation.
Communication - and consequently communicative value - is, of
course, only one of them.
Systems like painting, music and language^ have always been
dominated by communicative values, while architecture shows a
different history. For instance, it is quite easy to understand
that communicative value has dominated the production of artefacts
as far as official or religious architecture is concerned, from
the pyramids to the contemporary phenomenon of returning, at a
morphological level, to the deep structure. This return is
supposed to facilitate production, and produce another kind of
communicative value by the very acknowledgement of this return.
Banham (1960, p.321) emphasizes this point when he speaks about
functional-ism, arguing that:
11. For further comparison between these systems and architecture,
see Appendix I, pp. 317-9.
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"Under these circumstances it was better to advocate or
defend the new architecture on logical and economic
grounds than on grounds of aesthetics or symbolisms
that might stir nothing but hostility. This may have
been good tactics - the point remains arguable - but it
was certainly misrepresentation. Emotion had played a
much larger part than logic in the creation of the
style; inexpensive buildings had been clothed in it,
but it was no more an inherently economical style than
any other. The true aim of the style had clearly been,
to quote Gropius's words about the Bauhaus and its
relation to the world of the Machine Age, "... to
invent and create forms symbolizing that world" and it
is in respect of such symbolic forms that its historical
justification must lie."
What may be added to this is that the deep structure of
this contemporary symbolism signifies - not in terms of each
architect's emotional reaction, but in terms of social evaluation -
the development of an economic basis of symbolism and what is
more important, the beginning of the 'internalization' of this
development.
Such an internalization has already dominated other fields
of description of human practice and one of the most important
deep characteristics of contemporary architectural thinking is
that it does not only assume the significance of an economic
basis in the limited symbolic context of architecture, but also
acknowledges the necessity of the interdisciplinary character of
it. In fact, it should not be a surprise to see^economic basis
as constituting a fundamental system of social evaluation in
architecture, primarily because of the hardware operations and
extent of material resources (including land) and the huge scale
of human labour involved in producing architectural artefacts,
and consequently the difficulty of trying to reproduce them at
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costs which are significantly less than those of the originals.
And this may partly explain why the process of production in
architecture still remains a largely one-off process and is
comparatively less organized than in many other industrial
systems.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the structural approach has been explicitly
equipped with syntagmatic interpretation whose initial definition
and understanding originates in semiological linguistics. Its
architectural extension and characterization does not represent
a precisely isomorphic translation, and it has been contextually
redefined and closely related to the notion of the architectural
prototype. The main value of using a syntagmatic strategy is that
it embodies a semantic dimension dominated by social evaluation
which is historically produced and which plays an internal role in
characterizing a structure even at its very elementary formation.
The structural approach, syntagmatically characterized, has
in its theoretical foundation the advantage of introducing a point
of view which is at once synthetic and rigorous. It is synthetic
because it starts with the meaning involved in structures as
totalities and not as a property of individual signs or elements
existing in their own right. It is rigorous because it recognizes
the role of syntax in defining the rules and conditions which
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govern that meaning, but views this syntax as a syntagmatic syntax.
Unlike purely rationalized and prescriptive syntaxes which are
usually single-valued, excessively analytic and have their
origins in other scientific fields, syntagmatic syntax comes
primarily from the problem area and usually embodies more than one
descriptive tool for describing a structure. It does not argue that
there will be no contradictions or anomalies within and between
the images created in adopting these tools, but it takes it as
its prime task to identify them and enquire into their nature and
their potential for transforming the structure itself.
The issues related to this last point require a further
development of syntagmatic methodology, particularly in terms of
defining the appropriate descriptive theory which entails it.
This constitutes the subject matter of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
ARCHITECTURAL THEORY, DESCRIPTION AND PRACTICE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is mainly concerned with bringing forward (in an
extremely condensed fashion) the major arguments concerned with
'description and descriptive theories in architecture1 that are
contained in Appendices I and II. The aim is, first, to supplement
the ideas so far evolved in the preceding chapters (particularly the
last one) and, second, to establish a conceptual link between
these ideas and those which are to be discussed in the rest of
this thesis. Because of the summary nature of this chapter,
some of its terminology and theoretical content may seem too
abstract or insufficiently explained. Any difficulties which
arise, however, can be reduced if direct reference is made to the
original discussion in the two appendices. There the issues are
dealt with at great length and further clarified by providing
numerous architectural examples and identifying several practical
situations to which the theoretical assumptions presently being
made apply.
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7.2 THE NATURE OF DESCRIPTIVE THEORY IN ARCHITECTURE
In both Appendices I and II and at various times in the
preceding chapters, it has been argued that there is a conceptual
level of structural investigation which relates to architecture
as a science for the study of the built environment, its various
object-systems and the processes by which these are produced
and evaluated. The most important characteristic which such a
level of consideration confers upon architecture is that it
identifies the basic constitution of domain-specific architec¬
tural theory by emphasizing its ultimate dependence on architec¬
tural practice. It is in response to practice and the problems
that originate in it that architectural theory proper establishes
its significance, acquires its operational value, realizes its
potential and discovers its limitations. And since architectural
practice is fundamentally a social practice any theory which is
concerned with it or the conditions of its functioning cannot but
be predominantly descriptive.
By being descriptive is meant that the most significant task
before any such theory is not a concern with attempts at universal
causal explanation, but with the construction of appropriate
operational links between the usually abstract and highly
objectified bases of the knowledge it produces (especially when
consulting other sciences), and a practice which is empirically
originated and remains limited in its scope, not only by its
institutionalization within certain modes of production, ideologies
and so on, but also by the immediate nature of the phenomena it
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deals with and the continuously changing socio-cultural and
historical contexts in which they occur. In other words, the
consideration of architecture as a science firmly rooted in its
practice implies, as for other sciences of the artificial, that
its subject matter, its stock of knowledge and its descriptive
theories are historically affected.
The terms which have been used in both appendices to
incorporate the above features of a theory which is taken-as
descriptive in architecture are: 'problem-solving capacity';
'historical origin' (in terms of both its problems and its
logical and evaluative tools); and 'comprehensiveness'. The
first two terms indicate the 'beyonds' and 'behinds' of a
descriptive theory, while the third (that is comprehensiveness) is
1. DIRECT ORIGIN: From historically created problems and social
realization and formulation of these problems.
2. INDIRECT ORIGIN: From various scientific fields, where






mainly concerned with theory's own potential identity (such as
its logical cohesion and its ability to deal simultaneously with
all important aspects of the reality it describes). Significantly,
it is the first two which largely attribute to descriptive
theories their undeniably subjective character. This has been
referred to in Appendix II (pp.346-7) by emphasizing that:
"It would have been quite ambiguous to claim that a
descriptive theory which has a historical origin, a
problem-solving capacity and aims at ideologically
influenced purposes of the practice which it follows,
might be considered under any criteria as purely
'objective'. What might be objective is exactly this
realization about the subjective character of
descriptive theories. Accordingly, it is quite
natural to expect that the logical tools - in our case
the structured analysis - which are used to analyse
and even to construct such descriptive theories have
to be objectified."
Within this context, two points are important:
1. To describe a reality - any kind of reality - there will be
an obvious need to have a set of objectified descriptors
whose substances are of necessity different; and in terms
of substance, architectural descriptors may refer to
substances that are as varied as to be of an institutional,
environmental, activity, and so on, nature.
2. A descriptive account is never complete; being open-ended
and historically originated it is only adequate for certain
levels of logical complexity. This means that a certain
reality can have a series of descriptions depending in the
first instance on the problems (practical or conceptual)
which give rise to the need for describing that reality,
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the substances of the descriptors employed and the systems
of social evaluation prevailing at the time. Most
importantly, however, there is a need to rely on a
descriptive theory whose main task is to structure all
those aspects that are involved in the description
including the identification of what descriptors to employ
in the first place.
Initially, therefore, a descriptive theory may be defined
in terms of the principle by which descriptors and their contents
are brought into special (open or closed) relationship. This
relationship may be referred to as the 'descriptive dimension1.
Furthermore, relationships between descriptors may be examined
according to the predominancies accorded to them by theoretical
practice (at the present level of discussion this means architec¬
tural theoretical practice), where one descriptor (considered
as the most important one) or a group of descriptors is, or are,
accorded more predominancy than others.
The concept of descriptive dimension simply means that in
a comprehensive and well integrated descriptive theory the
various descriptors do not go their own separate ways, but
stand in reflexive relationships to each other and that there is
room for investigating simultaneously different aspects of a
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Fig. 7.2 Descriptive dimension
The concept of descriptive dimension introduces two areas of
investigation. The first is the area of the 'identity* of archi¬
tectural structures, the second is the area of their 'dynamics'
and 'transformational potential".
1. The arrows on the diagram illustrate the different degrees of
cohesion between the representations of the structure. The
deeper levels are much easier to relate than the surface ones.
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7.3 STRUCTURAL IDENTITY AND DESCRIPTIVE COMPREHENSIVENESS
Theoretically, the identity of a structure is reflected in a
kind of structure of the different descriptors involved in a
descriptive theory. Consequently, comprehensiveness emerges as
one basic property of any descriptive theory. But, on the other
hand, comprehensiveness cannot be acquired by combining descrip¬
tors in isolation from their historical origin, their
structural context and the prevailing system(s) of social
evaluation. What is implied here is that such an evaluation is
internal in the investigation of a reality and, consequently,
present in the articulation of the logical tools of a descriptive
theory and especially in its descriptive dimension. This
structural role of social evaluation is manifested in the con¬
struction of predominancies among the different descriptive images
present in the descriptive dimension. And although it is an
exaggeration to claim that the subjectivity attributed to social
evaluation can continuously change the nature of the logical tools
that a descriptive theory uses, on the other hand, it must be
admitted that these tools express different concepts at different
times and at various levels of maturity and generality. They
should, therefore, without losing their abstract and generalized
character, be articulated in order to include a 'contradictional'
interpretation of the transformation of structures which are of
specific interest for the study of the built environment.
On a specific level, each descriptor refers to a particular
aspect of an architectural reality which can be identified
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according to two chains; the 'complexity' chain and the 'deepness'
chain. Schematically, complexity and deepness chains may be
represented as follows (Fig. 7.3):
Deepness
1 rules J rules -J
T=(TVT2 ) T=<T1'T2 >
Fig. 7.3 Complexity and deepness chains (see
Appendix I, p.311)
The syntactic character of the complexity chain is obviously
very strong, since complexity chains are generally developed within
the framework of a given substance. On the other hand, the
semantic character of the deepness chain is equally strong as it
connects deeper levels of the structure with its surface ones
by transformational rules.
7.4 CONTRADICTIONAL LOGIC, DYNAMICS AND TRANSFORMATIONAL
POTENTIAL OF ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURES
In investigating what type of syntax is appropriate for
architecture, reference has been made to the linguistic analogue
(Chapter 6), in order to identify both the similarities and
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differences between the linguistic syntax and the 'architectural
syntax' which has been characterized as being of a syntagmatic
nature. The notion of syntagmatic syntax introduces (in an
operational manner) the idea of optimum level of abstraction for
descriptive theories of architecture which substitutes for the
bipolar objectivity subjectivity the concept of dynamic
coexistence between a theory's abstract logical basis and the




























An argument which relates to the dynamics of environmental
structures, and which has been elaborated in Appendix II in
terms of syntagmatic syntax and what has been termed as its
'contradictional logic1, is that design action essentially
originates in the realization of contradictions that are of a
dual character. They are either what might be called 'leading'
contradictions which are to be found in different forms within
each descriptive image of a structure or 'inter-image' contradic¬
tions caused by the lack of correspondence and differentiation of
substance between the different images of a structure. However,
leading contradictions manifest themselves most of the time at
the institutional level and, therefore, act as the major source
for 'revolutionary' design action, while it is at the level of
inter-image contradictions that 'conventional' or 'normal'
design action usually originates. Because of their immediate
implications for normal design action inter-image contradictions
are more appropriately called 'normal anomalies'. Table 7.1
summarizes the characteristics of both normal anomalies and
leading contradictions and evaluates them in terms of their
potential for design action.
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NORMAL ANOMALIES LEADING CONTRADICTIONS
a. Diachronic contradictions caused
by differentiation of substance
and, consequently, lack of
correspondence between different
descriptive levels of a
structure.
Present and recognizable in
different forms within each
descriptive image of a
structure. More general and
less circumstantial than
normal anomalies.
b. More objectified, since the ob¬
jectivity of the descriptive
theory is reflected in the
ability of N.A. to represent
real causes for transformation
of a structure.
More subjective and ideolo¬
gically influenced since they
depend heavily on the indi¬
vidual attitude and the
general position of the archi¬
tect or planner against the
structure he investigates.
c. High potential for transforma¬
tion of a structure in terms
of design action because normal
anomalies, due to their nature,
always suggest to a certain
degree the spatial implications




Limited potential for trans¬
formation in terms of design
action due to their ambiguity
in suggesting ways for their
resolution. This ambiguity
stems, mainly, from their
representation in very gene¬
ralized form and only within
one descriptive image of a
structure.
d. Related to the system of social
evaluation involved in the
investigation of the structure,
in terms of the ability of this
system to construct predominant
descriptive images of this
structure.
Related to the system of social
evaluation involved in the in¬
vestigation of the structure,
in terms of the ability of
this system to construct pre¬
dominancies of descriptors
within each descriptive image
of this structure.
Table 7.1 Major characteristics of normal anomalies and
leading contradictions and their evaluation in
terms of design action
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS
The consideration of architecture as a science firmly rooted
in its practice implies that its subject matter, its stock of
knowledge and also its descriptive theories are historically
affected. On the other hand, what refers to the 'objectiveness'
of a descriptive theory is the comprehensiveness of its logical
tools. In this context, comprehensiveness is interpreted as the
ability of a descriptive theory to deal simultaneously with
different images of the reality it attempts to describe.
Comprehensiveness, however, cannot be acquired by combining
descriptors in isolation from both their historical origin,
their structural context and the prevailing system(s) of social
evaluation.
In addition, there is the view that a contradictional
logic necessitated by the involvement of the descriptive dimension
and incorporated within the methodological framework of the
syntagmatic approach becomes a useful dialectic for studying the
identity, dynamics and transformations of architectural
structures, and contributes to the descriptive theories concerned
with them. There is also the view that the potential of con¬
ventional or normal design action is largely limited to the
resolution of immediate problems identifiable at the level of
normal anomalies. Normal anomalies are inter-image contradictions
originating in the lack of correspondence between the different
images of a built environment structure mainly due to the
differentiation of substance of the descriptors which reflect
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those images.
When considered simultaneously, normal anomalies generate
a high potential for transformation of the structure as a whole
They do so irrespective of the level of complexity or deepness
at which a structure is viewed, but most significantly at the
level of its syntagmatic syntax. The syntagmatic language, as
has been repeatedly argued (see Chapter 6, especially), is the
language of prototypes in architecture; and it is the study of
prototypes which it is hoped will provide the conceptual unity
between architectural theory and the practice of its design.
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DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE: THE NEW CONCEPTION OF THE DESIGN
PROCESS IN ARCHITECTURE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter and the following one elaborate the discussion
on the notion of the architectural prototype and explore its
potential at two levels; a) as a design tool, and b) as a research
tool - drawing both on the conclusions reached above and those
which emerge below. This chapter investigates the idea of the
prototype in conjunction with a series of similar notions advanced
in the literature, and mainly within a design-theoretic context.
The next chapter argues the case for two areas of research: the
'prototypic analysis' of the built environment and the development
of 'design-specific' prototypes.
8.2 THE IDEA OF PROTOTYPE IN A DESIGN-THEORETIC CONTEXT
Central to the nature of architectural prototypes is a
discussion of the design process in architecture and of its pre-
structured/prototypic origin. Emergent views on the design
process, developed over this decade, represent a decisive shift
from previous rationalized thinking about how design is to be done
and to become a precise instance of the optimal, to concern over
198
how design is actually done and is an instance of the prestructured,
the prototypic and the possible. Most design theorists now agree
that design action is fundamentally founded in an elaborate
process of transformation and reciprocation between a pre-existing
knowledge field which owes much of its synthetic existence to
past solutions, experience, beliefs and so on, and a set of
contextual constraints imposed by the particular design problem at
hand and the information concerned with it. There are many
approaches with this orientation in the recent literature, but the
few contributions discussed below provide sufficient evidence to
support the argument.
Drawing on the ideas of Kuhn (1970) and Polanyi^ about the
nature of knowledge (tacit and explicit) and its sociology, Raman
2
(1977) argues the case for the 'tacit dimension1 in design by
emphasizing that:
"The process of design in architecture, like any other
human activity, is not sustained entirely by totally
objective knowledge. Inherent in all architectural
solutions are a number of factors which can neither
be described as belonging to logic nor as expressive
of a concern for the requirements of those who use
buildings. They are to do with architects' beliefs,
values, 'ways of seeing', and so on. But they should
not be regarded as defects or idiosyncracies peculiar
to certain groups of architects. On the contrary, these
factors are essential to the spirit of architectural
vocation." (Raman, p.855).
1. For a book summarising Polanyi's central views and founding them
on the concept of meaning, see Polanyi (1975). Both Polanyi and
Kuhn agree that no knowledge is or can be wholly explicit. More
significantly, implicit knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is
essentially acquired by the act of doing (that is in its practice)
rather than by simply acquiring rules about it and memorizing
them in idle.
2. Further details of Raman's argument can be followed in his 1976
Ph.D. thesis entitled: Information and Architectural Design,
Edinburgh University, where numerous historical examples and
biographical accounts of the approach to design of some prominent
architects are cited.
199
The most important conclusion Raman deduces, however, is that
the major part of designers' work rarely aims at producing
unprecedented design ideas as such, and yet designing cannot be
said to proceed by a simple replication of established prototypical
solutions. Nevertheless, "once an architectural idea comes into
existence it is possible to recognise the characteristics that
relate it to the historically emergent prototype or model."
(Raman, p.857).
In a similar but antecedent approach, Hillier et al (1972)
make a significant contribution to the debate on the process of
architectural design on two fronts; first, by convincingly
challenging the epistemological basis of the Systematic Design
Methods Movement (SDMM) and, secondly, by rejecting its call for
the elimination of designers' preconceptions before embarking on
the act of designing. Instead, the authors confirm the primacy
of these preconceptions and explore their relevance within the
context of what they generally characterize as 'prestructures'; the
important question being, "not whether design action is pre-
structured but how it is prestructured, and whether the designer
is prepared to make this prestructuring the object of his critical
attention." (p. 12).
Most importantly, Hillier et al identify four areas in what
they call the 'designer's field' to which research could contribute,
namely the areas of instrumental sets3 solution types,, codes and
information. The kind of research appropriate to each of these
areas is characterized as follows (pp.18-9):
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1. Much research of the purely technological kind has its
outcomes in terms of instrumental sets.
2. Development work extends this into solution types by providing
exemplars.
3. Research which aims to provide a method of checking design
proposals against abstract requirements can be seen as a partial
formalization of codes (partial because it is concerned with
testing rather than generation and it is piecemeal).
4. Research which has its outcomes in the form of 'results',
rather than a tool, falls into the field of information.
The authors conclude that of the four areas open to research,
it is the second area and its possible outcome in terms of exemplars
and prototypes which holds the highest likelihood of influencing
designers at the crucial stage of initiating a design solution.
Nevertheless, because of the restricted definition they apparently
hold about prototype or solution type (as something nearly open
to exact replication) and consequently the likely dangers they
3
associate with the results of this area of research , the authors
feel somehow obliged to recommend the priority of the second most
influential area of research - that is the area of codes, mentioned
in the third category of the above list.
3. Such as that designers might adopt these results in an
immitative way3 or if the development of the prototype is
inadequate it may lead to the proliferation of these
inadequacies or that the prototype may be poorly understood
or badly adapted. Dangers of this kind, however, cannot really
be limited to the results of research on prototypes. The results
of research in any area are and can be open to misguided
applicationproliferation of inadequacies3 poor understanding
and bad adaptation. The important point to note here is that
design which proceeds by pure immitation must be a contradiction
in terms.
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The notion of ood.es is, of course, what has since been at
the base of Hillier and Leaman's theoretical investigations, but
whose concrete articulation still remains largely at the level of
syntax, especially in the form of the 'space syntax model'^.
However, from the point of view of this thesis, it is the idea of
solution type or prototype which deserves more articulation.
If prototype is considered at the higher level and in the
pragmatic manner which has been envisaged in the preceding
chapters, then it must be able to allow for a concept such as that
of codes and its variants to operate in conjunction with it as it
also did the notions of image, schema and syntagm. Indeed,
despite their obvious reservation, Hillier et al (1972, p.19; see
also Hillier, 1972; Hillier and Leaman, 1974a) themselves say that
the advantages associated with the development model (that is of
prototype or solution type) should not obscure its potential
usefulness. They argue that it could provide an organizational
solution to the problem of linking research effectively to design.
"If research workers work with designers in producing
experimental prototype solutions, which are intensively
monitored and improved, then explained and publicised,
then research itself benefits by becoming part of a
dynamic process from which it can continuously learn
and develop its concepts." (Hillier et al, p. 19).
A productive situation would be one in which a development
team is provided with a properly developed monitoring system which
is closely linked to a building programme.
4. For review3 refer to Section 3.3.
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An approach which is supportive to the argument of giving
priority to research on prototypes has also been developed by
March (1976).
"If the design process is externalised and made public,
as it evidently must be, for team work to be fully
effective, ... [then] in this externalised process it
is feasible to experiment with artificial evolution with¬
in the design laboratory using simulated designs andj-
environments. New synthetically derived stereotypes
may emerge, and old ones may be given new potential
without having to wait for practical exemplification.
Design comes to depend less on a single occasion of
inspiration, more on an evolutionary history..."
(March, 1976, pp.21-2)
To advance his thesis on the design process, March draws on
the classification of logical inference argued in the philosophy
of C.S. Peirce, where synthetic modes of reasoning are given
logical priority over explicative (or analytic/deductive) ones.
r
According to Fann (1970) , Peirce's original contribution is
exemplified in that, unlike both past and contemporary logicians
and philosophers of science whose interest has so far largely
centred on describing how one sets out reasons in support of a
scientific hypothesis once proposed (by then the hypothesis would
have already been a finished product), Peirce was more concerned
with the logically prior and more important question of how to
characterize the conceptual context, within which any such
hypothesis initially comes into being and gets adopted. And to
this his theory of abduction was devoted.
5. As in the sense prototype3 solution type and so on are used.
See also Section 8.3 below.
6. Fann's (1970) book is entirely devoted to the systematic
extrapolation and explication of Peirce 's theory of abduction
as it has been disseminated throughout the eight volumes of
his Collected Papers. Part of Farm's extrapolations referred
to here is attributed by him to Hanson (1959).
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In Peircean phi 1osophy7 abduction and induction are the two
components of synthetic reasoning, but within this, abduction is
the one which is logically prior and more productive, though its
determinate certainty is comparatively low as one progressively
proceeds towards induction and deduction, respectively. Abductive
inference, of which one is rarely wholly aware, crucially determines
the nature of the thought contents of which one is or is to be
factually aware. And for March,that is typically in the nature





- r Peirce's three modes of inference. There is one form of analytic reasoning, the
deductive, shown in D1 as logically determined. There are two forms of synthetic
reasoning, the inductive and the productive. The hope in inductive reasoning is to
arrive at the conclusion shown in II. However, there is no logical necessity for this and
the typical outcome must look like 12 where the black part of y indicates the amount by
which the rule y < z is not met. Abductive reasoning has three distinct possibilities. In
Al, as in the ideal world of Sherlock Holmes, the motive (rule) and the evidence (results)
conspire 'beyond all reasonable doubt'-but without logical certainty-to prove the
accused guilty (case). In A2, more typically, there is a shadow of doubt marked by the
black part of x suggesting the degree by which x < y is not supported. A3 is yet another
possibility. Here the evidence and the motive simply do not tie up: x, the black zone, is
disjoint from y.
Fig. 8.1 (According to March, 1976, p. 17)
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March gives equal priority to synthetic reasoning in design,
but replaces the term abduction with that of ;production which
carries its creative implications in a design sense. He relates
inductive reasoning to evaluation and productive reasoning to
analogy. The former refers to the logic of accepting a design
proposal as of sufficient adequacy, while the latter to the logic
which makes the suggestion of any one design proposal possible in
the first place. March then comes to conceive of rational designing
as being constituted by the trilogy production/deduction/induction
(PDI), where (paraphrasing Peirce) "production creates; deduction
predicts; induction evaluates." (March, p.18). The PDI-model of
design is schematized as follows (Fig. 8.2):
The PDI (producuon/'deduction/induction)-model of the rational design
process described in the text. The diagram suggests a cyclic, iterative procedure
PD1PD1PD. . . and so on, with constant refinements and redefinitions being made of
characteristics, design and suppositions as the composition evolves. In fact the model is
envisaged as representing a critical, learning process in that statements inferred at later
stages may be used to modify those used in earlier stages and thus to stimulate other
paths of exploration. For this reason no arrows are shown along these paths, although
the general direction of argument is clockwise.
Fig. 8.2 (According to March, 1976, p.20)
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In the course of his discussion, however, March makes two
highly significant contributions in which this thesis finds
support. The first is the emphasis he places on the explicit
treatment of the question of value in design. The second is
the demonstration of how productive reasoning (or synthetic
reasoning generally) in the design process gets facilitated in
terms of such notions as the 'building type' or (borrowing a term
from Hawkes, 1976) the 'stereotype' which can be easily linked to
the idea of the 'prototype'.
March insists that the act of designing is the act of evalua¬
tion and to separate design from value is to force a distinction
on design practice which does not and cannot exist. What are and
are not good reasons for adopting a design proposal are for the
most part questions of value and not a matter of undisputable
fact'7. This makes March's approach consistent with the syntagmatic
8 -
framework which has been proposed in this thesis . This becomes
especially true, when he proceeds to incorporate within his
approach the concept of building type or Hawkes' notion of the
stereotype.
8.3 PROTOTYPE, STEREOTYPE, FORMAT, PATTERN LANGUAGE, TYPE-CASTING,
DESIGN SCHEMA AND OTHER DESIGN-THEORETIC NOTIONS
Hawkes (1976) associates the notion of stereotype with that of
a popular solution (in the sense of it being widely recognized,
7. For further exploration of the question of value and evaluation
in design, see March (1976). See also Simon (1975), for a conception
of 'Style ' as an act of evaluation and choice among alternatives.
8. This can be extended to cover also the research on configurational
studies which has been reviewed in Section 3.5.1.
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understood and found successful) which finds its first development
within the confines of a particular building type, but which
remains open to generalization, thus offering a convenient start
for the solution of some recurrent building design problem.
"In this context, it is simply that there is, at any
point in time, a generally held notion about the
nature of a good solution to any recurrent building
design problem and that it is this notion which
frequently inspires the initial design hypothesis."
(Hawkes, p.465-6).
In fact, there is no stopping the generalization of any aspect
(for instance, environmental) of a successful stereotype to solve
problems of other building types. In this respect, it is interesting
to note that the idea that a particular building type may provide
adequate solutions to problems of design of wider generality than
merely those' of its particular kind has been suggested almost
forty years ago by the Czech semiotician Mukarovsky in a paper
9
entitled On the Problem of Functions in Architecture .
Mukarovsky argues that every period in architecture seems to
have a dominant building type with regard to which it solves some
of its basic problems - say, those of construction. A clear
example is the cathedral in Gothic architecture. One reason why
any building type may operate in such a manner is the fact that
the functionality of any particular building type is never
something quite separate from the functionality of all others. The
individual types do not lack in interrelations, mutual influences
or overlappings whether these refer to activities, economies,
9. This paper is now included in Mukarovsky (1978).
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internal environments, technologies and so forth. The reason for
this lies in the nature of architecture itself, since architecture
relates to man in his entirety and always has to be adaptive to
his changing needs.
"The potential relation of architecture to all man's
needs and aims is vividly illustrated by the possibility
of a shift in the dominant function of an architectural
creation (cf. the use of a palace as an official
building or a stock exchange as a university building)
and by the possibility of a shift in the dominant function
of an entire architectural type (cf. the evolution of a
type of basilica from a commercial into a religious
building)."
(Mukarovsky, p.241, his emphasis).
Hawkes1 idea of stereotype is, in fact, only one variant of a
series of similar notions which are spread widely in the literature
and all of which pertain to the concept of the architectural
prototype as has been generally presented in this thesis. Hillier
et al1s (1972) inclusion of the notion of 'solution type' as a
component of design 'prestructures' has already been mentioned in
this chapter. Other concepts include Alexander et al's (1967; 1968;
1977) 'pattern language', Allsopp's (1977) 'format', Lerup's (1977)
'type-casting' and as early as 1963 Norberg-Schulz' idea of 'design
schema' (which incidentally antedates the full flourish of the
SDMM).
Historically, concepts of this type are by no means new to
the theory and practice of architecture. The conception of
pattern books may be cited as a clear embodiment of similar ideas,
and also, as identified in a well documented essay by Rykwert
(1972), the idea of the first prototype - the 'first house' (that
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is the 'primitive hut') - which though lost in pre-history, still
has influenced architectural theorizing (both folk and professional)
through countless written, verbal or drawn accounts from many
cultures involving religion, philosophy, myth, politics and so
on. The persistent return to this idea by writers on architecture
from Vitruvius to the present day and also by practically all
peoples at all times, says Rykwert (p. 183), has always represented
a return by architecture to its supposedly real origin in the hope
of recovering the original form and essentials of all building,
and, more significantly, in search of renewal or inspiration and
as a guide to a rational way out of its recurrent crises.
It is evident now that the group of concepts which have been
discussed above and their variants are already engaged, in one way
or another, in a similarly important task, not only with reshaping
architectural theory and practice generally, but also with regard
to reorientating individual approaches. It is sufficient to refer
to the gradual but steady reorientation in the ideas^® of a
design theorist of Alexander's stature to see this crucial role
in operation.
Alexander now accepts that design action does not necessarily
start from the abstract level of so-called needs, but that there
is a level (that of patterns) in which both forms and contents,
problems and solutions coexist, and, therefore, can be investigated
on a multi-descriptive basis, and function as nuclei of complex
10. As they now culminate in the tridlogy: The Timeless Way of
Building; A Pattern Language; The Oregon Experiment.
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environmental structures. Most importantly, he accepts that the
discovery of these patterns does not follow from strictly stated
formal procedures (of the kind, for instance, he identified in
Notes on the Synthesis of Form), but, in fact, are informally
accessible to all who are concerned with the artificial environment,
be they designers or users. Furthermore, he accepts that the
realization of these patterns in the real world is not a matter
which is exclusively subject to technical means, but is fundamentally
decided by socio-cultural forces. In other words, design is and
always has been part of a larger socio-cultural framework and thus
cannot be thought of as totally autonomous and self-justifying in
its own terms. It is on these counts that the syntagmatic approach
may find support in Alexander's present efforts to reformulate a
theory which is located much nearer to the level of design practice.
8.4 CONCLUSIONS
The examples which have been discussed of design-theoretic
notions and their close relation to the idea of prototype could be
extended, but the point has been made. There is little in the
arguments which have been advanced in their support which contradicts
the concept of prototype as envisaged in this thesis or the synt¬
agmatic structural approach suggested for its investigation. In
the various approaches, there emerges a keen attempt to re-equip
architectural theory with the most fundamental tool by which
architecture has always presented itself, both to its design
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practitioners and its users. The image of the designer as a
detached objective form-giver, entirely dependent on abstract
formulae and dicta and operating outside history, society and
value is seen to be unrealistic. What they represent is a set of
integrative concepts capable of spanning the gap between the
theory of architecture and its practice, between its ends and
means, between its problems and solutions and, above all, between
its design practitioners and users. But the design process itself
remains just as open-ended as it has always been and its products




THE IDEA OF THE ARCHITECTURAL PROTOTYPE AND TWO AREAS
OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussion in the preceding chapter suggests two major
areas of research on architectural prototypes. The first is con¬
cerned with investigating the prototypic potential of the built
environment itself and is called'prototypic analysis'. The second
is the development of 'design-specific' prototypes. Here new
prototypes are to be proposed and analysed, and their problem-
solving capacity (going beyond one-off solutions) in response to
certain problem-fields in design is evaluated. To this area of
research, this thesis offers a preliminary working example which is
presented in Part IV, Chapter 10.
The two areas of research are, of course, interconnected in
terms of the methodological tools they both require and also in
terms of the contribution they make to the stock of architectural
knowledge - especially within an operational design-theoretic
context. Furthermore, the results of the first can always provide a
source in which many of the proposals made by the second are to be
originated. Within the scope of this thesis, however, the discussion
emphasizes the general significance of the two areas, and not the
exact details of how they are to be conducted.
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9.2 THE PROTOTYPIC ANALYSIS OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
From the outset, there seems to be an advantageous situation
for architectural knowledge to exploit. That is, however implicit
this knowledge is said to be, it remains open to interaction with
a subject matter whose general plasticity is comparatively high.
The idea here is that the process of internalization of knowledge
about, say, a prototype, whether by individuals or groups, may, to
a considerable degree, be subjected to a conscious process of
critical externalization, and thus made public and communal. This
is especially so if the prototype in question has already found a
degree of substantial realization in the form of concrete objects
such as buildings. To draw the attention to this possibility,
however, is not to argue that prototypes as such coincide exactly
with material objects such as buildings or elements of them. A
prototype is always less than the full materiality of any one
particular object, but, on the other hand, always more than it in
terms of its generality.
Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which actual
objects or artefacts enter into the definition and identification
of prototypes. Like any other real-world phenomenon, a building
embodies both its empirical reality and,epistemologically speaking,
an underlying structure which can be conceived of at various
hierarchic levels of abstraction, and which it shares with more
than one other building. It is at those hierarchic levels that
prototypes inhere. But, as there can be no language without speech,
it is the actual buildings which ultimately provide evidence for
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the existence of these prototypes, or alternatively substantiate
their operational validity and offer them points of contact with
everyday architectural reality. This has been confirmed in
Section 6.4 (p.168) when arguing that, "[prototypes] are not
surface phenomena in themselves, yet not entirely isolated from the
rich level of observables, since they realize their potential and
material existence in it. Prototypes are understood only because
they are already virtually contained within the architectural
environment.
Indeed, since every architectural artefact somehow conceptually
originates in a constituitive prototype or set of prototypes, it
in turn becomes inexhuastibly latent with prototypes in which new
designs can also originate, and which in turn provide extra sources
for further designs, and so -on ad infinitum. In this continuous
?
evolution , architectural design transforms into prototype(s)
every architectural product it encounters. To design is largely to
conceive and make available to oneself the entire built environment
as a prototypic apparatus.
The prototypic contribution made by the built environment
itself, therefore, must be part of the object of investigation of
any comprehensive theory which is associated with its design. The
particular type of analysis concerned with extrapolating prototypes
from the built environment itself or describing it under a
prototypic profile is termed here 'prototypic analysis'. In terms
2. See Section 6.4, for further elaboration
2. This does not mean that as they evolve, prototypes necessarily
transform into better ones. Prototypes do evolve all the time,
but like buildings, they also remain open to degeneration,
obsolescence and so forth.
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of the argument advanced in this thesis (especially in Part II),
this analysis is, of course, structural. It is best conducted
at the level of examining systematically the evolutionary
character of these prototypes within the general framework of the
syntagmatic approach, its descriptive contradictional logic and
its operation within the limits of social evaluation and the
predominancies it gives to particular aspects over the
others.
9.3 THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION AND PROBLEM-SOLVING CAPACITY
Within the context of a syntagmatic approach, any attempt to
investigate a prototype is bound to open up a hypothetico-historical
investigation about the prototype. It is simply that, however
novel or radical a prototype is, no prototype really has a separate
existence of its own. Any prototype new or old is nothing but a
node in a network of prototypes. Emergent prototypes always somehow
embody several characteristics of earlier prototypes and at the
same time extend some of theirs to future emerging ones. And that
can also be shown to be true of design action itself.
Just as for a design proposal, when we conjure a prototype,
we formulate some tentative belief about it, a belief which
results in giving it a 'generic centre', of referring it to a
moment of 'presence' or 'origin'. This generic centre founds and
constitutes its elementary structure. But then one must subject
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this structure to an analysis which is critical and stress its
open-endedness. There is no absolute fixity to the meaning of this
structure, since we have to admit that much of the meaning is
socially appropriated and amplified, and, therefore, has to be
coordinated with some historical relevance. Thus the emphasis in
page 168 that:
"[Prototypes] presuppose a structural organization that
is relatively persistent and amenable to some form of
analytic treatment, yet they retain a property of funda¬
mental incompleteness that makes them flexible, dynamic
and open to transformation and hierarchic permutation.
They continuously negate their actuality only to re¬
introduce it enriched with new possibilities that obtain
within various operational contexts. Hence they can be
employed creatively in the process of producing new
architectural realities as yet non-existent, and,
therefore, linking existent and past realities to
possible and future ones, but which can only be grasped
within historical limits and which are constrained by
culturally emergent conditions of usage."
In terms of prototypic analysis, the historical interpreta¬
tion called for here is not a matter of definitive causal explanation
or mere chronological ordering. It is mainly to do with problem-
solving, and can be approached in a manner which is conjectural;
and which, therefore, remains open to variation and further
improvement. It best proceeds by conjuring a field of historically
emergent problem situations to the adequate solution of which a
prototype or set of prototypes had or could have contributed,
within the constraints of certain systems of social evaluation and
the availability of the descriptive tools associated with them.
It is within the context of such structured situations, and the
variations in them, that the historical relevance of past prototypes
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to present-day problems can be assessed and maximized. And this is
where prototypic analysis could strongly link to research on
'design-specific' prototypes, since it is one of the most convenient
and perhaps most productive activities of the latter is to develop and
take advantage of the positive results of the former.
9.4 SPACE, FORM AND PROTOTYPE
Part I has characterized the differentiation of space for human
habitation as the most important function and immediate result of
architectural actions. Consequently, the most elementary structure
that is to be recognized as architectural must be dependent on a
high measure of spatiality. Inherent in such a view is the
importance of spatial dimension to apprehending and defining an
architectural prototype. In other words, all spatial forms are
potentially pregnant with architectural prototypes. But there
are two major types of spatial forms which architectural
prototypes could inhabit; planar(as when the concern is limited
to layouts or what has to do with surfaces generally ) and nonplanar
or volumetric (as when prototypes are assigned to forms which are
at least minimally habitable by humans and sufficiently complex to
support an empirical content which goes beyond hardware and statics
viability^ and provides for necessary environmental conditions
3. Particularly in aesthetic terms.
4. When receiving the attributes of a solid which allows for the
containment of a building fabric and structural resistance to
such forces as gravitation, wind and so on.
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which admit to a variety of activity programmes). Obviously, the
ability to inhabit a physically viable volumetric form, but one
which is not severely constrained, should prove a productive
attribute (particularly in terms of design-specific prototypes).
It is the one which is more true to the nature of architecture
and capable of referring to it as a totality.
However, whatever type of spatial form a prototype may take
possession of, it must be noted that it is not the study of forms
qua forms which is the essence of either prototypic analysis or
the development of design-specific prototypes. The apprehension of
any form requires a structure which goes beyond a single abstrac¬
tion of it in order to cover such vital matters as specifying a
topology appropriate to its definition and identification,
conferring on it a content and assigning to it the conditions which
constrain and make possible its social use. Once again, this
thesis emphasizes a conception of this structure as being evolved
within the syntagmatic framework, especially when it comes to
conceiving of any form as prototypically architectural. To all
this, of course, the concept of the architectural function is
central.
Now, whatever criticism one may levy against Funotionalism
as a philosophy in architecture, the concept of function itself
loses none of its importance insofar as it means the variety of
purposes which architecture serves in society. A helpful functional
distinction has been proposed by Hillier et al (1972; see also
Hillier, 1972; Hillier and Leaman, 1974a) in terms of their
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'four-function model1 which conceives of building as: (i) a clima¬
tic modifier; (ii) a behaviour modifier; (iii) a resource modifier;
,p>
(iv) a symbolic modifier. These are, of course, not exhuastive,
but, as the authors point out, they seem to be the ones which have
historically dominated the bulk of buildings. Besides being
interconnected, each function presupposes a multidisciplinary
framework to deal with it, while suggesting a way of mediating the
relationship between people and environment and between people and
people simultaneously. It refers to building in its totality and
not just parts of it.
Collectively, these four functions constitute a useful set
upon which research on prototypes could perhaps initially concentr¬
ate. The architectural viabiTity and design operationality of a
prototype which satisfactorily incorporates these functions will
no doubt be obvious, as also its 'syntagmaticality1. And since the
results of this type of research are not expected to be tied to
single instances of consideration or fixed prototypic assemblies,
but to develop on an evolutionary basis, then, it should be
possible to introduce a time dimension where the change-rate in
performing these functions could be monitored before any set of,
say, design-specific prototypes is made available for purpose of
wide-scale applications. At any rate, the way these prototypes
should be developed must be in a manner which is inviting to
designers to modify and elaborate on them and not face them with a
situation which allows no room for manoeuvre or participation.
There is always that element which to some degree differentiates
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each design problem from every other (if only in terms of
location). This differentiating element, of course, does not
necessarily make the design problem entirely unique, but, nonthe-
less, it is the one which constitutes its specificity. Therefore,
any design tool which is required to apply to more than one
problem-situation cannot remain rigid. It must be able to trans¬
form under constraint. And that is probably what is so important
to design itself; to effect a transformation on a constrained
situation.
9.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter argued the case for research on the prototypic
analysis of the built- environment and the development of
design-specific prototypes. These two areas of research are
expected to make a valuable contribution to the growth of
operational architectural knowledge, particularly within a design-
theoretic context. The operational modalities of either type of
research, however, have not yet been worked out in detail;
consequently, there emerges a potential field for further investi¬
gation. But, whatever the results of this effort, the concept
of prototype itself remains an operational one, the main intent of
which is to operate as a bridge between theory and practice, with
a view on characterizing general fields of solution/problem
situations.
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In the same way as the concept of structure has been approached,
it is not the attempt to try and pinpoint a definition of the
word prototype which constitutes its utility, but rather the sense
of being able to develop an idea of it operationally and relate
it to design-theoretic contexts. Prototypes, like structures,
can be envisaged as deep constitutive formations, but they are
never permanent or fixed: they are continuously being evolved and
transformed at different stages in history and in response to
emerging fields of problem-situations. Just as for any structural
whole (as has been discussed in Chapter 5), a prototype is capable
of contracting an indeterminate number of elements whose relation¬
ships cannot merely be ordered in a linear fashion or by inherent
or absolute qualities, but only by their place in its organisation.
The advantages of the union of conceptually and potentially
material contexts with a recognizably prototypic apparatus through
the establishment of a guiding methodological framework (here
proposed as the structural syntagmatic framework) make the joint
study of such important concepts as spatial form and structure,
and their operationalization within limitations of architectural
functions, an extremely beneficial field of enquiry for architec¬
ture. This, obviously, is a long-term project to which a substan¬
tial share of research effort may need to be directed, but the
working example given in the following part is intended as an
illustration of its potential. This example is not yet a fully
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CHAPTER 10
TOWARD A DESIGN-SPECIFIC PROTOTYPE: A WORKED
EXAMPLE
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter offers an illustrative example of the possibility
of developing a design-specific prototype which might lend itself
to a wide range of architectural applications. Historically,
the prototype has its origin in a school design project developed
by the author as an undergraduate student at the Department of
Architecture, University of Khartoum. The general solution arrived
at was based on a standard 'prototypic unit' and was elaborated on
a multiple hexagonal grid. A few representative drawings of this
were deposited with UNESCO's Regional School Building Centre for
Africa^ and were documented in its newsletter of summer, 1967. Two
of these drawings are included here as Fig. 10.1.
Until very recently, however, the underlying idea remained in
its original elementary form, despite its obvious potential for further
development. It is now in response to this thesis' advocacy for
research to develop a vocabulary of design-specific prototypes
that the opportunity has been taken to start the process of
realizing that potential. It has become apparent that the basic
idea can be generalized in various ways' which are more productive




than the one in which it was originally proposed. The results have
proved too numerous to include completely in this chapter and
2
what is represented here remains only a limited sample .
The spatial form which this prototype initially inhabits
is polyhedral, convex, flat-faced and single space-filling, but
it also admits of combination and juxtaposition with several other
well-known geometrical solids, including the two Platonic figures,
the cube and the tetrahedron. More significantly, this 'prototypic
polyhedron' is found to be a sub-member of a new 'parent' group
of singly space-filling polyhedra, independently identified and
characterized by the author, and given the generic name 'CUBO-
DODECAHEDRA'3.
Because of the powerful constraints space imposes on any
structure which inhabits it, it has been decided, within the
confines of this chapter and limitations of PhD research, to lay
greater emphasis on exposing the geometrical aspects of the
prototypic polyhedron, particularly those which relate to its
spatial transformabi1ity. The aim is to achieve a first level of
intelligibility which can easily be appreciated by both design
theorists and practitioners. Geometrical descriptors have the
important benefit of being general and less circumstantial. They
2. For an earlier exposition of many of the results included here,
see Awadalla (1978).
3. In Section 10.4 it will be shown that what has been called here
the prototypic polyhedron is, in fact, half a 'standard cubo-
dodecahedron'. However, for convenience, the term prototypic
polyhedron will be commonly used throughout the discussion.
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consist of highly objectified concepts which, once established,
become commonly agreed upon and less open to dispute. It is also
in their nature to be mainly concerned with the general expression
of properties and relationships of magnitudes in space. Thus one
of their major advantages is that they become intuitively useful
in deciding on the most elementary, but fundamental, of all
questions about any prototype: Does the prototype inhabit a spatial
form which is potentially realizable in veal space?
This is a prime question. It is a question of existence
whose answer must either be ensured experientially or be logically
inferred beforehand. However, once this, first level of existence
is satisfied, the process of its intuitive acceptance has to be
immediately questioned, so that the extent of the architectural
validity (hence prototypicality) of the defined spatial form
becomes subject to critical analysis. This involves a shift in
interest. As emphasized in the previous chapter, it becomes primarily
a concern with functional adaptability, that is a concern with the
discovery, elaboration and evaluation of what is architecturally
possible. Therefore, prior to the full engagement at this level
of consideration, the use of the term 'prototype' in conjunction
with any spatial form remains provisional, as is the case with the
example proposed here. The various ways in which it is to realize
its full architectural potential and the comparative value of
that potential can only be part of a long-term project of research
and development which extends far beyond this limited presentation.
The first step is to introduce the prototypic polyhedron on
the basis of a combined mathematical/architectural terminology,
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thus giving it an architectural character from the start. The
second step is to define and characterize the geometrical
properties of this prototypic polyhedron in some detail. This is
followed by the identification of its parent group of polyhedra,
the so-called cubo-dodecahedra. Their close links (especially
those of the prototypic polyhedron) with several other well-known
geometrical figures and their combinatorial and juxtapositional
possibilities with these are then duly explored. Next, the
discussion deals with the potential of the prototypic polyhedron
for achieving a 'physical reality1 considering questions of structural
stability and rigidity within the context of some general structural
systems, but without going into detailed building structural
analysis or methods of construction. After this follows an
elaboration of a variety of spatial possibilities which start to
multiply rapidly once the strict adjacency rules imposed at the
beginning are relaxed. Finally, several areas for further research
are suggested.
The general exposition itself has no pretence to great
mathematical rigour. It does not refrain from introducing a measure
of informality or speculative argument whenever this is found
helpful in emphasizing the operational character and design
potential of the prototype. This high level of informality is, in
fact, a true reflection on the way the results originated. Most
of them are a product of intuitive derivation from earlier ones or
an experimentation with cardboard models and sketches. The best
strategy of presentation, it is felt, therefore, is to give
results directly and illustrate them graphically, rather than to
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complicate the exposition and disrupt its continuity with detailed
formal proofs. As a supplement to this an exclusively graphical
appendix on many compositional ideas has been provided in the form
of Appendix III to this thesis.
10.2 INTRODUCTORY DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOTYPIC POLYHEDRON
Before proceeding to give a detailed geometrical characteriza-
tion of the prototypic polyhedron, it will be helpful to give a brief
description of it. This deliberately uses a combined mathematical/
architectural terminology, thus establishing the first important
link between the prototypic polyhedron and architecture. Aided by
Fig. 10.2 and Photo, 10.1, the following observations can be made:
1. The prototypic polyhedron is convex, 10-flat-faced and has
different classes of vertices, edges, faces, and facial and
dihedral angles.
2. The roof (or roof-unit) is made of three mutually and
orthogonally-adjacent square panels or faces labelled as
ABCD, ADEF and ABGF, respectively. These panels are
incident on a regular hexagonal floor plan (i.e. the hexagonal
base labelled as CJEKGI) at three points, the roof footing
vertices C, E and G, respectively.
3. The walls (i.e. the vertical faces labelled as BIC, BIG, DJC,
DJE, FKE and FKG) are made of six mutually congruent right-
angled triangular panels with the vertical line segments BI,













Fig. 10.2 & Photo. 10.1 The prototypic Polyhedron
229
triangular face have the values 54° 44' and 35° 16', respectively.
4. The vertex labelled as A is unique. It represents the roof
apex and is situated vertically above the hexagonal floor
plan circumcentre, the point 0.
5. The whole polyhedron is centrally symmetric around a 3-fold
symmetry axis perpendicular to the floor plan plane, and
passing through the apex (A) and the floor plan circumcentre
(0).
6. There are two types of standard elevations (depicted by
Figs. 10.2.8 and 10.2.9) and only one type of standard cross-
sections (depicted by Fig. 10.2.10).
An important point for the whole of this exposition is that all
polyhedral forms can be considered as combinations of surfaces
5and edges, where edges describe the boundaries to surfaces .
Volumes are formed out of assemblies of surfaces that are non-
co-planar but with contiguous edges. There will be instances when
such edges will be called co-edges. The term contiguous or adjacent
refers to a common edge or edges forming the junction between two or
more surfaces. The state of contiguity or adjacency may be
considered as an important part of any description of a polyhedral
figure. When describing or evaluating any solid geometrical figure,
questions might be asked about angles, edges, surfaces, volumes or
combinations of any of these, such as questions relating to quantity
measures of say angles (in degrees), edges (in lengths), surfaces
5. The discussion in this and the ensuing paragraph is adapted,
with several modifications to suit the discussion here, from
Big I (1977, pp.62-3).
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(in areas) or volumes (in volumes). More taxing questions might
refer to the relative positions in space of two or more contiguous
or adjacent surfaces in order to establish the form of junction
along a contiguous edge or edges. These questions mainly refer
to quantity measures of dihedral angles and sometimes to lengths
or orientations of contiguous edges.
Classes of polyhedral forms, therefore, may be defined by
applying geometric (size and shape) constraints to angles, edges,
surfaces and volumes. The motivation for applying these constraints,
besides their purely geometric interest, may arise from the material
contexts in which these polyhedral forms are to be employed in,
for instance, sciences of the artificial, where the purposes of
the objects that relate to them and the resources available for
the execution of these objects are paramount. A case in point is
the one relating to built forms.
The following clarification of terminology is also found
necessary to the discussion in the rest of this chapter. From
now on, unless otherwise specified, the terms 'prototypic unit1
or 'prototypic cell' will be used interchangeably with the term
'prototypic polyhedron'. The 'prototypic skeleton' or 'framework'
is the union set of all the edges defining the prototypic poly¬
hedron and its principal surfaces. More generally, the terms
edge, side or line segment will be used interchangeably; as also
will the terms vertex, node or point, on the one hand, and the
terms face, panel or polygon, on the other. A dihedral angle
(d-angle) is an interfacial angle (that is an angle between two
faces), while a facial angle (f-angle) is a polygonal angle (that is
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an angle described by the intersection of two edges in the same
face or polygon). The abbreviatons and notations listed in










u t-face triangular face
u. tr-face trapezium face
n-f-faces the class of faces whose number is
n and whose type is f, where f is
any face as defined. For instance,
n-s-faces for the class of n square
faces..
yO the class of angles whose number is




x°Xf the facial angle whose value is X
degrees and contained in the face f
as defined. For instance, X° is
defined in a triangular face. We
may also have m-xE for a class of
m facial angles.
< Y°
*f/f the dihedral angle whose value is Xdegrees and contained between the
faces f and f as defined. For
example X. is defined by a hexa¬
gonal and ' a triangular face. We
may also have m-X-,. for a class of
m dihedral angles.'
10.3 GEOMETRICAL REALIZATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
PROTOTYPIC POLYHEDRON
The process of geometrical realization of the prototypic
polyhedron can be approached in many ways, but the most interesting
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and straightforward one involves the as a generator (see
Fig. 10.3; Photo. 10.2). Take any unit similar to the orthogonal
3-s-faced unit ABCDEFG in Fig. 10.3.4, rotate in the space and
bring the three equivalent vertices C, E and G to rest on the
horizontal plane (Fig. 10.3.5). In this position, the figure
ABCDEFG represents what has been termed above as the roof unit.
When the three line segments B1, DJ and FK are projected
perpendicularly down to touch the horizontal plane (Fig. 10.3.6)
three equivalent points (I, J and K, respectively) are obtained on
that plane. The six points C, J, E, K, G and I are the vertices
of a regular hexagon. This is what has been referred to above as
the floor plan. The six upright triangular faces are the wall
panels. The completed prototypic polyhedron under construction is




Fig. 10,3 Constructing the prototypic ( (10.3,8)
polyhedron
(10.3.7) -i
Fig. 10.4 represents the complete planar net required for
constructing a cardboard model of the prototypic polyhedron. As a
comparison also, the corresponding generating cube ABCDEFGH has been
superimposed on Fig. 10.3.8, rotated and, then, shown as Fig. 10.5.
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Fig. 10.5 The prototypic
polyhedron and generating
cube superimposed on each
other
There are three standard classes of 'fundamental edges' in
the prototypic polyhedron: the class (with nine members such
as AB); the class '(with six members such as CJ); the class
'' (with three members such as BI). There is a total of eighteen
edges in the prototypic polyhedron. In notational terms, each
edge will be assigned the name of its class, thus we have the
fundamental edge £-|, or ^3- The class £-| are all edges in the
generating cube. They are the defining edges of the three s-faces
describing the roof unit (Fig. 10.3.5). The class characterises
the h-face CJEKGI (the base or the floor plan), while describes
the vertical co-edges in the t-faces (the walls). The three
fundamental edges are, in fact, uniquely described by every t-face.
Take, for instance, the t-face CDJ (Fig. 10.6). In this triangle
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the following holds (Pythagoras Theorem):
CD2 = CJ2 + DJ2
2 2 2
or £1" = Jig +
Fig. 10.6
(10.6,2)
The f-angles in every t-face (Fig. 10.6.2) are 35° 16', 54° 44'
and 90°, respectively. The value 54° 44' is, actually, equal to
that of the d-angle between every s-face (roof panel) and the h-face
(see Fig. 10.10).
Taking £-| as unity (Fig. 10.7), the relative magnitudes of
£.|, &2> ^3 are as follows:
: &2 : ^3
1 : J!: X
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An equally important linear dimension in the prototypic poly¬
hedron is the perpendicular height of the apex (point A) from the
h-face plane. Denote this by the symbol Since is not an
edge in the prototypic polyhedron, but only a linear dimension, then,
the group £-j, and will be commonly referred to as the
fundamental linear dimensions. When &-| is once again taken as unity,
the relative magnitudes of these dimensions are as follows:
5,-j : : £3 :
l • H ■ 1 • 21 -
J 3 ' S3 * A
A first observation is that the relative magnitude of is always
twice that of In fact, the relative magnitudes of ^
and 2,4 can be expressed in a variety of interesting ways. See,for
instance, the examples shown in Fig. 10.8. Taking as unity, then:
£1 : H : *3
/3 : ft : 1
/2-rectangle
"
ii-j : £ 3 : £4
















^2 * ^3 * ^4








There are four classes of vertices in the prototypic polyhedron
(depicted by Fig. 10.9). These classes differ according to both the
edge-valencies^ of their respective vertices and the types of
faces which are incidental on them. Both differences may be used
for the purpose of characterization. When writing rrrn-valent/f/f...,
m is the number of vertices in each class, n is the edge-valency of
each vertex and f is a face-type which is incidental on the vertex
and which has more than one member.
A
Fig. 10.9 Vertex valencies
There are five classes of d-angles in the prototypic polyhedron
(Fig. 10.10); 3-90°^, 6-125° 16's/t» 3"90°h/s, 6-90°h/t, 6-120°^.
Fig. 10.10 Dihedral angles
6. Vertex valency may be defined according to the number of incident
edges3 incident faces or incident space cells. In this study
(unless otherwise specified) vertex valency is defined in terms
of the number of incident edges.
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The facial angles in the prototypic polyhedron can be
classified, into five classes; 12-90°s, 6-90°t> 6-54° 44't, 6-35° 16't,
6-120°h.
Other parameters which are of importance both geometrically and
architecturally are the following:
A-j, denoting the area of the h-face (i.e. the floor plan);
A£, denoting the area of an s-face (i.e. a roof panel);
Ag, denoting the area of a t-face (i.e. a wall panel);
A^, denoting building surface area (i.e. total surface area
less the h-face area);^
Ag, denoting total surface area;
V, denoting total polyhedral volume.
Table 10.2 lists the different invariant factors or constants
which relate the four fundamental linear dimensions £-|, £g and
to each other and also to the parameters just enumerated. The
first column corresponds to taking £-j as known, the second column
corresponds to taking as known and so on. The appropriate
factors are enclosed by brackets.
When exploring the architectural potential of the prototypic
polyhedron, Table 10.2 and its derivatives can, of course, have
many uses. It can be easily extended and, therefore, used in, for
7. This is called building surface area due to its importance in
architectural studies; for instance, in quantity surveying,
environmental performance studies etc. Usually, when architects
talk about building surface area, they evidently refer to what is
otherwise known as envelope area, which excludes the sum area of
floor plans due to the fact that these are either part of the
earth surface or otherwise enclosed within buildings.
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Table 10.2: y = bxa
X
y
1 2 3 4
£i (1) (^72) (7§) (73/2)
*2 ((2/3)/3) (72) (2) (1)
*3 (73/3) (72/2) (1) (1/2)
*4 (^73) (1) (75) (72/2)
A1 (»3) *2 (3^3/2)£2 (3^)^2 (3^/4)£2
A2 (I)*2 (3/2) ^ (3)4 (3/4)^2
A3 (<^2/6) &2 (f2/4)£2 (*5/2)A2 (72/8)A2
A4 (3+f?)^2 (3(3+^)/2)£2 (3(3+/2))&2 (3(3+/2)/4)£2
A5 (/3+3+/2)£2 (3(v^+3+v/2)/2)^2 (3(v^+3+^))£2 (3( 73+3+72)/4)£2
V (l)*f ((3f§)/4)l\ (3v^) ((3/3)/8)^
instance, analysing various possibilities of spatial organization;
obtaining quick estimates of contents of building materials;
investigating environmental performance and so forth. Some preliminary
comparisons can also be made between the prototypic polyhedron and
other geometrical figures. Take, for instance, the value enumerated
in the heavily marked box (Vil-j). is the fundamental edge in the
3
corresponding generating cube and, therefore, the value £-| shows
that the total volume of the prototypic polyhedron is equal to the
volume of that cube (see Fig. 10.11 for graphical illustration).
Yet, the prototypic polyhedron covers a floor plan area (A^) which
is /3 times that covered by one of the cube s-faces (A^) (Fig. 10.12),
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for a total building surface area of 9:10 in favour of the proto-
typic polyhedron over the cube. And since there are six t-faces in
the prototypic polyhedron, it is initially more stable than the cube
which has none.
Fig. 10.11 Equality of volumes between the
prototypic polyhedron and
corresponding generating cube
, Floor plan area covered
by s-face (A^)
Fig. 10.12 superimposed on A-j
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From the outset, these advantages which the prototypic poly¬
hedron has over the cube are, of course, interesting. Nevertheless,
it would be premature, at this preliminary stage, to conclude that
a prototype based on the prototypic polyhedron would automatically
be superior to one based on the cube. A conclusion of this kind
can only be properly reached after an extremely extensive comparative
investigation which goes far beyond these first observations.
Indeed, to be of real value such a comparison must also involve
other geometrical figures. And yet still there can be no guarantee
that such a comparative investigation will lead (or should necess¬
arily lead for that matter) to a conclusion once and for all of the
superiority of a prototype originated in one geometrical figure
over all the others, and in every respect. In fact, since every
geometrical figure can be shown to have overlapping elements or
characteristics with every other, so will the prototypes based on
them. Quite significantly, the prototypic polyhedron and the cube
remain firmly related in a number of ways, not least when the cube
acts as the most direct generator of it and equal to it in terms of
volume, but also because it is the chief generator of the whole of
the new parent group of polyhedra of which the prototypic is a sub-
member. Furthermore, the cube can be easily joined to the s-faces
in the prototypic polyhedron or its parent group, thus giving rise to
some interesting spatial configurations (see, for instance,
Fig. 10.63).
An aspect about the volume of the prototypic polyhedron which
might also be of interest is that it is equal to half the volume of
the hexagonal prism which circumscribes it (see Fig. 10.13, for
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illustration). Furthermore, the rhombic-based space cells depicted
by Fig. 10.13.4 show that both the prototypic polyhedron and its





















In fact, around its 3-fold symmetric axis, the prototypic polyhedron
can be decomposed into two types of rhombic-based sub-cells (Figs.
10.14.3 and 10.14.3'), which, in turn,can be further 'mirror'
decomposed into the same equi-triangular-based sub-cells (Figs.
Fig. 10.14
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(whether equi-triangular-based or rhombic-based) or the prototypic
polyhedron itself is properly joined (through perfect congruence;
see, for instance Figs. 10.15, 10.16 and 10.17) along whole
vertical faces with units that are co-planar and equal in size, a
densely packed triangular, rhombic or hexagonally tessellated
geometric landscape results, respectively (see Figs. 10.18 and 10.19,
for two corresponding examples on the floor plan and roof plan of
the prototypic polyhedron).
(10,15,1) Proper joining (10,15,2) Improper joining
Fig. 10.15 Proper and improper joining.
(According to Hocking and Young,
1961, p.201)
'
-(10,15.1) Proper joining (10,15,2). Improper joining
Fig. 10.16 Proper and improper joining of prototypic
polyhedra
Fig. 10.17 Two ways of proper joining of every
three prototypic polyhedra
Adjacency around a 3-valent/







Fig. 10.19 Corresponding roof
plans to Fig. 10.18
8. The fact that the prototypic unit sits on a hexagonal floor plan
gives it a special quality. There have been many arguments in
favour of hexagonality. In particular instances, hexagonal
tessellations are seen to be superior (for reasons of economy)
to both the square and triangular tessellations. Of the three
polygons3 the hexagon is the one which mostly approximates the
cirole3 white at the same time it can be joined by others on six
sides. Also3 together with its approximations and the space
structures based on them, it has proved a popular structure in
nature. The most famous example of this is, of course3 the one
realized in the honeycomb of the bee (see D'Arcy Thompson, 1964




Roof unit plan (all
three shaded faces
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Most importantly, the prototypic polyhedron and its rhombic
and triangular-based sub-cells can be used singly or collectively
to pack the space solidly without gaps or overlappings. Fig. 10.20
depicts this property as regards the prototypic polyhedron. This
space-filling property provides for many practical architectural
possibilities, such as the generation of multi-level configurations
(see, for instance, Fig. 10.21) or double-planar structural space-
frames (see Fig. 10.47) and so on. The space-filling based on the
prototypic polyhedron is usually distributed on a three-layered
system of congruent regular hexagons, where the points of the middle
Fig. 10.21 An example on multi-storey compositions
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layer are alternately vertically situated below a point of the
upper layer and vertically above a point of the lower layer. This
spatial structure can be extended indefinitely in all directions.
More significantly, it has several interesting symmetry properties.
There is no room to go into the details of these here, but it is
interesting to observe that this structure is exactly equivalent to
the one generated by a graphite crystal as has been shown by Hilbert
and Cohn-Vossen (1952, p.52; see Fig. 10.22 for illustration and
juxtapositioning of the prototypic polyhedron).
(10,22.1) Graphite crystal structure. (10,22.2) A slightly transformed prototypic
(According to Hilbert and skeleton juxtaoosed on graphite
Cohn-Vossen, 1952, p.54) crystal structure
Fig. 10.22
10.4 GEOMETRICAL EXTENSIONS AND 3-DIMENSIONAL ANALOGUES
Before characterizing the prototypic polyhedron's parent group
of polyhedra, it is of interest to refer, first, to the close
relationship between it and several other well-known geometrical
figures. As an illustration, only the tetrahedron and the sphere
are considered here. In both cases, the cube will be involved.
For instance, the tetrahedron (Fig. 10.23.1) can be used to inscribe
the cube (Fig. 10.23.3) or the prototypic polyhedron (Figs.
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10.23.3' and 10.23.3"). The three solids can be juxtaposed
simultaneously on each other as depicted by Fig. 10.23.4.
Of the two ways of inscribing the prototypic polyhedron with
a tetrahedron, the first (Fig. 10.23.3') is the more interesting
9
since it results in the full-facial triangulation of the prototypic
9. The property of full triangulation is achieved when the number of
edges in a polyhedron is or made equal to 3V-6, where V is the
number of vertices. (For a well articulated discussion on tri¬
angulation and structural stability3 see Loeb3 1976; Chapter 6,
in particular. See also Pearce3 19783 for an elaborate and
architecturally orientated treatment).
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polyhedron (thus guaranteeing its structural stability and rigidity,
at least geometrically"'0), while leaving its inside and outside
spaces free of obstruction as they have been originally prior to
this particular inscription.
In relation to the sphere, both the prototypic polyhedron and
the corresponding generating cube can be inscribed by the same
sphere (Fig. 10.24). The three figure are, of course, concentric
(at 0 ). 0 represents the circumcentre of the prototypic poly-s p
hedral base. AH, BE, CF and DG are the cube's four body diagonals.
They are also, of course, diametrs in the circumscribing sphere.
Fig. 10,24 The prototypic polyhedron, the cube and
their joint circumscribin sphere
More specifically, the prototypic polyhedron sits in a -^-sphere
(Fig. 10.25), that is the relative magnitude of its (the height
of the apex vertex) to the circumscribing sphere's diameter is 2:3.
10. According to Loeb (1976, p.34), regardless of how they are
interconnected, V vertices require exactly 3V-6 interconnections
to be stabilized. However, though a V-vertex polyhedron may
not need all (3V-6) interconnections to achieve structural
stability, a polyhedron with such a number of interconnections
all along its faces (i.e. none are cross-sectional diagonals)
will be fully triangulated.
Fig. 10.25 The prototypic polyhedron and the \~
sphere in which it sits
It is appropriate now to develop the exact link between the
prototypic polyhedron and its parent group of polyhedra. Both types
of polyhedra are new and their identification and characterization
remain an independent effort by the author. The parent group
originates in two figures each of which is a double figure of the
prototypic polyhedron. The first double-figure represents an exact
'mirror' alignment of two prototypic polyhedra along their respective
h-faces (Fig. 10.26). The seocnd double-figure represents a
Fig. 10.26 The first prototypic double-figure
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60°-twisted alignment of two prototypic polyhedra along their
respective h-faces (Fig. 10.27).
Fig. 10.27 The second prototypic double-figure
However, the most interesting way of constructing these two
double-figures is to employ the cube as a generator (Fig. 10.28).
Translation along the
cube's body diagonal
Fig. 10,28 Generating the two prototypic double-
figures from the cube
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Both double-figures are convex and 12-faced. Six of the twelve
faces in each figure are square (the s-faces in the generating cube)
and shared between two polar units each of which is formed by the
orthogonal meeting of three s-faces around a polar vertex. The two
polar units are separated by a central 6-faced belt made out of the
remaining non-square faces.
In the first double-figure, these six faces are isosceles
triangles which join alternately along their bases' edges or at
their opposite 'head' vertices. Their f-angles are 54° 44', 54° 44'
and 70°32', respectively. On the other hand, the d-angles in the
whole figure are 18-90°, 5-120° and 12-125° 16', respectively, while
its twenty one edges are of two classes (18 and 3 in number). They
compare with those of the prototypic polyhedron and to each other
as follows:
A-j : 2^3
i . 21 * /3
or /3 : 2
The central belt of faces in the second double-figure consists
of six parallelograms (p-faces) which are congruent and join along
their short edges in a zig-zagging fashion. There are two classes
of f-angles in these p-faces; 54° 44' and 125° 16'. The whole figure
has three classes of d-angles; 18-90°2s, 6-120°2 and 12-125° 16'p/s,
respectively. Compared to the prototypic polyhedron's and themselves,
the two classes of the twenty four edges (18 and six in number) in




or v^3 : 1
Both double-figures, however, singly pack the space without
gaps or overlappings (Figs. 10.28 and 10.29, respectively).
Fig. 10.28 Space close-
packing by the first
prototypic double-
figure
Since both prototypic double-figures are 12-faced, directly
originated in the cube and considerably dominated by its ortho¬
gonal characteristics, the generic term CUBO-DODECAHEDRA is
suggested here as a name for the general class of polyhedra.
Hence the two double-figures remain special cases of cvho-
dodeoahsdra. For instance, the first double-figure is the only
cubo-dodecahedron with t-faces. Therefore, it can be given the
name TRIANGUL0-CUB0-D0DECAHEDR0N. The second double-figure
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satisfies all the requirements for defining a parallelohedron^
and thus may be conceived of as a PARALLELO-CUBO-DODECAHEDRON. But
since there can be (as will be shown below) an unlimited number
of parallelo-cubo-dodecahedra, the second double-figure must be
further differentiated. This can be done in two ways. One way
is to employ the ratio between the relative magnitudes of its
two standard edges. This ratio is /§:!, thus we may have the
name thefz-parallelo-cubododecahedron. The second way of differ¬
entiation is to conceive of it as being the standard-parallelo-
cubododecahedron. This is because like the triangulo-cubo-
dodecahedron, these two figures represent the two 'standard' cubo-
dodecahedra, in the sense that they remain the only two cubo-
dodecahedra from which the prototypic polyhedron can be obtained
(as an exact half) directly by a single slicing operation along
11. Paral lelohedra are a special class of zonohedra (Coxeter3
194 83p£9) 12. A parallelohedron is a convex polyhedron bounded
by paralleograms ar.d whose translated replicas can be fitted
together along whole faces to pack the space solidly without gaps
or overlappings. Obvious examples are the cube3 the hexagonal
prism and the rhombo-dodecahedron. However3 the fundamental
theorem related to parallelohedra is attributed to Minkowski and
it involves the requirement that a parallelohedron must have central
symmetry as must have its faces. For further discussion and
proofs3 see Toth3 19643 pp.114-19.
12. According to Coxeter (19483 p.27)3 a zonohedron is defined as a
convex polyhedron bounded by parallel pairs of congruent and
parallel-sided faces. An important property of such a polyhedron
is that it has n(n-l) faces3 where n is the number of different
directions in which edges occur. In the second double-figure3 there
are four directions in which edges occur3 there fore3 n(n-l) =
4 (4-1) =12 faces3 which are, ultimately3 all parallelograms.
Furthermore3 this double-figure has body central symmetry and
also every face in it belongs to two zones which cross each
other at that face and again elsewhere (at the counter face).
Hence3 the faces occur in opposite pairs that are congruent and
similarly situated in parallel planes.
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their equatorial planes (Fig. 10.30). In fact, all the remaining
hedron
cubo-dodecahedra can be obtained from these two figures through a
simple elongation process.
For example, the standard parallelo-cubo-dodecahedron can be
easily transformed into what may be called the RH0MB0-CUB0-
D0DECAHEDR0N by transforming its central belt of p-faces into
rhombic ones, when elongating their mutually parallel co-edges
from an equivalent length of to (Fig. 10.31). The rhombo-
cubo-dodecahedron has all the characteristics of the standard
Fig, 10.31 Constructing the rhombo-cubo-dodecahedron
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parallelo-cubo-dodecahedron (including its singly space-filling
property), except for the fact that it is the only cubo-dodeca-
hedron with equal edges all around and a central belt of rhombic
faces.
With various variations in the elongation process above, the
standard parallelo-cubo-dodecahedron can be progressively transformed
into an infinite series of elongated ovbo-dodecahedra
whose two classes of edges may range in relative lengths by the ratio
/3:x (0<X£°°). When the process of elongation is reversed and x
is made equal to zero the cube will be obtained. Thus the parallelo-
cubo-dodecahedra can be degenerately transformed into the cube by a
single 'translation' process.
In a similar fashion, the triangulo-cubo-dodecahedron can also
be transformed into an infinite series of what may be termed as the
TRAPEZO-CUBO-DODECAHEDRA. Fig 10.32 depicts one such tragezo
aubo-dodecahedron.
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In the same way, the elongation process above can be extended
to the prototypic polyhedron and its sub-cells (Fig. 10.33).
Fig. 10.33 An elongated prototypic polyhedron
and its elongated sub-cells
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All the elongated cubo-dodecahedra and their sub-cells are also
space-filling solids. On a general level, the cubo-dodecahedra seem
to bear a striking resemblence to the well-known group of figures the
rhombo (standard or elongated)-dodecahedra and their twist counter- .
parts the trapezo (standard or elongated)-rhombo-dodecahedra (Fig.
10.34). The distinction between the two groups of figures comes from
the special orthogonal characteristics of the cubo-dodecahedra. But
since the s-faces in the cubo-dodecahedra are rhombic (though special)
faces anyway, the two groups of dodecahedra can be considered to
belong to a more general class of rhombo-dodecahedra, of which every
figure in the two groups become a special case of a special sub-class.
Fig 10.34
Indeed, at various levels of consideration, each cubo-dodeca-
hedron can easily be juxtaposed on a corresponding elongated rhombo-
or trapezo-rhombo-dodecahedron. One interesting result of this is
that the prototypic polyhedron can be juxtaposed with half an elong-
3ated -rrrhombo-dodecahedron (Fig. 10.36), in such a way that each would
eventually be of help in stablizing the other. For instance, the
skeleton of the protopic polyhedron can be regarded as acting as a
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<10.35.2')
Fig. 10.36 Relating the prototypic polyhedron to
half the -^-rhombo-dodecahedron
triangulator to the faces (except the base) of half the ^ -rhombo-
dodecahedron, while, on the other hand, the juxtapositioning of this
half on the prototypic polyhedron results in mounting its s-faces
13
with three square-based pyramidal units (Fig. 10.36.4)
There are, of course, many other interesting geometrical
properties and features attached to this new group of cubo-dodecahedra
which could be investigated. For instance, what about their truncations
or stellations? What is the nature of their dual figures or the
figures which inscribe them? As a representative example (see
Fig. 10.37), the standard paral1 elo-cubo-dodecahedron can be shown
to be fully triangulated when juxtaposed on the octahedron. These
13. Any one of these square-based pyramids -is, in fact, the same
as any of s-based pyram-ids obtained by unfolding or subdividing
the corresponding generating cube into six congruent square
pyramids when coining its eight vertices to its body centre.
Each of these s-based pyramids will have as base one face in the
cube. The edges of the base are, of course, equal to the cube 's
side, while the remaining edges are equal to half its body diagonal.
When these six pyramids are placed on the faces of another con¬
gruent cube, the rhombo-dodecahedron results.
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properties are too many to go into within the confines of the present







Fig. 10.37 Juxtaposing the standard parallelo-cubo-
dodecahedron on the octahedron
10.5 PHYSICAL REALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL STABILITY
Before considering the rich spatial possibilities which the
prototypic polyhedron, its sub-cells and its parent group of
polyhedra give rise to, it is of value to offer a few suggestions
on how the prototypic polyhedron, in particular, can be struc¬
turally stabilized and made rigid. From the outset, however, it must
be emphasized that the suggestions given below are neither exhuastive
nor analytically rigorous. The aim here is to give a brief orienta¬
tion and a few preliminary examples of the kind of building structure
14. The use of the term building structure in the present context is
deliberate. It is intended to make a differentiation between
the special conception of 'structure ' as related to statics3
load-bearing3 resistence of forces and so on3 and its general
epistemological and methodological conception as has been
referred to in the rest of this thesis.
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systems which can be adopted and on the basis of which future
investigation may be conducted.
Structural stability may be achieved by geometrical arrange¬
ment or strength of materials. In reality, a building structure
always involves both. But within this, it tends to take more
advantage of one than the other, for a variety of reasons.
Initially, however, it is always preferable to take advantage of
geometrical arrangement with the aim of saving on materials and
space. Indeed, the significance of geometrical arrangement is far
reaching: it imparts strength to the structure even before the
detailed physics and bulk of materials is taken into considera¬
tion .
In relation to the prototypic polyhedron, therefore, the
building structure systems which are favourable for adoption are
either vector-active (i.e. strutted structure systems which are in
co-active tension and compression), surface-active (i.e. multi-faced
structure systems in surface stress condition) or any combination of
15 16
these ' . The behaviour of both systems or their combinations is
largely governed by the basic principles of geometric stability.
To be inherently stable, strutted systems depend on full
15. See Engel (1968)3 for cm -informative discussion on building
structure systems3 generally. See also Crapo (1979) for a
rigorous summary of the theory of structural rigidity of 3-
dimensional structures.
16. This does not mean that3 for instance3 bulk-active systems
(i.e. structure systems in bending) cannot be used to structure
the prototypic polyhedron3 but because of their high material
content and the amount of space they tend to occupy3 they are
clearly less favourable.
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triangulation^^, while surface-active systems depend on complete
boundedness by surfaces (Pearce, 1978, p.138). Both conditions,
however, are not always a necessity for the achievement of
structural stability. There are situations which when involved in
a structure may result in its structural stability without under¬
going the elaborate processes of full triangulation or full surfac¬
ing. Such situations may arise from, for instance, smallness of
scale, the necessity of involvement of building materials in the
physical realization of the structure and most significantly some
favourable geometrical distributions of particular members of the
structure itself. For example, with six t-faces and by fixing in
18
position the six joints which lie in the floor plan , the strutted
prototypic polyhedron can be expected to remain stable at a
reasonably operative scale without the introduction of major extra
reinforcement.
Fig. 10,38 Strtted prototypic polyhedron
17. "Stable structures are not necessarily triangulated ipolyh.eclra3
for there are numerous -internal struts that will stabilize a
structure without making it a triangulated polyhedron. However3
triangulated polyhedra have now been proved to be stable
structures." (Loeb3 19763 pp.34-35). (For detailed proofs, see
the same referenceChapter 6).
18. Though with the risk of extra loading at these joints.
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Nonetheless, as it is, the prototypic polyhedron cannot be
expected to adequately satisfy the range of stability and rigidity
conditions which must be met with increase in size. Hence additional
strutting will be required (for example, Fig. 10.39) up to the level
of full triangulation. There are, of course, many ways to achieve
this (for instance, Fig. 10.40), but (as observed earlier) one
interesting possibility involves inscribing the prototypic polyhedron
with a tetrahedral skeleton (Fig. 10.41).
Fig. 10.39 Additional facial strutting
Fig. 10.40 Two ways of full facial triangulation
Fig. 10.41 Full facial triangulation by inscription
of a tetrahedral skeleton
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Nevertheless, even when fully triangulated, a structure will
start to be progressively unstable, when its struts become too long
to resist buckling. Therefore, further elaboration of the triang-
ulation process may need to be introduced. Two examples of further
triangulation elaborated on the roof unit are shown in Fig. 10.42.
Fig. 10.42
Except for a large size, therefore, it is possible to sub¬
stitute a simple layer of vector-active triangulation for a contin¬
uous surface, giving a family of triangulated analogues to the elemen¬
tary shape of the prototypic polyhedron. But as triangulation in one
plane gives a form analogous to slender, though relatively solid,
surfaces, there will be a tendency for surfaces to be compoundly
prone to bending and buckling out of their planes. And with
further increase in overall size, this becomes definitely so.
Hence, there is the fundamental problem of eliminating the risk
of buckling and bending, either involving the whole structure or
confined to local deformations.
According to Pearce (1978, p. 191), there are two main ways to
deal with this condition. Only one method allows surfaces to
remain planar. This is accomplished by creating double-planar
space-frame structures. The shapes of the faces so structured will,
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of course, influence the geometric arrangement of these space frames.
The second method is to mount these faces with non-planar (convex
or concave) arrangements, including trusses, folded-plates, hyper
and domical surfaces, and so on. This, of course, results in a
rapid reduction in the flexibility of joining space-cells to each
other.
Now, as far as the prototypic polyhedron is concerned, the major
source of structural instability may arise with the roof unit, because
of its undeniably cubical nature. Cubical or prismatic shapes,
though they are the most popular shapes used in architectural
design, are inherently lacking in structural stability, especially
when compared with triangulated (in particular fully triangulated)
ones (Fuller, 1975; Loeb, 1976; Pearce, 1978). Hence in the
following examples the main concern will be with suggesting possi¬
bilities for stabilizing the roof unit.
Before extending the application of space-frames, folded plates
and so forth, there are still some intermediate ways which perhaps
could be employed to achieve structural stability, while keeping
the external space of the prototypic polyhedron completely unaffected.
At the roof level, for instance, internal cross-ties, cross-
trusses or transversally interlocking surfaces (Fig. 10.43) may be
of use, so long as the enclosed space remains functional by
maintaining sufficient ceiling heights.
As regards the external space, whatever additional structuring
arrangement is employed, there is an important restriction which
must be complied with if a minimum level of flexibility in joining
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Fig. 10.43
prototypic units is to be maintained. This restriction refers to
keeping entirely clear all the spaces outside the infinitely
elongated, hexagonally prismatic surfaces surrounding the protot¬
ypic polyhedron (Fig. 10.44). In this manner, the vertical planes
along the t-faces remain flat and thus free to join with their
similars in other prototypic units as the need arises.
Fig. 10.44
Within this restriction, for instance, different stratified
(double or more) roof layers can be created (Fig. 10.45). These
layers may be filled in a variety of ways by space-frame structures,
Fig. 10.45
and so on. In fact, as a simplification of this, each face in the
roof unit can be considered within the confines of its vertically
enclosing infinitlely elongated, rhombic prismatic planes (Fig.
10.46). The way it is structured, then, can be repeated on the
other faces within the context of the whole prototypic unit.
Obviously, there can be many ways of developing double-planar
space-frames to fit to the roof faces, but an interesting possibi¬
lity is to develop space-frames which employ small replicas of the
partially (or if need, be-fully) triangulated protctypic polyhedron
as their basic space sub-units. This is not difficult to realize,
since the prototypic polyhedron and its sub-cells have already been
shown to be space-fillers. Fig. 10.47 does not represent a fully
developed prototypic space-frame structure, but it is indicative
of its possibility. Thus the prototypic polyhedron can be of use
Fig. 10.46
Fig. 10.47
in organizing a geometric arrangement which is functionally useful
spatially and at the same time offer a feasible opportunity for
generating space-frames which can be employed for stabilizing
this functional space structurally.
In terms of non-planar structural arrangements, Fig. 10.48
suggests a number of options on folded, hyper or curved surfaces
including, for instance (Fig. 10.49), the mounting of the square-
Fig. 10.48
Fig. 10.49
based pyramids obtained by juxtapositioning half the elongated
3
~2 -rhombo-dodecahedron which has been referred to in the previous
section (p.257). These pyramids can be arranged in the form of
folded surfaces or trusses, and also transformed into singly or
doubly truncated ones.
With curved arrangements, the possibilities may include
domical roof tops (for instance, Fig. 10.50) or ultimately (when the
above hexagonally prismatic restriction is ignored) the full develop¬
ment into geodesic domes. Fig. 10.51 depicts the main great circles
on which the vertices of the prototypic polyhedron lie. This offers
an initial connection between the prototypic polyhedron and any
2
geodesic domes based on the -sphere in which it sits.
The examples given above on structural stability may be either
over-simplified or too general, but they illustrate the wide range
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of options which are open to prototypes based on the prototypic
polyhedron in order to secure their structural stability and maintain
their flexibility to suit requirements of size, materials, technology
and structural economy. This is the more so, when the multiplicity
of spatial arrangements the prototypic polyhedron, its sub-cells and
parent group allow are also considered. The following section
offers some illustrative examples.
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10.6 SPATIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONFIGURATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
The first set of possibilities in the spatial configuration
t/v
process are those limited to properly combing units of equal size
while maintaining planarity at the floor plan level. Within these
adjacency restrictions, a multiple series of floor plan layouts can
be elaborated on regular hexagonal grids and with a variety of diff¬
erent adjacency requirements (Fig. 10.52). This might also involve















However, the adjacency restrictions laid down above are
unnecessarily strict. Once they are relaxed through change of
levels of assembly, elongation, variation in size, overlapping,
nesting, truncation, and so on, an almost endless universe of
spatial possibilities emerges. The following series of self-
explanatory examples is intended simply to give an impression of
the richness of possibilities.
Fig. 10.54 Stepped joining
Fig. 10.55 Joining with elongation
Fig. 10.56 Joining with 1:2-frequency
F ig. 10.57 Joining with 1:2:4-frequency






Spatial hierarchy according Spatial hierarchyto nested prototypic units according to C.P.T
Fig. 10.60 Hierarchic single and two
storeys nesting
 
10,62 Distribution on semi-regular plane
and creation of different types of
tessellations
passages
Fig. 10,63 Joining with
the cube
When the process of combination is extended to involve the
prototypic polyhedral sub-cells and the prototypic polyhedral
parent group, the richness of spatial possibilities goes beyond
any reasonable attempt to illustrate it. A quick look at the
following photographs and the graphical supplement (Appendix III)
is sufficient to indicate that the range of possibilities which is







This chapter was designed to give the first rudiments of a
design-specific prototype whose further development would consti¬
tute a long-term research project. As an initial step towards
its architectural realization, the envisioned prototype has been
given a generic centre by allowing it to inhabit and progressively
evolve within the constraints of the so-called prototypic poly¬
hedron, involving also its space sub-cells and parent group of
polyhedra. The prototypic polyhedron has proved to be at once
space-defining and physically feasible. Many varied and rich
spatial possibilities are found to arise. Yet, the examples given
do not begin to exhaust the range of possibilities which exist and
are available for architectural elaborations. Nevertheless, what
has been derived above can only serve as 'raw material' for a much
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more comprehensive architectural undertaking. Whatever the merits
of the approach developed in this chapter, it remains a partial one,
being evolved almost within the confines of one descriptor. It
is far from being adequately syntagrmtic in the sense in which the
syntagmatic approach has been argued in the earlier parts of this
thesis. In view of this, therefore, it would be premature to
confer the full status of prototype on the prototypic unit and its
extensions. What has been evolved here should be viewed as part
of what might be called the pre-prototypie stage. It is a
necessary stage. But beyond it, it is obviously important to
allow the envisioned prototype to have time to evolve, before its
real architectural worth can be fully realized, increased or
properly evaluated. This will unavoidably involve extensive
experimentation or if possible practical design applications. Both,
however, remain part of the long-term research strategy.
The objective which such a long-term project is meant to
serve is in compliance with the argument advanced and expounded
in more than one place in this thesis. This argument has repeat¬
edly emphasized that when the majority of designers (if not all)
attempt to solve design problems (in their normal design practice),
they employ already structured (new or old) architectural prototypes;
prototypes which are manipulable and intelligible to them and which
form a highly significant aspect of their operational architectural
knowledge. It should be then a prime objective for research to
equip them with a well-understood and structured vocabulary of these
prototypes.
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It is hoped that the account given above, will make a useful
contribution to this objective. In a sense, the main usefulness
of this account lies in the general logic with which it character¬
izes an elementary geometric figure, identifies its close link
with several others and goes from there to establishing its
potential for supporting an increasingly complex content. The
essential question which now remains is the following: Given the
spatial properties and flexibility of the prototypic polyhedron
and its extensions, how prototypically architectural can it be made
to be? This, of course, will depend on how responsive it is
within an institutional, environmental and activity context.
This, then, provides a sound basis for future investigation. In terms
of environmental research, for instance, some areas suggest them¬
selves almost immediately:
1. The investigation of distribution of thermal loads on the
surfaces of isolated prototypic units or complexes of them in
different climatic conditions.
2. The investigation of distribution of wind flows and the
possibility of relating this to problems of sand accumulation
in desert conditions, snow accumulation in arctic conditions
or more generally to the micro-climate produced in the inter-
building spaces.
3. The investigation of the use of roof panels as solar collectors.
With a natural inclination of 54° 44' of roof panels, they
might be suitable for use in particular climatic areas,
especially temperate ones, where the optimum inclination of
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solar collectors may approximate to such an angle.
4. The investigation of the closely linked problem of openings
and fenestration.
And so on.
Another important area of research is to investigate what
building types, say, housing, schools, public halls and so forth,
which are suitable for such accommodation. In this context, it
is worth remembering, once again, that the whole idea has originated
with a school design project and, therefore, the feasibility of
this particular building type should pose few problems. The
question of building materials, their economics and high or low
level of technology required is an equally important one to
explore.
It is also possible to investigate how alien or not the
prototypic shape is to certain cultures. For example, in African
cultures, where all sorts of huts have been used, this shape may be
potentially acceptable. In fact, in Sudan, the traditional hut
shape of a circular plan and conical roof has been increasingly
displaced in some areas (especially where new types of furniture
have been introduced) by a square-based and pyramidally-roofed hut.
This new type of hut seems to come much closer, at least aestheti¬
cally, to the prototypic shape (Fig. 10.65).
Nevertheless, at this stage, the idea that a prototype based
on the prototypic polyhedron - or indeed any other new prototype -
can be said to be potentially acceptable to a particular society
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Fig. 10.65
(especially in a conservative one, like the Sudanese), can only be
a speculation. It is quite difficult to say, from the outset, what
cultural inhibitions a particular society will impose on accepting
a generalized idea like the one presented here. Therefore, it is of
the utmost importance to enquire, in detail, into the levels of its
cultural adaptability within the confines of specific cultural
contexts, before any conclusive statement about its viability to
solve particular design problems in relation to any particular society
is to be made. This obviously, is a chief requirement under the
syntagmatic framework, that is the incorporation of the cultural
dimension within the object of investigation, whether this relates to
prototypes or architecture generally.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
1. A persistent theme throughout this thesis has been the search
for an appropriate conception of a methodological framework through
which it would be possible to investigate architecture in its
totality with a view to influencing its practice. There is no claim
here that such a framework has emerged in sufficient detail to
warrant its formalization. Obviously, this is not the sort of
framework which could be expected to be fully produced within the
time-scale of a PhD thesis. Nevertheless, some important aspects
of such a framework have been identified and their architectural
validity investigated. The following is an abstraction of the main
arguments related to these aspects.
2. It is a firm conclusion of this thesis that the fundamental
problem with architectural research is a theoretical one. It is
the increasingly weakening architectural basis of the theories which
guide this research which is at the root of its commonly acknowledged
inability to produce operational knowledge. Instead of presenting
a unifieid all-embracing view of architecture, theoretical formula¬
tions have tended to present themselves as isolated models and
techniques largely imported from other disciplines, but usually at
*
.
Each chapter in this thesis has been provided with a set of
conclusions. These conclusions can be referred to in order
to complement the following general conclusions.
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the same time excluding the epistemological basis of what they
import from critical analysis.
3. As a first step, therefore, theoretical formulations should
reflect a dual concern. The first is to maintain a high level of
architectural identity; the second is to address questions of
practice at the very basis of their formulation. The close link
between theory and practice is in the nature of architecture
itself, since it is not only a method for describing the built
environment, but also a practice for producing it.
4. This is not to deny the contribution of other disciplines
or to believe this contribution can be managed without when dealing
with such a complex system as the built environment, but to
insist that the contribution should evolve within an architectural
context.
5. This introduces the requirement for a comprehensive structural
framework which besides being relevant to the description of the
built environment as such is also concerned with the operational
character and problem-solving capacity of the descriptive tools it
employs and eventually in the knowledge it produces.
6. A framework of this kind is termed (borrowing the term from
linguistics) the syntagmatic framework. The syntagmatic framework
is based on the assumption that design action, because of the
immediacy of the phenomena it deals with, occurs predominantly at
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the synthetic level of consideration. Thus to be operationally
effective an architectural theory needs to accept a less deep
level of abstraction than the purely syntactic (i.e. analytic) one
for describing environmental structures. This level is the syntag-
matic level. Its basic tool is the syntagmatic pattern in which
prototypes which are highly structured can exist on multi-
disciplinary bases and can be used both for describing complex
architectural structures and for designing them.
7. The level at which prototypes occur is the proper level at
which a successful mediation between the theory of architecture
and its practice is to be sought. Therefore, the bulk of the
knowledge, method or technique sought from other disciplines should
be directed towards elucidating this level of consideration and
towards identifying, developing and enriching the empirical content
of the prototypes.
8. 'Space1 represents the most objective basis on which any
prototype, or indeed any recognizable architectural structure, is
founded. It is simply that whatever constitutes architectural
space, constitutes architecture. It is crucial to formulate a
proper conception of space if the nature of architectural reality
is to be sufficiently understood. Hence the search for a methodo¬
logical framework cannot be carried out in an ad hoc manner, but
has to proceed simultaneously with the specific empirical object of
the study, namely architectural space.
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9. However, beyond its intuitive acceptance, space cannot be
properly viewed outside the totality of architectural structures.
And within this, it is no longer important whether architectural
space or the built environment is technically describable in
terms of a particular set of descriptors, but how comprehensive
and well integrated this set is, in order to reflect the real
identity of it.
10. As a methodological consequence, the need emerges to adopt a
structural approach which not only recognizes the importance of
the spatial and aspatial dimensions of architectural structures,
but also organizes and presents the different images they take:
their institutional image, their activity image and their environ¬
mental image. At deeper levels (the levels at which prototypes
are conceived and internalized) the interdependence between these
images can be profound and present a structural totality involving
stable forms (morphology-synchrony), dynamic processes (trans¬
formation) and history (evolution-diachrony).
11. There are various contributions which the structuralist
perspective (when properly qualified) can make to the formulation
of a methodological framework. These are fundamentally conceptual.
The most obvious interest afforded by structural ist thinking is
not a precise method or technique by which any object-structure
will be automatically discovered, but the insistence that the
theoretical premises underlying any such method and the conditions
under which it applies should be made as explicit as possible so
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that they can be among the things held out for comparison and
critical analysis.
12. An argument which is closely connected to this is that the
structural analysis, of whatever object one is dealing with, is a
product of a theory whose construction depends primarily on the
nature of the object under consideration and on the derivation of
the appropriate conceptual tools which permit the analysis of
this object as a totality, that is as a system.
13. A structural approach, therefore, besides recognizing the
specificity of architectural realities and the contexts in which
they occur, must go beneath the level of their surface manifesta¬
tion and habitual observation and establish how they manage to be
continuously transformed while at the same time maintaining an
internal order and a structural coherence which give them meaning
and guarantee their functioning.
14. A structural approach, syntagmatically characterized and
developed within an architectural context, accepts the involvement
of meaning at the very bases of the structures it investigates,
rather than seeing it as an addendum or epi-phenomenon. In other
words, the main value of adopting a syntagmatic strategy is that
it embodies a semantic dimension dominated by social evaluation
which is historically originated and which plays an internal role
in characterizing a structure even at its very elementary formation.
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15. The structural syntagmatic approach also recognizes the role
of syntax in defining the rules and conditions which govern meaning,
but views this syntax as a syntagmatio syntax. Unlike purely
rationalized and descriptive syntaxes which are frequently single-
valued and excessively analytic, syntagmatic syntax usually
embodies more than one descriptive tool for describing a structure.
It also accepts the contradictions and anomalies within and between
the images created by the descriptive tools it adopts, and takes
it as its prime task to identify them and enquire into their
nature and their potential for transforming the structure itself.
16. Syntagmatic syntax also introduces the idea of an optimum
level of abstraction for descriptive theories of architecture.
This substitutes for the bipolar objectivity-subjectivity the
concept of dynamic coexistence between a theory's abstract logical
basis and the immediacy and reality of the objects of its investiga¬
tion. The immediacy of architectural realities severely constrains
the degree of abstraction of the descriptive theories concerned
with them. It indicates that the most significant task before any
such theory is not to attempt universal causal explanations, but
to construct the appropriate operational links with the practice
which produces these realities.
17. It is the study of prototypes which presents the appro¬
priate operational link and provides for the conceptual unity
between architectural descriptive theory and the practice of its
design. The literature on design theory has been progressively
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enriched with similar organizational concepts such as pattern
language, stereotype, solution type and design schema. They all
advance a similar argument to the one developed here to support
the operational value of the prototype. What appears now to be
urgent is to explore in depth not only the theoretical functioning
of these notions in reorientating design theory, but most
importantly to devise concrete research programnes which investi¬
gate their practical workings.
18. Under the syntagmatic framework, this thesis has suggested
two interrelated areas of research. The first is that of proto-
typic analysis of the built environment', the second is the develop¬
ment of what has been termed design-specific prototypes. The first
is mainly concerned with investigating the prototypic potential
of the built environment. Besides providing a better understanding
of the built environment itself, it can provide an essential basis
either for developing the second area of research or, at least, a
frame of reference under which it can be properly evaluated.
19. Research on design-specific prototypes is particularly con¬
cerned with proposing new prototypes, and analysing and testing
their problem-solving capacity in response to a variety of emergent
problem-situations. The most convenient origin for these proto¬
types is in those which already exist. However, the investigation
of spatial form generally offers an equally rich source and this
thesis has illustrated this with a worked example. The architectural
validity of the example has not been fully demonstrated, but the
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potential of its working has been explored.
20. The principle limitations of the thesis lie in the lack of
detailed empirical support. Although some empirical content has
been introduced at various points, this has not been sufficient
to indicate fully the implications of the suggestions being made.
However, despite an acute awareness of this, the complexity of the
concepts involved necessitated concentration upon the theoretical
discussion. The concepts themselves are contentious and have been
subject to dispute. Hence little has been taken for granted.
The major interest has been to view them critically and to treat
them with the seriousness they deserve. The definitions given to
them have always been evolved in an operational form. And this,
indeed, has been the strategy throughout the thesis: to argue the
case for the operational level.
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTORS IN ARCHITECTURE*
Foreword
This paper represents a combination of apparently different
work carried out in the Department. The aim is both experimental,
in terms of the effectiveness of this type of co-operative work,
and essential in terms of the search for a common framework of
description in architecture, within which architectural research
may be organized. Fortunately - but not entirely by coincidence -
the three individual approaches developed by the co-authors of this
study^ were found to be closely interconnected and constituting a
conceptually self-sufficient system, as they have been corrected and
revised by continuous feedbacks during the discussions. These revi¬
sions stimulated a reconsideration of each one's individual work.
The study is divided into the following five sections:
1. The dynamic nature of descriptive theories and their problem-
origin.
2. Comprehensiveness and structural approach to descriptive
theories.
3. The abstract syntax of microclimatic and network descriptors.
* The contents of this appendix appeared originally in a collective
paper written by the author of this thesis and his colleagues Dr
T. Kotsiopoulos and Dr T. Maravelias. This paper has been published,
under the same title, in Edinburgh Architecture Research (E.A.R.),
Volume 3, 1976, pp.35-75, and is now reproduced here in its entirety.
Several minor modifications, especially in terms of footnotes, have
been rendered necessary following the adoption of the same general
system of referencing authors and so on employed throughout the main
body of the thesis.
1. 'Network Structures and Architectural Design ' (A. Awadalla);
'Barrier Structures and Participation Problems in Urban Universities '
(T. Kotsiopoulos); 'Urban Microclimatic Structures' (T. Maravelias).
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4. The importance of semantic considerations: towards a generative
approach.
5. The syntagmatic nature of architectural descriptors and their
problem-solving capacity.
1. On the dynamic nature of descriptive theories and their problem-
qii9 ill-
Descriptive theories are generally considered to be of static
character. In this sense, terms like predictive, prescriptive, nomo¬
thetic, or normative are distinguished from the term descriptive.
However, in this study 'description-' is used in its broader sense of
'explanation'. Within this context description automatically implies
both a 'behind' as well as a 'beyond' in terms of its historical
evolution and its practical applications. Before discussing these
basic characteristics of descriptive theories we shall distinguish
between descriptive theory and descriptor.
Descriptors are the components of descriptive theories. In other
words, they constitute the basis according to which a description may
be implemented. A descriptive theory may consist of either one
predominant descriptor which is being considered as the most important
one, or a set of descriptors which supplement each other in a
structural way within the framework of a descriptive theory. Compre¬
hensiveness, therefore, emerges as one basic property of descriptive
theories. However, comprehensiveness is not a property that a
descriptive theory may technically acquire only by combining
descriptors in isolation from both its historical origin and its
structural context.
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A basic assumption in this study is that sciences, as domains
of particular knowledge, are historical products. This is especially
true for the so-called 'social sciences-' and the ''sciences of the
artificial ', in which not only their stock of knowledge, but also
their very subject-matters are historically affected. The major
explanation of this basic assumption is that these sciences describe
human practices which are strongly influenced by ideologies. The
additional reason that scientific paradigms in these sciences are
equipped with 'behinds' and 'beyonds 1 is simply that it is
extremely hard for the observer to consider himself excluded from
the reality he investigates, though there are some serious objections
to this particular thesis as far as comprehensive social phenomena,
such as language, are concerned^.
In this study, it is not our intention to be involved in this
epistemological question. What we are going to argue here is that
descriptors in architectural descriptive theories are generated as
products of historically created problems with which the practice of
architecture is concerned. Thus, descriptors represent in a way the
ideological struggle of the historical moment in which they appear.
The history of description in architecture is quite short to prove
this, due to the difficulties that the consideration of architecture
as an art has imposed; a phenomenon common also to other fields such
as language, music and painting in which the attempt of investigating
an art in a scientific way is also a recent achievment.
Descriptors are derived historically according to the following
general model:
2. See Lewi-Strauss' object-ions to W-iener's assumptions -in Lewi-















1. DIRECT ORIGIN: From historically created problems and social realization
and formulation of these problems
2. INOIRECT ORIGIN: From various scientific fields, where descriptors have
been effective within analogous context.
Present architectural thinking realizes that climate was always
a basic generator of built forms. What led to the emphasis on micro¬
climatic descriptors - apart from some obvious reasons directly
derived from industrialization, such as pollution, conservation of
energy, etc - was the formalization of 1 comfort' as a commodity.
The demand for comfort has always been central to architectural
practice. What happened, however, after the Industrial Revolution
and the technological advance of systems by which comfort may be
achieved, is that comfort has been included in the course that
Mandel (1974) describes as 'a system for constantly extending needs'.
He writes (p. 25):
"The system must provoke continued artificial dissatisfaction
in human beings because without that dissatisfaction the
sales of new gadgets which are more and more divorced from
genuine human needs cannot be increased."
It is very characteristic that P. O'Sullivan (1972) proposed the
term 'lack of discomfort' in order to identify the subjectivity of
the concept. This subjectivity is not only due to the inadequacies
of psychological or other scientific tools to identify it, but is
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also due to the recent function of comfort as something which one
could buy and sell and which is consequently subject to the unstable
character of market forces.
In addition to this direct reason for the emergence of micro¬
climatic descriptors in architecture, there are indirect ones such as
the development of climatic considerations in other sciences, e.g.
bioclimatology, psychoclimatology (connected with the general
3
tendency towards a psychological approach to architecture) and so on .
In the case of network descriptors, direct reasons are related
to the possibilities of 'channelization' that contemporary technology
has introduced and made possible. Physical elements like light,
water, etc. have always been considered as having a social usefulness.
However, it is the channelization of these which transformed them
to manipulable and spatially specialized sources. The LASER is an
example of this tendency signifying what might be called a second
degree of channelization of light by which even non-visual
communication signals may be transmitted.
Apart from this first level of understanding direct historical
evolution of network descriptors, there is a second level at which
not only the very nature of the channel is taken into account but
also the complexity and accumulation of networks which are involved
3. The establishment of Microclimatology by Geigev in the mid-'20s,
the development of Climatology, especially after World War II,
beyond its purely descriptive bases, and the emphasis attached
to problems like adaptation, acclimatization and so on in both
man and machine constitute probably the most basic influences
for the establishment and development of other scientific fields
which have more directly influenced microclimatic descriptors
in architecture. Such sciences include, for instance,
bioclimatology - founded in 1956 and developed by Tromp in
Holland - forecasting climatology - especially developed in the
'60s - economic climatology - developed in the '60s, but more
importantly by Maunder in 1970 when he brought together economic,
social and atmospheric considerations in an attempt to put an
economic value on climate and weather - and psychoclimatology -
developed in the '60s, but particularly for architecture in the
early '70s.
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in a given spatial form. Inevitably, to understand and solve this
complexity, architectural descriptive theories have to exploit, in
an indirect way, the evolution of mathematical theories of graphs
and networks and sometimes, to try to generalize them in order to
4
understand the built environment as a whole .
If we consider simultaneously climatic modification and produc¬
tion of networks at their very elementary level, we might understand
the duality of elementary architectural actions, that is, of producing
barriers, in order to differentiate a physically homogeneous
situation, and of producing channels, in order to bridge a physically
heterogeneous one. This basic syntactic duality leads us to a
structural approach of description in architecture, but closely
connected with its historically created meaning and social evaluation.
2. Comprehensiveness and structural approach to descriptive
theories of the built environment
Environment has been considered in Ecology as the aggregate of
external conditions that influence the life of an individual or of a
population of organisms. The term 'built environment' implies the
particular impact of man on modifying the natural environment of a
specific place and producing what is generally known as 'human
settlement'. In this sense, then, built environment might be defined
either as a totality of natural and artificial components or as a set
of elementary actions of modifications of natural space transformed
4. Grccph theory was founded with L. Euler's formulation ccnd solution
of the first graph-theoretic problem in 1736. Incidentally, this
had been conceived as a built environmental problem. It was the
famous Konigsberg Bridge Problem. More than a century later J.C.
Maxwell and G.R. Kirchoff discovered some basic principles of
network analysis in the course of their studies on electrical
circuits. However, books on the subject started to appear only
after World War I and wider interest was much awakened only after
World War II. Now, of course, it is a well established branch of
mathematics of wider popularity and applications in numerous
fields of inquiry.
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into logically higher forms.
This distinction introduces two quite different ways of investi¬
gating the characteristic of wholeness which has been attributed to
the built environment by the current descriptive theories in
architecture. The first way reflects a present trend in architectural
theories borrowed from the general tendency in modern sciences and
well developed by Bartalanffy (1968); that is, to approach the notion
of wholeness and consequently comprehensiveness from a 'systemic'
view. Here comprehensiveness is inevitably accompanied by continuously
increasing complexity. In such a way, it places limits to the degree
of wholeness which might be achieved.
The second way reflects the present structuralistic thinking
which is also an approach to problems of wholes. However, it does so,
trying at the same time to reduce complexity, by using the most
elementary operations together with transformational rules which lead
to higher structures, in order to attain comprehensiveness with
simplicity.
According to Piaget (1971, p.19) wholeness can be attained
genetically by 'reflective abstraction'. This means that while in
the systemic mode of thought a property can be derived by being
drawn out of things, by reflective abstraction properties are derived
from the way in which we act on things. It is quite natural to
expect descriptive theories in architecture - dealing particularly,
as other sciences of the artificial do, with the results of human
actions - to be more amenable to reflective abstraction than to
the systemic way of thinking. The deep character of reflective
abstraction is that description becomes anthropocentric and
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consequently historically created. It is this point which has made
many authors, including Piaget, conceive reflective abstraction in
5
close connection with the Marxian concept of 'praxis' .
So structural ism and historical explanation become reciprocally
related. History may be explained structurally - as in a way Marx
did - and structuralism together with the descriptive theories based
on it, may also be explained historically - as Piaget (1973,
Introduction) has clearly pointed out.
The practical significance of this very general remark is that
it introduces the only way in which elementary structures may be
formed. Furthermore, it shows the way in which the question of
whether or not the investigator should try to find an abstract
context for these structures may be answered; implying that this
abstraction is simply without any importance if it is not to solve
the problems that have produced it.
Piaget's 'Genetic Structuralism' is a general method of
enquiry based on the concept of totality (wholeness), self-regulation
and transformation, common not only to linguistics and anthropology
where it has primarily been developed, but also to mathematics,
physics, biology, philosophy, the social sciences and so on.
'Semiological Structural ism' is another type of structuralism
developed especially in the Saussurian linguistics and in the
anthropology of Levi-Strauss. It has developed out of the assumption
that theories of structural linguistics are directly or indirectly
5. "Fortunately too, living scholarship leads to the rediscovery
of the method by those who might not otherwise regard themselves
as 'Marxists'. Perhaps the most outstanding example in recent
times is Piaget....Marx might be surprised to find himself
described as an 'operational structuralist'." (Harvey, 1973,
pp.287-8).
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applicable to all aspects of human culture insofar as all of
these may be interpreted, like language, as systems of signs (Robey,
1973). This way of thinking, in turn, presupposes the adoption of
semiotic dimensions in these systems of human culture. This type of
structural ism, though adopts a quite distinct body of thought,
accepts all the principles of Piaget's genetic structuralism.
Piaget's later work, however, has also been expanded to this type
of structuralism which could investigate interdisciplinary problems
of the broadest kind (Piaget, 1973).
At present there is a tendency to formulate descriptive
theories in architecture using semiological structural ism as a
methodological background^. This is based on the notion that archi¬
tecture is predominantly a system of signs which may be compared
with purely semiological systems such as language, painting, music
and so on.
We generally agree with this approach, not because architecture
may be only semiologically explainable but more importantly because
of the following two reasons which belong to the methodological
aspect. Firstly, the notion of meaning which is implied by semio¬
logical structural ism is crucial to architectural description,
particularly in the generalized form of meaning, that is, 'social
evaluation 1.
Secondly, there is a level at which the methodological
advantages of both the genetic (general and abstract) and the semio¬
logical (socially meaningful) approaches may be resolved. We shall
6. Seej for examples Jencks and Baird (1969).
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call this level 'syntagmatic1. One of the main aims of this paper
is to show how this level may be generated, particularly in archi¬
tecture. Before doing this we shall refer to some basic concepts
starting from what might be called a purely syntactic approach to our
descri ptors.
3. The abstract syntax of microclimatic and network descriptors
Syntax may be considered as the level at which the generation
of structures which may be apparently observed is investigated
achronically according to the chain from the elementary to the
complex. In linguistics - and other semiological sciences - the
involvement of meaning has been mapped on syntax by producing what has
been called the chain from deep to surface structures. There has
been a long discussion between linguists on how semantics are involved
in the 'deepness chain1 and we shall refer to the importance of this
discussion to architecture in the next section.
Apparently, in architecture, both the syntactically pure
complexity chain and the ambiguous deepness one may be considered
simultaneously. Here, complexity chain means that we assume that
the complex structures we observe have been generated by successive
transformations of elementary structures. Hillierand Leaman, being
interested in the evolution of deep structures, are trying to intro¬
duce a syntactic terminology appropriate to architecture. They adopt
the view that elementary structures in architecture are barrier-
structures whose evolution towards higher structural degrees may be
described by functional variables - such as contiguity, differentia¬
tion, boundaries and permeability - and operational rules aiming at
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transforming simpler structures into higher ones (Hillier and Leaman,
1974b). The key to their analysis lies in the concept of the internal
transformability of an object. This distinguishes the structural
approach from the systemic one as far as intelligibility is concerned
(mostly related to our term of 'comprehensiveness'). (Hillier and
Leaman, 1974a,p.6).
The elementary operation in modifying climate - where it is con¬
sidered achronically and on a statistical basis - may be described as
an elementary barrierization of physical climate.
Consider a building element; for instance,a wall. By creating a
wall we modify the various climatic fields such as wind, temperature,
radiation, humidity, precipitation, etc. The result is that different
boundaries are produced, attributing to the specific operation of
barrierization a multifunctional character. These boundaries indicate
the particular differentiations which occur in each climatic field:
WIND FIELD RAIN FIELD SOLAR RADIATION FIELD
Boundary of
wind modification radiation boundary
The physical properties that, in the classical theory of physics,
interconnect these fields imply some fundamental characteristics of
elementary microclimatic deep structure, analogous, for instance, to
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on both sides of
the barrier
Rain boundary:
Always on the one
side of the barrier
Direct solar radiation
boundary: Always on
the one side of the
barrier
TOPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY CLIMATIC
8ARRIER STRUCTURES.
Obviously, these are images which have been necessarily derived
from the involvement of a semantic dimension rather than from a pure
physical actuality. Of course, in a strictly physical sense, rain and
solar radiation boundaries are topologically identical to the wind
boundary. However, we have considered them in the way shown in the
diagram above - speaking about 'modification' in terms of wind but,
at the same time, about 'presence-absence' in terms of rain and
direct solar radiation - because of the fact that in architectural
»
thinking even abstract elementary structures can not be isolated
from a certain semantic context. This is a central point for this
study to which we shall repeatedly refer at different levels leading
to the notion of syntagmatic approach.
The path from deep structures to the surface ones, in terms of
the syntactically elementary structure, may be understood by intro¬





























Built environment structures, of the elementary type discussed
previously, are very rarely realized, since they are mainly understood
after they have been transformed into structures of higher complexity,
such as 'enclosures'. The application of transformational rules is
characterized by an evolutionary chain in which a structure at a given
complexity level becomes the generator for the one at the next level.
Consider once more the elementary structure expressed in terms of

















Again the physical properties that interconnect the micro¬
climatic fields imply fundamental characteristies of higher complex¬
ity deep structure, such as:
Barrier — enclosure




are dominated by the
same rules as in the
elementary wall-structure
304
Channelization of space may be considered as the elementary
operation of eliminating physically or artificially existing
barriers. Channels constitute elementary deep structures which at a
surface level may represent a variety of networks, such as elec¬
tricity, water,drainage, circulation, etc. The very nature of a
channel implies, even at the most elementary level, a source, a
destination, and a span between them which signifies that flow is a
specific aim of elementary operations in channels, as opposed to the
elementary microclimatic barrierization where the aim is to interrupt
or disturb a physically existing flow.
Networks as we understand them in the built forms are already
equipped with a semantic interpretation, in the same sense as micro¬
climatic descriptors already include the semantics of the physical
fields. In order to identify what deep structure - and consequently
deepness chain - of a network could mean, we have to refer to the
'Erlanger Program' by F. Klein, mentioned by Piaget (1971, pp.21-22) s
in order to show the 'fruitfulness 1 of structural ism. So the deep level
at which we abstractly understand networks is the topological one
and is expressed in the language of graph theory. According to this,
graphs are just trees, semi-lattices or lattices where only connected¬
ness is of primary importance. We have to introduce quantities in
order to reach another level of complexity at which graphs begin to
be transformed into networks (March and Steadman, 1971, p.268). In
the next higher level, we may conceive of a network as a cybernetic
mechanism. At this level, the nature of the network is identified by
concepts like inputs, outputs, the particular identify of control
mechanisms which it includes and so on.
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The introduction of physical properties of flow leads to the last
'deep' level in which a network is identified as energy, commodities,
human circulation, etc. This level is quite different from what we
mean here as a surface structure of a network.
If we consider networks as we understand them at this 'deep'
level in the built environment, we can identify chains of complexity
which depend on the particular properties that may be identified at
any of the previously mentioned deep levels. The important point
here is that these complexity chains consist of concrete structural
orders and are transformed according to a set of transformational
rules.
Consider, for example, electricity networks:
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After Eleotvics 72/73, the Electricity Council Handbook of
Electrical Services in Buildings (1973, pp.30-31).
To find what might be called a 'general complexity chain of
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networks' in which all types of networks are to be combined, we note
that we have to ignore the physical properties of networks as such,
and to take into account the most deep levels of them. Such a


























The reason for producing such a hypothetical chain (b) is because
we need to equip this chain with a higher semantic level in order to
achieve, in a holistic way, the correspondence to the structural
complexity levels according to which the artificial environment is
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formed. However, what happens in reality is that technology tries
to modify the physical properties of networks in order to make this
correspondence achievable, but at the same time, built forms have to
be structurally developed so as to be compatible with the existing
technological level at a given time.
This general pattern, which is quite similar to the case of
microclimatic descriptors, shows both the limitations of the purely
syntactic approach and the weak connection between isolated syntactic
approaches and problem solving processes and leads to what we shall
call later the 1syntagmatic ' approach.
Elementary architectural operations are initially concerned with
barrierization in order to modify climate. Obviously, the history
of architecture does not signify a very strong change in the way that
this elementary barrierization is worked out, but signifies a
remarkable change in the way this operation is socially evaluated. As
opposed to this, the historical evolution of channelization does not
show only a differentiation of the social evaluation of networks, but
also important changes in the physical properties, the identities,
and the complexity of them. We may refer to proposals like those of
Buckminster Fuller, in which climatic fields (wind, temperature, etc)
would be altered, in order to imagine what such a change of physical
fields by technology could mean in terms of the elementary
barrierization:
It is quite difficult to show how elementary architectural
actions may constitute a subject of valuable description, apart from
their semantic context. However, it is possible to show this in a
very abstract way, in which the dialectics of the concepts of
'barrier' and 'boundary' have to be given deep consideration.
Elementary barrjerization
o —>• •->! •
Elementary channelization
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The simplest abstract architectural gesture is probably
barrierization, but in simplest real architectural operations
barriers are structured together with channel-boundaries. This very
basic characteristic is shown in the following examples:
A theoretical mind, well convinced about the descriptive value
of syntax, may proceed towards a common consideration of both micro¬
climatic and network descriptors in terms of their structural
characteristics. A first way of approaching this is by constituting
a chain in which even channels might be reached by transforming the



















However, this common consideration is better achieved if the
transformational model (the model which structures the rules of
transformation and the variables that characterize each structure)
which dominates the syntactic chains, created by the two descriptors,
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Such a highly theoretical consideration would be in danger of
explaining intelligible and socially evaluated things in a complicated
way, if it did not take into account what we will later call the
'syntagmatic ' identity of the structures. Even in the previous
diagrams, we can observe the involvement of syntagmatic considerations
when, for example, 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' first refer to
barriers and boundaries and secondly take forms like 'boundary dis¬
continuity through hierarchy' (in order to reach the tree-network,
useful for flow regulation) or 'boundary continuity through
permeability' (in order to reach the permeable microclimatic barrier,
useful for microclimatic regulation). The syntagmatic consideration
is discussed in detail in the course of the following sections.
4. The importance of semantic considerations; towards a generative
approach
According to the initial model by Chomsky (1965) semantics in








After Leech (1974, p.328)




(Base) Deep structure Projection rules
Transformational rules
Surface structure
After Leech (1974, p.329)
Both Chomskyan versions constitute what has been called the
'interpetive approach1 to semantics, and thus have been distinguished
from a recent approach called the 'generative' one (Leech, 1974, p.324ff)
According to the generative approach semantic interpretation is no
longer derived from the purely syntactic deep structure, but the
structure is so deep (this is what is called the 'base' in the
Chomskyan versions) as to be identical with semantic interpretation.
In this manner projection rules disappear and the model becomes
simpler as follows^:
After Leech (1974, p.330)
7. We are not dealing here with phonology.
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Traditionally, semantics deals predominantly with the concept of
'meaning'. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richard (1923) wrote on what they
called The Meaning of Meaning. The important point made by Ogden
and Richard, later by Bloomfield (1933) in Language and quite
recently by Leech (1974) in Semantics is that meaning may best be
studied as a purely linguistic phenomenon in its own right. Leech,
however, proposes instead of meaning the concept of 'communicative
value'. Value in semantics explains the way in which the meaning
of a semantic unit is developing from the total set of semantic units.
In this way, value introduces the notion of 'system of evaluation'
which in the case of language is, of course, one aspect of the system
of communication. This means that, apart from the system of verbal
communication - with which language is concerned - we can refer to a
broader semiotic framework which extends the dimension of communica¬
tive value beyond language.
Piaget (1971, pp.20-24) points out that in all spheres of human
behaviour there are systems of meanings the essential parts of which
are studied by linguistics, but he stresses the fact that, although
language has played a basic role in the transmission of values and
rules of every kind, it is not the only system of signs or symbols
by which these values and rules have been originated. For instance,
the appearance of representation in individual development is not due
to language alone, but to a much wider semiotic function. He pro¬
ceeds by suggesting that language constitutes a system of meaning in
the power of one and it is accompanied in collective life by systems
to the power of two, such as myths, which are simultaneously symbols
and semantic characters.
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It is the notion of 'convention' - mentioned also by Piaget (1971,
p.53) - attached to signs and meaning that incorporates the social and
historical character of meaning and that allows us to introduce a
broader concept which is concerned with the social evaluation
of signs. Thus to the chain of linguistic meaning -+ linguistic
value ■+ communicative value -> broader value, we may add social value,
directly dealing with historical evaluation. So, the simple concept
of meaning, appropriate for linguistics, is replaced by the concept
of 'historically created social evaluation' which allows us, even
starting from a purely semiological base, to enlarge its context
in order to include the broader social character of systems like
architecture. Morris (1946) uses the analogous concept of
'pragmatic meaning' in order to transfer the linguistic meaning -
which he refers to as 'syntactic meaning' - to the sphere of examining
the sign in relation to operations and behaviours.
The historical evolution of the social evaluation of products -
which at first sight might be only evaluated semiologically- means
that we accept that each particular historical period is character¬
ized by a particular balance of systems of evaluation. Communication
- and consequently communicative value - is, of course, only one of
them.
Systems like painting, music and language have always been
dominated by communicative values while architecture shows a
different history. For instance, it is quite easy to understand that
communicative value has dominated the production of artefacts as far
as official or religious architecture is concerned, from the Pyramids
to the contemporary phenomenon of returning, at a morphological level,
to the deep structure. This 'return' is supposed to facilitate
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production, and produce another kind of communicative value by the
very acknowledgement of this return. Banham (1960, p.321) emphasizes
this point when he speaks about Functionalism.
"Under these circumstances it was better to advocate or defend
the new architecture on logical and economic grounds than on
grounds of aesthetics or symbolisms that might stir nothing
but hostility. This may have been good tactics - the point
remains arguable - but it was certainly misrepresentation.
Emotion had played a much larger part than logic in the crea¬
tion of the style; inexpensive buildings had been clothed in
it, but it was no more an inherently economical style than any
other. The true aim of the style had clearly been, to quote
Gropius's words about the Bauhaus and its relation to the
world of the Machine Age '... to invent and create forms
symbolizing that world1 and it is in respect of such symbolic
forms that its historical justification must lie."
What we have to add to this is that the deep structure of this
contemporary symbolism signifies - not in terms of each architect's
emotional reaction, but in terms of social evaluation - the
development of an economic basis of symbolism and what is more
important, the beginning of 'internalization' of this development.
Such an 'internalization' has already dominated other fields of
description of human practice and one of the most important deep
characteristics of contemporary architectural thinking is that it
does not only assume the significance of an economic basis in the
limited symbolic context of architecture, but also acknowledges the
necessity of the interdisciplinary character of it. Harvey is a
good example of this. He points out that:
"In asserting the primacy of theeconomic basis Marx was pro¬
posing two things. First, he is suggesting that the relation¬
ships between structures are themselves structured in some way
within the totality. In a conflict between thee/olution of
the economic basis of society and elements in the super¬
structure, it is the latter that has to give way, adapt, or
be eliminated. Some structures are therefore regarded as
more basic than others within a totality. Structures can
therefore be ranked in order of significance. Marx obviously
decided that the conditions concerning the production and
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.reproduction of material life were fundamental - he
certainly argued more strenuously for this view. And this
led him to his second main point. When we attempt to view
society as a totality, then ultimately everything has to be
related to the structures in the economic basis of society."
(Harvey, 1973, p.292).
One should expect that economic bases have been constituting the
fundamental system of social evaluation of architecture because of the
hardware operations required to produce architectural artefacts and
the difficulty of reproducing them. This has been happening also in
other systems - consider, for example, stone writing or sculpture -
but the additional property of architecture is that it has mainly to
do with land use and economic resources. We shall try to make a
rough comparison of four systems of human practice: architecture,
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Social evaluation appears at a final level which has been
already called 1 super-surface structure ' and which, particularly in
painting, music, and language, has been considered as the aesthetic
one. Specifically in language, what has been accepted by Chomsky
as surface structure constitutes a level which does not exist in the
other systems as a self-sufficiently evaluated level and it is the
result of the highly communicative power of language.
Nevertheless, in architecture it is not only the aesthetic
evaluation which constitutes the system of social evaluation, as
opposed to music and painting in which, because of the ease of re¬
production, aesthetic evaluation has historically become predominant.
The bipolar form-substance, for instance,may be used as a basis which
clarifies a comparison among these systems. Although these systems
are comparable in terms of form, they are quite different as far as
the substance of their final product is concerned. Substance in
painting is completely preserved from the chosen elements to the super-
surface structure. Language and music belong to another category in
which there is always the opportunity of conceiving both systems
either in a written or in an oral substance. Architecture belongs
to another category in which the super-surface structure is reached
through a mapping which is quite different from the substance of the
real product. The important difference between these last two
categories is concerned with the process of producing the super-
surface structure and not with the process of resolving and under¬
standing it.
This deals directly with the economic bases of social evaluation
in architecture, which allows us to interpret the nature of the
production of architectural 'syntagms ' and what might be called
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pragmatic meaning in architecture. Indeed, the four systems may be
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8. Industrial design is a particular category in terms of production
of the artificial super-surface structure in which aesthetic
value has been greatly replaced by a set of operational advantages
concerned with the prototype. However, in industrial design,
especially because prototypes are designed in order to be
reproduced, the ability to be a commodity gets an aesthetic
value, reversing the traditional scheme. This new kind of
aesthetically evaluated functionalism may be very easily ack¬
nowledged in contemporary forms of architectural design (P.S.S.H.A.K.,
infrastructural design for flexibility, etc).
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5. The syntagmatic nature of architectural descriptors and their
problem-solving capacity
The introduction of the notion of syntagm is an inevitable
consequence of the complexity of social evaluation in architecture
and the strong historical character of this evaluation. Such a
notion presupposes that we are closer to the generative approach in
terms of the deepness chain and not to the interpretive one, the last
possibly being convenient for purely communicative and reproducable
9
systems such as language and music .
According to Saussure (1974, p.123) syntagm in linguistics is a
"combination of consecutive units supported by linearity".
'Syntagmatic' relations are considered in semiology as being opposed
to 'paradigmatic' ones^. This philosophical distinction which might
also be derived from that between ' structure ' and 'taxonomy' would
not reflect the real importance of the syntagmatic approach if the
concept of syntagm does not include the logical understanding of a
sentence which is the simultaneous reference in both syntactic and
semantic levels. Thus, the syntagmatic approach to a structure
includes the social evaluation of even the elementary deep structures.
The function of prototypes in architectural practice has
characterized its whole history both at a 'language' level by
producing different styles and at a 'speech' level by influencing
9. These notions (' interpretive ' and 'generative ' approach) have
been discussed in the earlier part of Section 4.
10. According to Lyons (19733 p,12)3 "The syntagmatic relation which
an element contracts are those which derive from its combination
with preceding and following elements of the same level.... The
paradigmatic relations contracted by an element are those which
hold between the actually occurring element and other elements
of the same level which might have occurred in its place. "
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the individual way in which architectural surface structures have
always been produced. What we propose here is that prototypes do not
constitute anything but syntagms, in which the semantic component
cannot be isolated from the syntactic one. Particularly in archi¬
tecture ,prototypes have played the role of 'already structured 1
elementary units which have always carried a special meaning. Apart
from this obvious way in which everyday-architecture has been practiced,
even revolutionary moments in architectural history could not be
explained syntactically as one would expect at first sight. What
happened, for example, in recent architectural history is that only
the comnunicative meaning has been minimized while social evaluation -
that is, pragmatic meaning - has been enlarged and has been mainly
dominated by economic values.
Syntagms have been dominating not only the historical evolution
of architectural practice, but descriptive theories in architecture
as well. In recent descriptive theories, for instance, it is possible
to see emphases and predominancies of particular systems of evaluation
which define the specific character of them. The historical evolution
of descriptors in architecture is closely connected with the
historical evolution of these systems of evaluation.
Consider, for instance, three theories in architecture concerned
with the description of the built environment and its 'beyonds'. In
these theories - by people who have been basically trained in quite
different disciplines - we shall see how the general principles
reflect the emphases on specific systems of social evaluation in the
way we called syntagmatic, and also how such syntagmatic approaches
differentiate the syntactic chains which might be derived from them.
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Lynch (1960),in the preface to The Image of the City, is
concerned with "the look of cities, and whether this look is of any
imprtance, and whether it can be changed". His work, which is
predominantly experimental, stresses the syntactic aspects of built
form by analysing its 'environmental image' into three components,
'identity', 'structure' and 'meaning'. By definition, the whole of
this approach is based on the communicative value of built form.
He points out that:
"So various are the individual meanings of a city, even while
its form may be easily communicable, that it appears possible
to separate meaning from form, at least in the early stages of
analysis. This study will therefore concentrate on the
identity and structure of city images." (Lynch, p.9).
Lynch could not avoid the syntagmatic dimension in his work -
even working in a purely systemic way - since he had himself pointed
out that symbolic, aesthetic and other values beyond the communicative
one are also of equal, if not more, importance. Furthermore, what
is striking is that city images, even in terms of communicative value,
are grouped according to social classes, age, sex, education and
profession.
Lynch has tried to investigate syntax chains evaluated socially
in terms of human perception, cognition and communication. The
components of his elementary structure^ inevitably include this
particular kind of semantic interpretation, and consequently the
whole structural chain does the same, belonging by definition to
the syntagmatic approach.
We have to look at his chapter concerned with 'metropolitan
form' in order to imagine how this chain may be descriptively
identified and to show how flexible is the syntactic chain and social
11. 'Paths 'edges 'districts '-nodes-' and
' landmarks '.
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evaluation according to the system of meaning we use.
Apart from his first technique - which is less structural and
more systemic - to identify the way in which higher order structures
(such as metropolitan ones) may be formulated, it is quite interest¬
ing how structurally valuable is the second one in which the
elementary structures already contain the powerful attributes (always
within the communicative context) that allow them to produce higher
order structures. He points out (p.113) that:
"The second technique is the use of one or two very large
dominant elements, to which many smaller things may be
related: the siting of settlement along a sea-coast,
for example; or the design of a linear town depending on a
basic communication spine..."
The structural chain that may be produced in such a way is
syntactically different compared, for instance, with what we might
understand as a hypothetical abstract topological syntax of a
city, as might be suggested by the first technique.
Alexander represents the kind of investigator who moved from
the predominantly syntactic aspects of design to the syntagmatic
ones. In his first book Notes on the Synthesis of Form (1964) he
tried to establish a general mathematical syntax according to which
elementary structures were to be equipped with some semantic
12
interpretation .
In the preface to a recent edition (Alexander, 1.974) of the
above book, he states:
12. Alexander uses the word 'needs ' which later (in The Atoms of
Environmental Structure (Alexander and Poyner, 1967) he
transforms into the word 1 tendencies '.
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"At the time I wrote this book, I was very much concerned with
the formal definition of "independence", and the idea of using
a mathematical method to discover systems of forces and diagrams
which are independent. But once the book was written, I
discovered that it is quite unnecessary to use such a complicated
and formal way of getting at the independent diagrams."
(His emphasis)
The recent work of Alexander (after 1967) reflects this remark,
since it has been directed towards creating what he has called
1
pattern 1anguage '.
So Alexander accepted the already structured prototypes (purely
syntagmatic) and also the differentiation of their syntactic
characteristics caused by political, social - in a word cultural -
demands. By attempting to establish an insitution like the Cent-er
13
far Environmental Structure , he simply realized the social
significance and changing character of architectural prototypes and
tried to find a technique to record them and to produce his flexible
'environmental pattern language'.
In Harvey's (1973) work Social Justice and the City, the
predominance of economic evaluation of environmental structures at
the urban scale is quite obvious. Equipped with the powerful
apparatus of theoretical Marxism combined with what he calls the
'operational structural ism' of Piaget, Harvey does not try just to
use economics as one basis of an environmental descriptive theory,
but as the comprehensive basis for that. His purely syntagmatic
approach goes further, structuring the syntagms themselves through
the structure of social evaluation. He does not speak anywhere
about what this means in terms of syntagmatic syntax, but we may
realize what that might be, considering some of his basic concepts,
13. See Proceedings of the Seminar held by the Center for
Environmental Structure in 1967.
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such as 'real income', 'use value', 'exchange value' and so on.
It is not our intention here to proceed in a detailed discussion
about syntagmatic syntax as it may be formulated in relation to
Harvey's work. Nevertheless, it will become more and more clear
that his emphasis on the economic basis is considered here as being
strong enough to stimulate further research on the syntagmatic
nature of architectural prototypes.
It might have become apparent that in this paper we are opposed
to the tendency to produce purely syntactical approaches either in
describing space or in producing it meaningfully.
We presume that any descriptive theory is intended to solve
some problems which have been created historically and which have
influenced its origin.
It is clear that syntagm and syntax are in two ways inter¬
connected. That is, a syntagmatic beginning produces syntaxes and
the abstract syntax gets meaning in the course of syntagmatic
interpretations. The important difference is that abstract formu¬
lations generally start from other scientific fields while
syntagmatic ones come primarily from the problem area.
There are some questions concerned with present tendencies to
establish an abstract syntax in architecture. A first question is
whether abstract syntax is applicable by projection rules -
similar to the Chomskyan version in Linguistics - and what are the
difficulties of these applications.
The second question is concerned with whether or not there is
the abstract syntax and, coming back to the first question, what is
the degree of abstraction and applicability of this syntax. Our
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answer to this double question is simply that although practice may
be using abstract formulations, it does so by producing a variety of
these and that this variety is directly influenced by the problem-
origin of descriptors and the systems of social evaluation of their
syntagms. We have already summarized this, speaking about the
syntagmatic beginning.
We shall examine some of these points as far as three
descriptors of the built environment are concerned. The first two,
already mentioned,are those of microclimate and networks. We shall
try here to show how their syntagmatic premise produces syntaxes
quite different from what current attempts - working in an abstract
way, similar to those developed in Section 3 - have been trying to
establish. The third, the participatory approach, is distinguished
from the previous two, because it has been developed exclusively
at a syntagmatic level, particularly as a movement of architectural
practice. We shall try to show also what this descriptive basis
could mean in terms of syntax.
Consider microclimatic descriptors in an example in which there
is a specific set of microclimatic conditions (e.g. wind, rain, etc)
and microclimatic structures are to be mapped only topologically.
This mapping, though containing different boundaries, corresponds to
a specific structure according to which internal rules connect the












At the same level of topological representation, a syntagmatic










Contrast between comfort boundaries 0,1,2,_ Degrees of comfort
on a perceptional basis
What is important here is that this structure is very flexible
without altering at all the 'objective' microclimatic conditions
and, consequently, the previously mentioned purely syntactic struc¬
ture. This indicates that the structure, as we understand it
syntagmatically, depends on the structure of the system of social
evaluation and the predominancies within it. If we consider comfort,
for instance, as a measure of social evaluation - in which the
perception of climate by humans and their reactions are predominantly
taken into account - we produce an even topologically different
structure than either the purely syntactic approach or another
syntagmatic approach, in which predominance belongs not only to
comfort but probably to an economic basis as well. So, syntagmatic
structures constitute already structured prototypes, highly valuable
in architecture, which cannot be derived by applying projection rules
to the kind of abstract structure shown in Section 3.
The network descriptors involved in architectural descriptive
theories have also a syntagmatic character which generates syntactic
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structures quite different from those which might be generated by a
purely syntactic approach (as those presented in Section 3).








The street lighting example
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The perceived environmental stress surface for a portion of Philadelphia.
In: GOULD, P. & WHITE, R., Mental Maps, Penguin (©1974), p. 31. (After David
LEY in: The Black Inner City as a Frontier Outpost: Images and Behavior of a North
Philadelphia Neighbourhood, University Park, Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1972).
stress
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Experiments on what have been called 'mental maps' have shown
how the involvement of systems of social evaluation (e.g. 'perceived
environmental stress', 'preference', etc) may produce syntactic
chains, totally different from the purely syntactic ones. In the
street example, street lighting, for instance, is syntagmatically
structured in terms of a pattern far more complicated than the
purely syntactic pattern of 'homogeneousness 1 of lighting. However,
transformational processes, which have been always working at the
syntagmatic level in terms of microclimatic descriptors, sometimes
lose their character when we try to understand them as applied to
networks. This simply means that some of the technicalities of
recently developed networks (e.g. electricity circuits) have not yet
been entirely incorporated within the syntagmatic 'lexicon' to the
extent that other networks (such as waterproofing) have been.
Microclimatic and network descriptors belong to a category in
which the starting point of explanation lies nearer to the mapping
procedure than to the social evaluation of a syntagmatic structure.
This means that, in order to understand a structure syntagmatically
through microclimatic and network mapping, we have to structure
predominancies within the system of social evaluation or, in a more
objective sense, to understand how the historical problem-framework
has formulated these predominancies.
Obviously, this is not the only way in which descriptive
theories - not only in architecture - are structured. Problems and
their ideological 'behind' may influence directly at a more general
level the starting point of these theories. Nevertheless, the move¬
ment towards 'Social Architecture' shows how this process may produce
too generalized tendencies which do not structure the system of social
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evaluation, necessary to produce the satisfactory syntagmatic levels
for solving the problems. More attention, hence, has to be given to
contemporary movements on architectural praxis. The 'participation
movement' is one of them and we shall see how it may be syntagmati-
cally explained.
Participation, either at a community or at an individual level,
is more intelligible as 'maximum users' participation in the process
of forming their environment'. Apparently, there is a variety of
goals that people, who exhort users to participate, hope to achieve;
starting from the improvement of the built environment and ending
in what might be a political mobilization of disadvantaged communi¬
ties. Similarly, the 'behind' of thn's practice and its ideological
background vary considerably. No one can ignore that participation
is often nothing more than an administrative technique or 'strategy'
(as Burke (1968, p.287) calls it) closely connected with the process
that Selznick (1969, p.277) identified as 'co-optation', through
which an - even repressive - organization attempts to avert threats
to its stability or existence. However, participation as a community-
based ideological context signifies, generally speaking, the antidote
against alienation.
Alienation is a recent pheomenon of human history; at least at
the generalized scale we observe in contemporary industrial society.
Marx in his first works, and especially in the Manuscripts of 1844,
referred to it, but it is Ernest Mandel who, starting from Marx's
concepts, analyzed it in a remarkable way, distinguishing among the
different kinds and degrees of alienation^. He tried to answer the
14. See pp.19-28 of Mandel's essay3 The Causes of Alienation: in
Mandel and Novack (1974).
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question of whether or not alienation is an inevitable phenomenon
15
in industrial society, even if this society is a socialist one .
It is characteristic and convincing for the value of the bipolar
alienation-participation that Mandel identifies this particular kind
of practice as one of the answers to the process of disalienation.
What might such a general ideological background mean for the
description of the built environment in the syntagmatic sense of the
term?
Alienation and participation deal mainly with the process of
production and, in our case with the process of production within the
framework of which the built environment may be identified. In this
sense, alination indicates that the product no longer belongs to the
producer and, very frequently, this product, by being involved in the
market circuit, turns against the producer himself (Marx used the
concept in this context speaking about Entausserung). We understand
this process in the built environment at a general level, distinguish¬
ing between: (a) the traditional societal forms in which the user and
the architect either were identical or perceived each other perfectly,
so that there was no question of alienation in the process of produc¬
ing built forms, and (b) the contemporary industrial societal forms
in which the built environment becomes simply a commodity and is
very often characterized by what Mandel called 'technical increase of
needs', as an inevitable consequence of market function. Furthermore,
we understand that within the context of (b), the room for creativity
has been transferred from the user to the architect, recently to the
industrial designer, and finally to the economic manager; that is, it
15. See Mandel's essay3 Progressive Disalienation through the Building
of the Socialist Society, or the Inevitable Alienation in
Industrial Society?: in Mandel and Novack (1974).
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has literally disappeared.
The first level of understanding the process of alienation as
the starting point of the ideological background towards participation -
that is, towards progressive environmental disalienation - fulfils
the semantics of the elementary structure with which a descriptive
theory of built forms may be explained. Needless to say, such a
syntagmatic elementary structure derives directly from economic
measures and has nothing to do with the topology or any other 'purely'
syntactic structure of the built environment. Nevertheless, this
kind of syntagm seems to be so important that it might be, for
instance, the key-concept for C. Alexander to find the context of
what he called 'good fit' between form and function and would solve
his basic problem of identifying the otherwise arbitrary 'needs',
' requirements ' or 'tendencies'^.
It is obviously a difficult task to map such an elementary
syntagmatic structure, particularly because of the lack of information
to identify the degree of creativity involved in the relationship
between user and space and because of the adaptability of the
surface of human behaviour. Users often simply accept their environ¬
ment because they do not have the opportunity to do otherwise,
because they are influenced by the illusion that they have chosen it,
or because they do not realize how such a lack of creativity
influences their behaviour as a whole. There is no doubt, however,
that evidence of attempts to escape from this passive acceptance may
be found and may constitute an index for such a mapping. Inhabitants
16. This is not to argue that Alexander himself did not realize such
inadequacies. The development of his thought is a remarkable
example of successful understanding of such problems and self-
correction.
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of newly constructed villages, for instance, who had been previously
accustomed to a traditional way of connecting themselves with their
environment, try - desparately and primitively many times, but
absolutely understandably - to transform their new shells not just
because the new homes do not correspond to their needs but also
because they try to connect themselves with their environment.
Alienation is a context of environmental structures that we can
also understand at the degree of complexity which corresponds to urban
space. We have been used to explaining this phenomenon by surface
characteristies such as 'the gigantic inhuman size' and 'the extent of
criminality' or by deeper ones such as the property of accumulation
which is attributed to the built forms by the very nature of their
materials. However, it is here that the deep structural character¬
istic of alienation - or non participation - that is, the activities'
barrier, becomes significant in two ways; as a barrier between
activities and, consequently, between groups of participants and, in
a dynamic sense, as a barrier between a human group and an activity
under development. Contemporary cities are predominantly character¬
ized by this attribute and their barriers may be identified at a
whole scale of signifiers, starting from what might be called
'physical barriers' and ending in 'institutional barriers', such as
those which eliminate access to property accumulation, etc. The way
in which the citizens of Paris suddenly realized their city, in the
Commune time (1871), as a 'festival '^, gives an example of both the
deep structural identity of institutional barriers and the difficulty
of recognizing it in contemporary cities.
17. See pp. 140-2 of Villies de L'Isle-Adams ' (under the pseudonym
'Marius') article Paris as a Festival., in the Commune paper
Le Tribun du Peuple.- in Edwards (ed., 1971).
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It would be strange if we could explain this process towards
complex alienation structures starting only from the barrier between
user and environmental product. We have to deal, obviously, with an
economic process which is very complex to allow only architectural
creativity to be the key-point towards disalienation. However, what
seems to be important here - especially because we start from a
strongly ideological context, which is already structured and not
from a lower 'physical ' level as in the case of microclimatic and
network structural description -, is that we are more interested in
the way in which the variations of practice lead to a variety of
elementary syntagmatic structures and less in the opposite process.
We shall give an example of how one of these variations produces a
syntagmatic syntax of the built environment:
A particular interpretation of the participation movement is
that the architects' advisory role is to play an important part.
There are many interpretations of this role as well, from the most
activist ones, in which architects become political organizers of a
community, to the most 'technical' ones where architects continue
to act within the traditional context of their profession. But, in
this last case, the context is characterized by a tendency to equip
the participants with the necessary environmental infrastructures, in
order to allow them to exercise their abilities in the easiest
possible way. The organization of infrastructures becomes, in
descriptive theory, the recognition of them, leaving the organizational
part as the inevitably following 'beyond' of the description. These
18'
participatory infrastructures' may be determined by surface
18. The term 'participatory infrastructures ' looks3 to a certain degree3
controversial because it contains a descriptive estimation of a
given reality through a non-existing condition. We may anticipate
this criticism if we turn back to the basic assumption of this/
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characteristics, such as flexibility of materials, the users'
tendencies to participate, the institutional background for parti¬
cipation, etc, but it is the bipolar stable-transformable which
constitutes the key for the deep elementary structure of such a
description of built forms. While the city or area form would be
syntactically understood - in the 'pure' mode - as a complex barrier-
structure, according to such an ideologically stimulated syntax it
would be understood as a structure of transformability, evaluated
SYNTAGMATIC SYNTAX OF BUILT ENVIRONMENT
ON THE BASIS OF PARTICIPATORY TRANSFORMABILITY
18 (aont). study that descriptive theories are characterized, even at
the most elementary level of their components3 by 'beyonds The
very notion of syntagm would lose its meaning3 if its prescriptive
component were to be excluded and not to be transformed into the
meaningful syntax we have already described as the syntagmatic one.
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Within the context and space of this paper it has not been
possible - although desirable - to discuss in detail thoughts that
apparently would require a further explanation. The reader may easily
understand that we have attempted only to introduce a general idea
and to develop the terminology concerned with it. However, there are
some points which have been repeatedly stressed and, we think, are of
particular importance for further research.
A first one is concerned with the impression which might
probably be concluded from the text that we completely reject the
notion of abstraction in architecture. What we really tried to do
in this paper was to explain the limitations of the purely syntactic
approach. The strong syntagmatic character of architectural problems,
combined with the high level of structural complexity of architectural
prototypes, provides an intermediate level of abstraction which is
capable of giving a direct possibility to solve these problems, as




























When we previously explained the syntagmatic character of micro¬
climatic and network descriptors, we introduced one way in which the
above argument on the optimum level of abstraction is adopted by
practice. We have also shown the other way, when we discussed the
alienation-participation syntagmatic structures. The first way is
concerned with the process from the apparently syntactic to the
syntagmatic while the second one with the process from an undoubtedly
ideologically stimulated syntagmatic context to the syntactic chains
that interpret this context. It is obvious that in reality practice
works in both ways simultaneously and reaches the necessary levels
of abstraction that allow these ways to contribute to each other. And,
it is not the achronic 'scientific' syntax that would provide the key
for establishing once and for ever these levels, for the simple
reason that it is too poor and too general and too achronic to follow
this complexity.
A second and final point is concerned with the particular aspects
on which to concentrate further research. It is now quite clear to
us that it is crucial to examine systematically the evolution of
architectural prototypes within the framework of syntagmatic
approach and the context of social evaluation. It is through this
investigation that the structure of socially evaluated meaning may
be identified and it is this structure that will enlighten this
investigation as well as the solution of contemporary architectural
problems. By this, we do not intend to argue that this necessity has
not been recognized and elaborated by architectural thought in many
different ways. We simply attempted to show how a method which at




DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES IN ARCHITECTURE*
Foreword
This paper supplements the work carried out by the same authors
in E.A.R./3 under the title "Description and Descriptors in
Architecture"^. In that article we have suggested that further
research on this subject should be mainly orientated towards examin¬
ing systematically the evolution of architectural prototypes within
the framework of 'syntagmatic approach' and the context of 'social
evaluation'. However, instead of carrying out this task, in a
necessarily short paper, it appeared to us that it would be useful to
develop further the general idea itself and to clarify the termin¬
ology concerned with it which, as the discussion of the E.A.R./3
article has proven, was obscure on some points. These points are
briefly discussed in the introduction and elaborated in the text of
this paper.
The present study is divided into the following two sections:
1. Notes on the identity of environmental structures.
2. Notes on the terminology concerned with the dynamics of
environmental structures.
* The contents of this appendix appeared originally in a collective
paper written by the author of this thesis and his colleagues, Dr
T. Kosiopoulos and Dr T. Maravelias. This paper has been published,
under the same title, in Edinburgh Architecture Research (E.A.R.),
Volume 4, 1977, pp.23-52, and is now reproduced here in its entirety.
Several minor modifications, especially in terms of footnotes, have
been rendered necessary following the adoption of the same general
system of referencing authors and so on employed throughout the main
body of the thesis.
1. See Awadalla et al (1976). For brevity, we shall refer to this
article as the "E.A.R./3 article" throughout this study. [This
E.A.R./3 article is now shown as Appendix I to this thesis.]
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Needless to say, there is no way of understanding the content of
this article outside the framework established in E.A.R./3.
Introduction
In the E.A.R./3 article we concentrated on discussing the problems
of establishing a theory for the investigation of the built environment
within a structural framework. By doing so, we outlined the methodo¬
logical limitations of both purely syntactic and purely semiological
levels of approach to deal comprehensively with both the logical and
the semantic complexity of architectural structures. We have attempted,
also, to show - through examples taken from each of the authors'
individual research - the 'syntagmatic character of these structures
and, furthermore, that it is imperative for any descriptive theory
concerned with them to reach a level of 'optimum abstraction' and to
keep the explanation within both its historical framework and the
social evaluation of environmental structures.
As mentioned in the foreword, there are two major areas which, we
think, need further clarification and development. First, the area
of the identity of a structure (because of the strictly environmental
point of view we took in the E.A.R./3 article) and second, the area
of the dynamics of a structure (because of both the consequences of
the enlargement of the first area and the limited discussion in
E.A.R./3 about it).
The key-concept for the re-investigation of the identity of
architectural structures and, therefore, for the descriptive theories
concerned with them, is the 'descriptive dimension'. Structures in
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E.A.R./3 have been considered more or less under the assumption -
though not clearly stated there - that their predominant representa¬
tion and, consequently, the starting point for their description is
to be found at the level of the environment. The concept 'descriptive
dimension1 means simply that, apart from the purely structural
analysis according to the deepness and the complexity chains, there is
room for investigating different representations of the structures -
such as at the activity or the institutional levels - which sometimes
are nearer to the historical origin of them.
This consideration implies a whole new area for discussion about
the 'identity' of a structure intelligible at the environmental level.
We shall be trying to identify some points of such a discussion in
connection with the dynamics of structures and especially the potential
for their transformation.
The potential and the nature of transformation are exactly the
second area this article deals with and the key-concept to this is
the notion of 'contradiction'. The simplified form of our central
argument is that transformations are caused by contradictions within
the structures and it is our task to identify and classify their
nature.
1. Notes on the identity of environmental structures
The term 'structure' in architecture has gradually acquired a
polysemic meaning, the complexity of which makes its use quite
ambiguous. The traditional meaning and use of the term associates
the concept of structure either with the loadbearing parts of a
building or, in a more general sense, with anything built by man, from
341
2
a house to a pyramid . An imported use from other conceptual
domains, influenced by the development of 1 structuralist' thinking,
associates structure with a number of other concepts like * system'1,
'whole', 'coherence', 'set of relationships', etc., beyond the
environmental level - though not yet necessarily of a syntagmatic
character.
As is the case with the general epistemological use of the term
3
'structure' , its imported use in architecture is not clear and
consequently the conditions for applying it to a given reality are
not well understood. The multiplicity of connotations attributed
to it doubts both the existence of a single definition and a single
methodological orientation, which could be termed 'structuralist'
and, hence, the conceptual confusion surrounding the use of the
term in the general epistemology and consequently in architecture.
In general, differentiations in the use of the term might be
considered as taking place by the different values applied to it
according to two major semantic bases:
(i) The conditions under which a structure can be applied as such:
For Piaget (1971, p.5), for instance, conditions of "wholeness",
'transformation ' and ' self-regulation' are applied to define
' structure ' as a system of transformations under some well-
defined transformational rules. Two extreme examples according
to this basis may be given; the 'mathematical group' (which
Piaget (1971, p.19) considers as the finest prototype of his
definition of structure) and, a concept in general use, the
'social structure' where no such formal conditions may necessarily
2. See, for example, the definition given by The Penguin Dictionary
of Building (1974 edition)




(ii) The degree of abstraction applied to a certain reality which is
necessary in order to understand a structure. This basis leads
automatically to the syntactic components of the "deep structure"
and it is identical in its practical application to the
Chomskyan linguistic model of grammar (E.A.R./3, pp.55-6).
According to this basis, structures are to be identified either
5
at the abstract level of deep structure or, alternatively, at
a surface level of the observable reality. One attitude
identifies a structure at a surface level under the condition
that there is a deep level which is itself the structure, while
a second attitude accepts the deep level analysis as inevitable
without imposing conditions to identify a structure at a
surface level.
Our position, reflected in E.A.R./3 and firmly held here, is
that there is no objective way of imposing any conditions to define
a concept of structure and, afterwards, using this concept for
explaining a particular set of architectural realities. Obviously,
the structural identity may be, in some cases, strongly implied by
conditions applied to the environmental image of these realities
(e.g. a neighbourhood as a structure), in other cases, to the
institutional image (e.g. a hospital or a university as a structure)
g
and, in other cases, to a complex image (e.g. a town as a structure ).
Before we introduce and discuss the concept of 'descriptive
4. ':social structure ' even considered, in its broader sense may well
depend upon higher structures, for instance like those of rroles '
and 'character structure '. For an explanation of this dependence,
see Gerth and Mills (1957).
5. Compare with the concept of 'space syntax' developed by Hillier
et al. (1976).
6. Seej for instance, Lagopoulos ' (1972) definition of 'town' as a
senriological structure.
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dimension", it seems that it is necessary to elaborate further on the
distinction between description and descriptive theories we put
forward in E.A.R./3 (p.39); that is:
"Descriptors are the components of descriptive theories. In
other words, they constitute the basis according to which a
description may be implemented. A descriptive theory may
consist of either one predominant descriptor which is being
considered as the most important one, or a set of descriptors
which supplement each other in a structural way within the
framework of a descriptive theory. Comprehensiveness, there¬
fore, emerges as one basic property of descriptive theories.
However, comprehensiveness is not a property that a descriptive
theory may technically acquire only by combining descriptors
in isolation from both its historical origin and its
structural context."
Moreover, we took the view that:
"... 'description' is used in its broader sense of "explanation".
Within this context, description automatically implies both a
'behind' as well as a 'beyond* in terms of its historical
evolution and its practical applications".
Popper illustrates, in his own philosophical context, the major
assumption in our thesis above. That is, comprehensiveness - in
Popper's terms 'understanding' - is unavoidably related to 'problem-
solving' when complex structures like those of his 'objective third
world' are concerned (Popper, 1972, p.168). He emphasizes the
importance of description, considered in its broader sense of
explanation, as being the aim of science and, furthermore, he argues
that actions and, therefore, history can only be explained as
problem-solving (Popper, 1972, p.191).
However, in this study we further consider explanation to be
closely related to the structure of descriptors and especially to the
transformation 'within' and 'between' the different descriptive
images generated by complex multidisciplinary structures. But,
before we proceed to an extensive discussion concerned with the
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above argument, it is important to consider first what the general
implications of the concept of descriptive theory in social sciences
might be.
'Descriptive theory 1 is an achievable, if not common, reality
in social sciences. That is, because, as Althusser (1972) emphasizes,
descriptive theory is the 1 irreversible'1 beginning and 'transitional'
phase of a theory. This becomes obvious considering that in social
sciences the dependence of theory on practice is very strong. Both
Harvey (1973) and Althusser (1971) have emphasized the dependence of
theory on practice speaking about 'theory as practice' and 'theory
as specific form of practice' respectively. It becomes, therefore,
obvious that, since architectural structures are products of a specific
form of social practice, the dependence of descriptive theories
concerned with these structures on this practice is imperative.
Now, it is important to examine the relationships between three
chains, all of which might be considered as containing distinguish¬
able images of a structure with an environmental representation. In
E.A.R./3, we spoke about two chains, the 'deepness' and the 'complexity'
chain. Schematically, these are represented by the following
diagram:
Deepness
T=(T1,T2 ) T = (T,, T2,
The structural dimensions of descriptors,
after the E.A.R./3 article, p.54.
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The syntactic character of the complexity chain is, obviously,
strong. Complexity chains are to be identified in the decision¬
making process but all of them are developed within the framework of
a given substance. For example, a university complex is derived from
accumulating elementary activity patterns. The transformational
rules of a complexity chain deal with the transformations from the
elementary to the more complex, although in the decision-making
process it is sometimes clear that 'elementary' might well mean a
basic pattern for the whole master plan.
The deepness chain is a semantic chain connecting deeper levels
of the structure with surface ones by means of transformational
rules. In the E.A.R./3 analysis, conducted within strict disciplinary






SURFACE STRUCTURE Building compartmentalization +
+ activities' organization, etc.
DEEP STRUCTURE Basic organization of building
(enclosure + access, etc.)
UNDERLYING STRINGS
(RULES OF THE BASE)
Building physics, etc. +
+ balance, etc.
CHOSEN ELEMENTS Materials, etc.
However, in the case of structures whose origin might be found
at more than one disciplinary area, it is possible to identify, even
at the deeper level, other descriptive tools (e.g. organization of
activities ,etc). Especially, in structures the origin of which is
mainly institutional - like universities - the analysis of the deepness
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where to where, etc.
*See note 7
The chains produced by the involvement of 'descriptive dimension'
in the diagram above are different in terms of the substance of the
available information, but this difference is minimized at the deeper
levels where the cohesion of descriptors i.s maximized. Semantic
levels, therefore, are established and explained in reference to both
the deepness and the descriptive dimension. In summary, descriptive
chains necessarily supplement both complexity and deepness chains
when descriptive theories about multidisciplinary structures are
concerned.
In social sciences and particularly in architecture, the involve¬
ment of the semantic dimension in descriptive theories attributes to
them their subjective character. It would have been quite ambiguous
to claim that a descriptive theory which has an historical origin, a
problem-solving capacity and aims at ideologically influenced purposes
of the practice which it follows, might be considered under any
7. The arrows on the diagram illustrate the different degrees of
cohesion between the representations of the structure. The
deeper levels are much easier to relate than the surface ones.
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criteria as 'objective'. What might be objective is exactly this
realization about the subjective character of descriptive theories.
Accordingly, it is quite natural to expect that the logical tools -
in our case the structural analysis - which are used to analyse and
even to construct such descriptive theories have to be objectified.
Instead of speaking about the 'subjectivity-objectivity'
bipolar, it might be more productive to raise the question of the
degree of abstraction of a descriptive theory and its subject.
The 'dynamic coexistence', reflected in what we called in E.A.R./3
'optimum level of abstraction1 between the abstract logical tools
and the historically and ideologically originated problems,
constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the kind of descriptive






























Adapted from E.A.R./3, p.74
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Both Piaget's 'reflective abstraction' and Harvey's 'operational
structuralism' based on Marxism - which have been used as models in
E.A.R./3, contain similar conceptual pairs. While 'reflective
abstraction' and 'praxis' are abstract and achronic, the descriptive
theories they generate are ideologically manipulable in terms of
practice and historically emerged in terms of description. Accordingly,
the concept of 'syntagmatic syntax' reflects also the same
coexistence. As mentioned in the E.A.R./3 article (p.62):
"... the syntagmatic approach to a structure includes the
social evaluation of even the elementary deep structures."
The concepts of 'structure', 'elementary' and 'deep'ref1ect the
abstract character of the linguistic model and the concept 'social
evaluation' (equivalent to 'meaning') reflects the historical and
ideological origin of description.
Having examined the type of descriptive theories with which we
are involved in studying multidisciplinary structures, it now
becomes significant to study the question of how such structures are
to be identified by these descriptive theories. Theoretically, the
'identity of a structure ' is reflected in a kind of structure of the
different descriptors involved in a descriptive theory. It is easy
to imagine that this structure of descriptors is transformed on both
an historical and a geographical basis. It is also, easy to imagine
that such transformations correspond to the changes of what in
E.A.R./3 has been called the system of social evaluation' of a
structure or the 'pragmatic meaning' of it.
However, 'structure of descriptors' may well represent what in
E.A.R./3 has been called the 'social evaluation' of a structural
349
subject. What is implied here is that such an evaluation is 'internal 1
in the investigation of a subject and, consequently, present in the
articulation of the logical tools of a theory and especially in its
descriptive dimension. Thus, we may argue that, when the structure
of descriptors is broad enough to reflect the system of social
evaluation which is in operation at a certain historical moment and
comprehensive enough to explain adequately the transformations
among the different descriptive images of the structure, then and
only then does such a set of descriptors constitute a descriptive
theory. This 1 structural role' of social evaluation is greatly
manifested in the construction of predominancies among the different
descriptive images present in the descriptive dimension. In this
way, the institutional, activity or environmental image - which,
among other alternatives, constitute the descriptive dimension in
this study - may become predominant within an explanatory framework
which a descriptive theory acquires, depending on the particular
system of social evaluation by which the different descriptors of
the theory have been structured.
In summary, the identity of the structure of a descriptive
theory defines a structural approach in which social evaluation
becomes the basic tool for the development of the descriptive theory.
What is implied by this is that the transformations from one
descriptive image to another cannot be considered in isolation, but
only within a system of social evaluation. The whole series of
transformations, within a given period, represents the system of
social evaluation as applied to the structure at that time.
To understand the structure of descriptors we have to. under¬
stand possible transformations from one image to another, other than
350
the systemic ones introduced by the 'hierarchies 1 of modern practice.
In the E.A.R./3 article's analysis, transformational rules took the
form of a commutative square - that is, they, being opposite to each
other, supplement each other from the deep-elementary to the surface-
complex level. Such rules were transferred into different descrip¬
tors (microclimatic, network, etc.), but their abstract basis was
common (continuity-max, discontinuity-max, channel barrier, etc)
(E.A.R./3, p.54). Apparently, at higher levels, the systemic logic
between descriptors appeared inevitable. But, even within this
framework, it is possible at least to identify the causes of the
transformations of a structural subject, in terms of the contra¬
dictions or 'anomalies' between the different images. The following
discussion on the dynamics of environmental structures makes it
obvious that design and planning action partly originate by the
realisation of the non-correspondence between the images of a
structure at different descriptive levels (e.g. environmental, activity
or institutional level) and partly by the contradictions appearing
within the image of a structure at a single descriptive level.
2. Notes on the terminology concerned with the dynamics of
environmental structures"
A basic assumption in the theory which is based upon the philo¬
sophical dimension of Marxism and is known as 'materialist dialectics'
is that the fundamental cause of the development of a structure lies
in the contradictions within the structure itself, under a set of
given conditions. Mao (1975, pp.313-6) has expressed this central
point in his familiar epigrammatic way writing that:
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"Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of
its development, while its interrelations and interactions with
other things are secondary causes...contradiction has a twofold
meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of
development of all things, and the other is that in the process
of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists
from beginning to end."
The general discussion about 'contradictions' could be very
interesting, especially when it is concerned with the different
interpretations and analyses of this concept. We do not intend to
enter into a detailed discussion about the general epistemology of
contradictions which is, undoubtedly, a very broad one; instead, we
shall present certain illustrative views which offer a preliminary
basis that we found useful in the conceptualization of the notion of
contradiction and its extension to the study of the dynamics of
environmental structures in this paper.
One basic point of such analyses, is the differentiations made
between principal and secondary contradictions. Mao's attitude on
this might be concluded from the following extract:
"The fundamental contradiction in the process of development
of a thing and the essence of the process determined by this
fundamental contradict-ion will not disappear until the
process is completed; but in a lengthy process the conditions
usually differ at each stage. The reason is that, although
the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process of
development of a thing and the essence of the process remain
unchanged, the fundamental contradiction becomes more and more
intensified as it passes from one stage to another in the
lengthy process. In addition, among the numerous major and
minor contradictions which are determined or influenced by
the fundamental contradiction, some become intensified, some
are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some
new ones emerge; hence the process is marked by stages."
(Mao, 1975, p.325; our emphasis).
In reference to Mao's work Althusser (1971) defines contradic¬
tions in terms of principal and secondary ones. For the first, he
prefers the term 'general contradictions' and defines it as (p.99):
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"... the contradiction between the forces of production and
the relations of production, essentially embodied in the
contradiction between two antagonistic classes..."
He also writes that this 'general contradiction1 cannot of its
own explain either a ' revolutionary situation1 or the 1 rupture and
triumph of the revolution'. He specifies that, in addition to this
general contradiction, there must be an accumulation of what we
might understand as 'secondary contradictions', which are not
necessarily solely derived from the same base as the general contra¬
diction though they might be affected by it. He says (p.100):
"... They derive from the relations of production, which are,
of course, one of the terms of the contradiction, but at the
same time its conditions of existence; from the superstructures,
instances which derive from it, but have their own consistency
and effectivity, from the international conjuncture itself,
which intervenes as a determination with a specific role to
play."(His emphasis)
As opposed, to a certain degree, to Althusser's approach,
Foucault classifies contradictions in terms of the history of ideas
and discourse, distinguishing between contradictions of appearance
(of discourse), and contradictions of foundation, which give rise
to discourse itself. In this context, it is interesting to look at
one quite long passage from his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). He
writes (pp.150-1):
"... the fundamental contradiction emerges: the bringing into
play, at the very origin of the system, of incompatible
postulates, intersections of irreconcilable influences, the
first diffraction of desire, the economic and political
conflict that opposes a society to itself, all this, instead
of appearing as so many superficial elements that must be
reduced, is finally revealed as an organizing principle, as
the founding, secret law that accounts for all minor contra¬
dictions and gives them a firm foundation: in short, a model
for all the other oppositions. Such a contradiction, far from
being an appearance or accident of discourse, far from being
that from which it must be freed if its truth is at least to
be revealed, constitutes the very law of existence: it is on
the basis of such a contradiction that discourse emerges, and
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it is in order both to translate it and to overcome it that
discourse begins to speak; it is in order to escape that
contradiction, whereas contradiction is ceaselessly reborn
through discourse, that discourse endlessly pursues itself
and endlessly begins again; it is because contradiction is
always anterior to the discourse, and because it can never
therefore entirely escape it, that discourse changes, under¬
goes transformation, and escapes of itself from its own
continuity. Contradiction, then, functions throughout dis¬
course as the principle of its historicity.
This history of ideas recognizes, therefore, two levels of
contradiction: that of appearance, which is resolved in the
profound unity of discourse; and that of foundationswhich
gives rise to discourse itself. In relation to the first
level of contradictions, discourse is the ideal figure that must
be separated from their accidental presence, from their too
visible body; in relation to the second, discourse is the
empirical figure that contradictions may take up and whose
apparent cohesion must be destroyed, in order to rediscover
them at last in their irruption and violence. Discourse is
the path from one contradiction to another: if it gives rise
to those that can be seen, it is because it obeys that which
it hides. To analyse discourse is to hide and reveal contra¬
dictions; it is to show the play that they set up within it;
it is to manifest how it can express them, embody them, or
give them a temporary appearance." (Our emphases)
However, contradictions as such do not, by all means, constitute
a comprehensive concept totally sufficient for interpreting the
transformations of structures, particularly of those whose images may
be identified at different descriptive levels. The mechanisms of
transformations are very complex, to such a degree that they allow
only the connection between ' contradiction'1 and ' potential for
transformation'1 to be made. Contradictions are quite understandably
causes for change of a structure, but the path from the cause to
the real nature of change is very long and quite complicated. Never¬
theless, what seems to be possible is to identify, in an empirical
and predominantly a posteriori way, the core of contradiction within
the transformation and to distinguish between the significance and
the eventual marginal role of it for the transformation itself.
It is our thesis here that a descriptive theory in which there
are various descriptive levels - such as the 'environmental',
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'activity' and the ' institutional ' ones - articulates respectively
the kind of contradictions which are eventually identified as to
be connected with the transformations of the structure as a whole.
Apparently, contradictions between the different images of the
structure at those descriptive levels are by no means impossible. On
the contrary, experience has repeatedly proven that such contra¬
dictions constitute fundamental causes for 'design action'. It is
logical, however, to expect that such 'inter-level' contradictions
(for example, an environment which is not corresponding to a changing
activity image or an institutional framework which is far beyond an
environmental image or much behind an activity one) do express the
existence of more general contradictions which are more intelligible
at higher descriptive levels. It is dangerous, nevertheless, to
exaggerate the capabilities of design action. Since design action is
a specific kind of social practice, it is limited not only by its
institutionalization within a given mode of production, but also by
the very immediate nature of the phenomena it is dealing with. When
it aims at resolving the inter-level contradictions, that is, contra¬
dictions between images of a structure, design action has, as a
rule, a limited potential for transforming the structures as wholes
and for resolving leading contradictions - even if the expression
of those inter-level contradictions is sufficiently clear.
In particular, when we consider structures in terms of their
environmental image, it is possible to distinguish a specific
category of contradictions caused by the differentiation of substance
between the descriptive levels. We prefer to call this category of
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contradictions ''normal anomalies' , the most common kind of which
are those between the stable environmental and the changing activity
image of a structure. Normal anomalies of this kind, on the one
hand, and conservative design, on the other, are perhaps the most
typical bipolar in architectural design action.
Normal anomalies appear between the different images of a built
environment structure produced by different descriptors irrespective
of the level of complexity and deepness at which the structure is
looked at. The objectivity of the theory, that is, of the
descriptors chosen, is reflected on the ability of these 'anomalies'
to represent real causes for transformation of the structure. Normal
anomalies also represent, by the degree of their realization and
resolution, the system of social evaluation of the structure at a
specific historical moment.
In this sense, anomalies between the different images of a
structure can function as potential for transformation of the
structure as a whole. Thus, the supposed transformational rules be¬
tween the different images of a structure are eventually character¬
ized by such anomalies.
Is there any way to understand these transformations in terms of
g
the syntagmatic syntax and its commutative square? By definition
such a syntax would incorporate characteristics of an historical
moment such as the acceptance of a given set of descriptors, the
8. Kuhn's (1970) epistemology is a clear example of the use of the
notion of 'anomaly ' as the fundamental lam on which scientific
knowledge is developed. Kuhn's theory, in short, is that scien¬
tific paradigms (within the framework of which ''normal science '
is taking place), being historically originated human products,
are transformed through the potential which is included in them
in the form of 'anomalies ',as he calls them. Anomalies are the
contradictions between what a paradigm should imply for the in¬
vestigation of a structure and what the investigator observes.
9. For an explanation of the notion of commutative square and its
particular use in this work, see E.A.R./3 and also pp. 368-76.
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realization of 'anomalies' among the different images of a structure
and an 'hierarchy' according to which such anomalies are practically
manipulated.
It is possible, however, to imagine from the first moment that
the contradictions which are involved as transformational potential
in such a syntax have a clear dual identity. They are either what
we call 'leading' contradictions which are to be found in different
forms, within each descriptive image of a. structure or diachronic
contradictions caused by the lack of correspondence between the
different images, that is, 'normal anomalies'. Accordingly, the
advantages of such an analysis would be that the systems of social
evaluation are included in the expressional tools of the syntax and
are not external to it as they were in E.A.R./3. In this way, there¬
fore, social evaluation becomes quite naturally a dialect of under¬
standing the multidisciplinary defined structure and not a language
for a particular discipline like architecture.
Leading contradictions, as opposed to normal anomalies, are more
general and less circumstantial. The adjective 'leading' means
simply that they are present and recognizable (in different forms,
perhaps) at more than one image of a built environmental structure.
The character of leading contradictions depends on the individual
attitude of the architect or planner, on his general position against
the particular structure under investigation and on the particular
system of social evaluation employed in the investigation of this
structure. In terms of syntagmatic considerations of a complex
structure, leading contradictions are determined through predominancies
structured within a broader system of social evaluation. These pre¬
dominancies - especially because of the immediacy of architectural
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actions required - are able to ascribe an institutional, activity
or environmental character to leading contradiction or to hierarchize
leading contradictions of different character according to both the
assumptions and objectives of the study and the assumed role of the
architect or planner.
CHARACTERISTICS OF NORMAL ANOMALIES AND LEAOING
CONTRADICTIONS AND THEIR EVALUATION IN TERMS OF DESIGN ACTION
NORMAL ANOMALIES LEADING CONTRADICTIONS
a. Diachronic contradictions caused by
differentiation of substance and,
consequently, lack of correspondence
between different descriptive levels
of a structure.
Present and recognizable in different forms
within each descriptive image of a structure.
More general and less circumstantial than
normal anomalies
b. More objectified, since the objecti¬
vity of the descriptive theory is
reflected in the ability of N.A. to
represent real causes for transform¬
ation of a structure.
More subjective and ideologically influenced
since they depend heavily on the individual
attitude and the general position of the
architect or planner against the structure
he investigates.
c. High potential for transformation
of a structure in terms of design
action because normal anomalies,
due to their nature, always suggest
to a certain degree the spatial




Limited potential for transformation in
terms of design action due to their
ambiguity in suggesting ways for their
resolution. This ambiguity stems, mainly,
from their representation in very general¬
ized form and only within one descriptive
image of a structure.
d. Related to the system of social
evaluation involved in the investi¬
gation of the structure, in terms of
the ability of this system to construct
predominant descriptive images of
this structure.
Related to the system of social evalu¬
ation involved in the investigation of the
structure, in terms of the ability of this
system to construct predominancies of
descriptors within each descriptive image
of this structure.
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From the arguments previously given and summarized in the
table above the structural role of social evaluation can be seen in
terms of:
(a) Identifying the structure and hierarchy of normal anomalies
and leading contradictions, thus defining transformation both
in terms of its nature and its context within a structured
whole.
(b) Arranging the logical tools of the descriptive theory and, in
particular, the descriptive dimension of the structured whole
by influencing the theoretical conception of the problem and
indicating particular design action, thus operating within a
given mode of 'theoretical practice'.
Therefore, the resolution of contradictions - either in the
form of design action of a conservative character, or as a revolu¬
tionary process, especially concerning the leading contradiction -
takes place within an historically determined system of social
evaluation which itself is contradictory and characterized by such
leading contradictions.
According to a fundamental assumption of this study -
especially discussed in E.A.R./3^ - description as a whole reflects
this system of social evaluation and, therefore, the contradictions
within the context of its subjectivity. Although it is an
exaggeration to claim that this subjectivity can continuously change
the nature of the logical tools that a descriptive theory uses, on
the other hand, it is necessary to admit that these tools express
different concepts at different times. They should, in our case,
10. See E.A.R./33 pp.74-5.
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without losing their abstract and generalized character, be
articulated in order to include a 'contradictional ' interpretation
of the transformations of structures which are of specific interest
for the study of the built environment. It seems, therefore, that
there is room here for an interesting task for the theorist: that
is, to check his tools and the concepts which are involved in any
dynamic consideration of environmental structures from this parti¬
cular point of view.
In the discussion that follows we have tried to illustrate
some terminological aspects concerned with the present contradic¬
tional interpretation of the dynamics of environmental structures
through examples taken from each author's work and from other current
architectural theories.
Some of the most predominant and architecturally significant
contradictions inherent in certain ecoclimatic descriptors, like
'comfort', can only be identified if we consider carefully the
different descriptive images generated by ecoclimate^.
Comfort is usually considered as an environmental descriptor-
However, at a deeper level of analysis, comfort description can be
seen as deriving from a broader institutional framework within which
the general human control upon nature is organized through technology
and social organization which, eventually, in a wider context,
11. 'Ecoclimatic ' phenomena as opposed to 'microclimatic ' ones are
considered here to he those concerned with the semantics of the
physical fields of climate and microclimate, that is, with the
human perception, understanding and evaluation of the climatic
conditions of the huilt-environment. In such context,
therefore, the ecoclimatic phenomena cannot be defined by their
microclimatic characteristics alone or describable in a purely
climatological or meteorological language, but only within a
much broader conceptual framework where the processes of producing
the architectural environment together with the semantic dimen¬




facilitates the intellectual and economic dominance of man by man
Banham (1969) among others, has successfully emphasized the insti¬
tutional image of environmental descriptors arguing that:
"A large part of that ease and leisure comes from the deploy¬
ment of technical resources and social organizations, in order
to control the immediate environment: to produce dryness in
rainstorms, heat in winter, chill in summer, to enjoy acoustic
and visual privacy, to have convenient surfaces on which to
arrange one's belongings and sociable activities."
(Banham, 1969, p.18)
Man's struggle to free himself from constraints imposed by the
environment in favour of needs and activities extended beyond human
survival has always manifested itself at an institutional level in
which control over the environmental forces, such as climate, is
controlled, by profit through particular socio-economic and political
structures. For instance, the unjustified isolation and description
of comfort merely on environmental grounds facilitates, in the best
13
possible way, the use of comfort as a commodity .
Within the institutional image of comfort leading contradictions
of the following type are easily recognizable. On the one hand,
there is the general demand to naturalize the environment through
particular means of production, planning and social organization in
order to achieve equal standards of comfort and amenity, and on the
other, the means of achieving comfort are totally dependent on a
growing technological and industrial society in order to maximize
capital profit. However, as far as design action is concerned, it
could be rather philosphical and, in any case, impractical to claim
that the perceptual organization and functioning of the built
12. This view corresponds to the analysis which has been given by
H. Marcuse and J. Habermas. See Habermas (1971); particularly
Chapter 63 "Technology and Science as Ideology"pp. 81-122.
13. See E.A.R./33 p.40.
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environment is generated by such leading contradictions of deep
political character which dominate the institutional image of eco-
climatic descriptors. In fact, design action is generated only when
inter-level contradictions between the different images of
ecoclimatic descriptors (that is normal anomalies) and especially
those between 'environmental-institutional 1 and ' environmental-
activity' images are manifested within the environmental structure.
It is easy, for instance, to imagine that normal anomalies between
the environmentally defined comfort problem-situations and the
economic functioning of comfort commodities account for a large
part of the present deterioration of the urban environment, as far
as its ecoclimatic characteristics are concerned (e.g. increasing
environmental pollution, energy crisis, class differentiation in
comfort amenities, artificially created technological inadequacy
for utilising cheap natural energy and so on, etc) and, therefore,
these anomalies create particular causes and implement certain
strategies for design action.
Normal anomalies of the ' environmental-institutional 1 type can
be recognized, for instance, in the commonly accepted requirement
to maintain the present comfort standards by means of conserving
energy resources on the one hand, and on the other, to increase
control over comfort operating without consideration of limited
energy resources since this control is primarily controlled by
profit. Also, this is reflected in the contradictions inherent in
the process of achieving comfort through an integrated consideration
of the climatic forces which requires the ability to act on an
environmentally defined spatial 'totality' on the one hand, and,
on the other, the institutional demand for a disintegrated private
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space which prevents spatially integrated measures to be taken for
achieving comfort or introducing solutions to other ecoclimatic
problems.
Finally, normal anomalies of the 'environmental-activity ' type,
like, for instance, those appearing between the definition of a
uniform comfort-zone without reference to the multi-usable character
of space or to the cultural character of ecoclimate, and the function¬
ing of activities with different climatic requirements organized
within a uniformly considered ecoclimatic space are, also, very
significant from a design action point of view.
Similarly, we can see how the use of the 'grid' in layout
design operates as a generator of contradictions. The main conven¬
tional communicative tools of design - the plan, section, elevation,
etc - are basically provided by the Euclidean conception of space,
where the shortest distance between any two points is the straight
1 ine.
However, due to restrictions imposed by the use of grid layouts
and the insertion of barriers along the grid lines, for purposes of
construction economy, building users are obliged to use building
14
space in its 'hodological 1 nature (space of possible movement) . In
this sense, any movement route taken from one place to another is far
from being of a direct straight line nature. In most cases, however,
it will be in a series of perhaps broken lines; the decision, which
lines to follow along the circulation route, is not necessarily
always the optimal one. In fact, there is no way to guarantee this
14. For a discussion concerned with the definition of the concept
of ' hodological space', refer to Norberg-Schulz (1971, p. 22).
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will ever be possible because the 'preferred route' is dependent on
a much broader system of evaluation than the one provided by distance





This leads us to doubt the- starting premise and ultimate
objective of the majority of the present generation of analytic
layout design methods. The starting premise of these methods is man's
presumed greatest need (based on the 'principle of least effort')
for the minimization of travelled distances in a metric sense. The
grid was adopted as a convenient start. Grid geometry, based on
Euclidean geometry, asks for shortest distances to be in direct
straight lines. But, as we have just argued above, it is impossible
in a situation which is affected by many restrictions imposed by grid
barriers to travel in direct straight lines. Hence, and at the very
base of its formulation, the route optimization problem in building
layout (or in planning, generally) faces an obvious logical difficulty
which it has only been able to surmount, partially, through a series
of simplistic assumptions. These simplistic assumptions eventually
forced many theorists into elaborate ways of problem formulations,
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only to find them insoluble even by using the fastest computer.
A major justification for the development of these methods is
that organizations and, hence, buildings are becoming more and more
complex, yet the solutions offered are of the most simplistic kind
and firmly held in a deterministic world that overlooks change
(i.e. transformation) which is the most influential single factor
that continuously gives rise to the new complexities, rightly, so
observed.
Moreover, this entire approach is based on the assumption that
the structure and function of spatial organization is not a matter
of how spaces happen to be used in practice, but on how fixed
activities are assigned to them and on how trips are travelled and
generated between them. This is very consistent with the fact that
many of the proponents of this approach took a logician's view of
space. They viewed space in isolation from the dynamic circumstances
in which it happens to be used. They have accorded 'trip
association' a position of great importance in their layout design
theories and saw it as a universal category which has been ascribed
a universal truth status of fixed meaning and valued wage costs.
But, returning to our earlier analysis, we can see that a trip is
not a universal category. It is a concept which takes on a specific
meaning only in specific social situations. In search of any such
meaning, we have to acknowledge the many contradictions (i.e. lack of
isomorphisms) which are continuously manifested in the dialectic
between a continuously dynamic and changing social process (activities
and uses, etc) that gives rise to social space, and the static
geometry of physical form that gives rise to physical space. In the
terminology developed earlier in this paper, it is easy to imagine
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that such contradictions generated by a grid based and trip associa¬
tion design action are, obviously, normal anomalies which do emerge
due to the lack of correspondence between the spatial, the
activity and the institutional image of a structure.
At a more general level, both Harvey's and Lefebvre's theories
on the city and urbanism are concerned with acomprehensive explanation
of those contradictions which are generated between a rational
organization of society and everyday reality. According to Lefebvre:
"The city, likewise philosophy, historically covered the
contradictions between the rational organization of society and
the everyday 'reality'. But modern planning practice projected
into reality a fragmented rationality that distorted the social
practice of the urban dwellers."15
This leading contradiction between "rationalization' of society
and everyday reality generates a number of secondary contradictions
specially concerned with the nature of urban space and its pro¬
duction. Such secondary contradictions are summarized by Lefebvre
(1976) in the conclusive chapter of his La Pensee Marxiste et la Ville.
Firstly, Lefebvre emphasizes the contradiction between the socially
produced total space and the private ownership of space which accounts
for its compartmentalization. In this way, he argues, space becomes
not only naturally compartmentalized in order to become a commodity,
but also conceptually decomposed to fit the scopes of different
15. According to Tchumi (1972, p.581).
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disciplines . Secondly, he emphasizes the contradictions between
the urbanization of society and, therefore, the absorption of rural
areas into the city, and the demand for ruralization of the city,
for instance, suburbia, satellite settlements, etc^. Thirdly,
Lefebvre stresses the contradiction between the increasing control over
nature connected with the growing forces of production and the
technological advances, and the demand for naturalization of the city
1 g
by the elimination of the high degree of its artificiality .
The importance of hierarchizing leading contradictions and
normal anomalies through a careful consideration of the way in which
a system of social evaluation constructs predominancies within a
descriptive framework, either in terms of the significance of
different descriptive images or the predominancy of one descriptor
over the others, can be illustrated in the following example.
Peter Cook (1970) discussi-ng the possibility that architecture
will dissolve into being an everyday consumer-durable, a movement
which he terms as 'gadgetecture ', argues (p.128) that:
"The advent of do-it-yourself is more than just a marketing
gimmick: it is bringing back to the ■individual at least the
"symbols" of involvement. Perhaps one way through from the
design point of view is to look at the problem of do-it-
yourself elements as the straight marketing of a building.
Consumer choice then ceases to be a bland catch-phrase and
the production of consumer-durables may set up a serious
history of development." (Our emphases)
16. It is interesting to note here the contradictions between the
compartmentalization of space and our attempt of conceptual
integration in describing space as a totality in terms of the
structure of descriptors, the comprehensiveness of the logical
tools employed and the structural role of social evaluation.
17. These, obviously, represent normal anomalies at higher levels
of planning practice.
18. This type of contradiction has been further exemplified by the
discussion on 'comfort ' given in pp. -35,9-62 of this article.
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Looking at the above statement we are supposed to believe in
several possible advantages of a 'do-it-yourself gadgetecture 1 as
advocated by Cook. These are mainly: (a) the advantage of containing
"symbols" of individual involvement, and (b) the advantage of freeing
consumer choice from being a 'bland catch-phrase1.
However, in our view, it is quite easy for anyone to discover
that behind this surface level of observable reality the so claimed
above advantages immediately disappear and, in fact, are replaced
by 'less individual involvement1, 'more consumption control over the
19
habitat' and of course 'less consumer choice' . The distinction
between leading contradictions and secondary set of contradictions
can be used effectively to explain the reasons behind that. However,
it might be more productive here to refer to a successfully formulated
argument against a consumer-based architecture (gadgetecture) raised
by Jencks.- Jencks (1973, pp.359-60) argues:
"If it had long been an assumption of capitalism that supply
followed demand, then by the sixties it had become equally
clear that demand, follows supply3 when this supply is
dependent on advanced technology. John Kenneth Galbraith
outlined and popularized the qualities which attend any
advanced industrial state. First of all, as he pointed out,
there is a tendency for wealth and power to accumulate in
the hands of a few large corporations: the five hundred
largest in the United States produce almost half of all the
goods and services of the entire society. Secondly, to
ensure their own survival and security, there is a necessity
for them to keep pace with a changing technology which is
all the time becoming more complex and sophisticated. In
order to do this, they must call in expert opinion, which in
turn effectively means that the knowledge of any one group
or individual is not enough for a decision to be made upon.
This decentralizes decisions." (Our emphasis)
19. See Papaneck's (19743 p. 54) critic-ism of this type of advocacy
for a gadgetecture in his book Design for the Real World,
especially Chapter 4 which is characteristically titled
"Do-It-Iourself Murder". This criticism is based on the
grounds of social and moral responsibility of the designer.
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Jencks carries on to cite the 'Ford Mustang* example given by
Galbraith as a paradigmatic proof of his above argument, and then
(p.359) he comments:
"With so much at stake in terms of time, money and experts,
the Mustang had to work, the public had to be conditioned
to accept it, or simply, it had to sell. This it did in
fact beyond all expectations."
20
Further, he continues to stress that the 'Open Society' , in which
a free consumer-based architecture is supposed to operate, is in fact
a partially closed one.
"Thus we have an inversion of both the capitalist ethic and
the morality which underlies almost all designers and
architects. For the Open Society or consumer pluralism which
they purport to serve in fact turns out to be a partially
Closed Society which limits the amount and sensitivity of
choice. One kind of freedom is being exchanged for another;
the freedom to buy an article tailor-made to one's needs is
being exchanged for the freedom to select from a limited
number of technically sophisticated and conformist products.
Or put in the terms of urbanism, the right of interest-
communities to determine their specific needs and livelihood
is being limited by the affluent majority."
(Jencks, 1973, p.360).
Finally, we may conclude the discussion in this paper through an
example which illustrates how contradictions, either as normal
anomalies or as leading contradictions, are involved both in the
elementary architectural structures and in their transformational
potential into higher order ones.
The notion of the simplest architectural structure has been given
by Hi Her and Leaman (1974b) in the form of a commutative square:













whereJ is a wall = is a perforation e an enclosed space Sa defined space and^the structure
sign. ;
ARCHITECTURE: SIMPLEST STRUCTURE
However, such a purely Chomskian iinterpretation of architectural
structures, as mapping structures which permit a syntactic explanation
of architecture, as the discussion in the E.A.R./3 article has
21
proved , would be in the real danger of explaining intelligible and
socially evaluated things in a rather unnecessarily abstract and
complicated way, if the syntagmatic identity of architectural
21. See E.A.R./3, pp.44-55.
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structures is not seriously taken into account. In our use of the
commutative square as representing elementary architectural struc¬
tures, in the E.A.R./3 argument, the involvement of syntagmatic















































After the E.A.R./3 article, p.54.
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'Continuity' and 'discontinuity' first refer to barriers and
boundaries and secondly take forms like 'boundary discontinuity
through hierarchy' (in order to reach the tree-network, useful for
flow regulation) or 'boundary continuity through permeability'
(in order to reach the permeable microclimatic barrier, useful for
microclimatic regulation).
Such contradictional interpretation of even the elementary
architectural structures, in fact, attributes to them their syntag-





However,apart from using a 'contradictional logic' to




microclimate and networks, it is also possible to consider this
logic applicable to certain architectural movements, for instance,
'functional ism', in order to explain how multi-dimensional (e.g.
spatial-activity) structures acquire their transformational potential.
Thus, it may become apparent that both normal anomalies and leading
contradictions are accountable for the transformation of the
structure as a whole, but, also, that at the level of design action
contradictions are generally formed as normal anomalies, while
leading contradictions - though present all the time - specifically
contribute to the transformational potential of a structure only
within a much broader socio-economic and political framework.
A way to examine the transformational potential of a spatial-
activity structure at the level of design action is to consider
comprehensive architectural descriptors, such as design flexibility,
within a commutative square logic defined by the bipolar 'certainty'
(in terms of the space activity multivariable function) and
''uncertainty ' (in terms of the social internalization of this
function):
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max. CERTAINTY THROUGH HEURISTIC
DESIGN PROCEDURES
e.g. Introducing alternative 'space-activity'
functioning through programming (C.A.D.)
or other algorithmic procedures (Formal¬
ized Design Methods).
ENV.: certainty of terms of known building procedures
and use of the physical organization of space.
INST.: uncertainty in terms of satisfactory utilization
of these space-activity defined organizations.
complementarity achieved in Order 1.
ENV.: certainty in terms of providing multi-
functioning space-activity organizations
NST.: uncertainty in terms of users' untamiliarity
.with the new (not socially emerged) spatio-activity order
complementarity achieved in Order 2
*See Note 22
22. The examples given in the diagram above represent one way of
explaining through a oontradiotional logic the transformation
of space activity organization in buildings as it is observed
in modern architectural practice. Furthermore3 it is interesting
to notice that the chain defined by these examples (order
0 1 ■+ 2. ■?.) also represents a chronological order reflected
in the modern history of architectural movements.
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The contradictions which appear during design action, that is,
between certainty - in terms of providing, through heuristic
procedures, a repertoire of alternatives at an environmental level
for space-activity functioning - and uncertainty - in terms of the
social internalization of these alternatives at an institutional
or an activity level - are obviously normal anomalies well recog¬
nizable within the context of conventional design. The above
diagram explains how a structure acquires its transformational
potential through a repetitive process of resolution and re¬
generation of such normal anomalies. It also shows the structural
role of social evaluation in terms of identifying normal anomalies
which account for the transformational potential of a structure.
However, it is possible to identify transformations of archi¬
tectural structures by means of leading contradictions occurring,
for instance, only within the institutional image of these struc¬
tures. Consider once again the above diagram. It is obvious that
at higher levels where the structure acquires its maximum flexi¬
bility in environmental terms, the institutional image of it
presents a very low social internalization of this flexibility.
In this context leading contradictions of the following type are
easily recognizable in these structures:
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MAX. INTERNALIZED SOCIAL FLEXIBILITY OF ARCHITECTURAL






























































The hybridization of the two diagrams above presents the total
transformational potential of an architectural structure. This
explains the importance of considering both normal anomalies and
leading contradictions in describing integratedly the dynamics of
these structures.
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INDIRECT TRANSFORMATIONAL POTENTIAL OF





































A CONTRADICTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DYNAMICS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL STRUCTURES.
To conclude, in this paper we stressed the descriptive implica¬
tions that the multi-disciplinary character of architectural struc¬
tures brings to their investigation. In doing so, we extended the
limited view of the concept of environmental structure we took in
E.A.R./3 by further ascribing to it a descriptive dimension, which
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we found to be necessary if the formulation of any comprehensive
descriptive theory is to be achieved. In addition we presented the
view that a 'contradictional logic' necessitated by the involvement
of the descriptive dimension and incorporated within the methodo¬
logical framework of 'syntagmatic approach' becomes a useful dialect
for studying the identity, dynamics and transformations of archi¬
tectural structures and contributes to the descriptive theories
concerned with them.
In both this article and the E.A.R./3 one, we advanced some
theoretical arguments concerned with the problem of comprehensive
description in architecture, developed within the methodological
framework of structural ism, giving particular emphasis to the
terminology concerned. It seems to us, however, that the dis¬
cussion could have been further elaborated and developed, at
certain points, to support our arguments but at this junction, we
felt it would be more productive to concentrate on a detailed
experimental examination and evaluation of our major assumptions.
To a certain extent, this is being carried out at the level of our
individual research. Nevertheless, we hope that this task will
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